College of Graduate Studies: Theses & Dissertations

Term of Award

Summer 2026

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy in Logistics and Supply Chain Management (Ph.D.)

Document Type and Release Option

Dissertation (restricted to Georgia Southern)

Copyright Statement / License for Reuse

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Department

Department of Logistics & Supply Chain Management

Committee Chair

Gulver Karamemis

Committee Member 1

Alan Mackelprang

Committee Member 2

Gerard Burke

Abstract

Signaling theory explains behavior when information asymmetry exists, in which one party possesses information that the other cannot directly observe. Although signaling theory has been widely applied in management research, one signaling element that has received comparatively limited attention is the signaling environment. This dissertation investigates how a firm’s signaling environment shapes the direction and consistency of its signals. Specifically, it contextualizes the macro-level political environment as a signaling environment and examines how changes in government structure influence corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) signaling and substantive ESG performance. Government structure is defined by the (mis)alignment of the Executive and Legislative branches, creating varying levels of signaling consistency for firms.

First, this dissertation extends the OSCM and signaling literature by showing how different government configurations shape the alignment between firms’ public ESG signaling and actual ESG operational performance. In particular, it explores friction in divided-government structures, assessing how political gridlock may increase firms’ ESG decoupling or hushing behavior. Furthermore, this dissertation sheds light on how firms with larger market shares and those with high lobbying expenditures will respond to the signaling environment.

Methodologically, this dissertation introduces a nuanced operationalization of ESG signaling by jointly analyzing the breadth (range of issues) and depth (frequency of issues) of disclosures within 10-K reports to capture distinct strategic profiles. By integrating these dimensions, this measure moves beyond surface-level disclosure intensity to capture strategic variation in how firms construct and deploy ESG signals.

Under aligned government structures, firms exhibit more coupled ESG responses. Patterns of Imperfect ESG engagement appear in Democrat trifectas, which are characterized by increases in both ESG signaling and performance, whereas Republican trifecta environments show retrenchment, with reductions in both ESG signaling and performance. Under misaligned government structures, the direction and effects of ESG signaling and ESG performance become more fragmented, indicating greater prevalence of ESG decoupling and ESG hushing. Similar to findings under aligned structures, the social dimension remains the most consistent mechanism through which signals translate to performance.

The novelty of this study lies in uncovering exactly how firms structure their responses to such environments through a distinct set of behavioral archetypes: engagement, decoupling, hushing, and retrenchment. In doing so, this work offers a framework for understanding and anticipating how firms navigate macro-level institutional friction.

Research Data and Supplementary Material

No

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