Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-25-2018
Publication Title
Journal of Law and Courts
DOI
doi.org/10.1086/696858
Abstract
In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureaucracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys.
Recommended Citation
Miller, Banks, Brett Curry.
2018.
"Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006."
Journal of Law and Courts, 6 (2): 379-403 Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press Books.
doi: doi.org/10.1086/696858 source: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/696858
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/poli-sci-facpubs/121
