The Effect of Per Se Recusal Rules on Donor Behavior in Judicial Elections
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-31-2013
Publication Title
Justice System Journal
DOI
10.1080/0098261X.2013.10768033
ISSN
0098-261X
Abstract
Recent judicial decisions and political developments have elevated the issue of impartiality among elected judges as a topic of public and scholarly interest. Using a data set of all donations to candidates for the Supreme Court of Alabama from 1994 through 2010, we explore one potential proposal for limiting the appearance of judicial bias and its effects on the behavior of campaign donors—per se recusal. Our results indicate that the existence of a per se recusal statute significantly decreases the likelihood of observing large donations from several categories of donors. In auxiliary analysis, we find that attorney donors have increasingly funneled contributions through PACs since this statute's enactment—presumably, because such contributions are exempted from the law.
Recommended Citation
Miller, Banks, Brett W. Curry.
2013.
"The Effect of Per Se Recusal Rules on Donor Behavior in Judicial Elections."
Justice System Journal, 34 (2): 125-151: Taylor & Francis Online.
doi: 10.1080/0098261X.2013.10768033 source: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0098261X.2013.10768033
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/poli-sci-facpubs/123
