AMTP Proceedings 2026
Document Type
Conference Proceeding
Publication Date
Spring 2026
Abstract
This paper studies a price obfuscation strategy in which firms display pricing cues but conceal final prices, requiring consumers to take an additional step, such as adding a product to a cart, to observe the actual price. We develop a two-period analytical model with two competing firms that differ in their price disclosure strategies. Consumers are heterogeneous: knowledgeable consumers can infer prices from pricing cues, while ignorant consumers must incur search costs to obtain price information. Firms compete under four possible strategic scenarios depending on whether prices are revealed. The results show that when search and mismatch costs are low, both firms display prices and compete with lower prices. As search costs increase, an asymmetric equilibrium emerges in which one firm reveals prices while the other hides them. The model also shows that both firms never hide prices simultaneously, implying that full price obfuscation does not arise in equilibrium.
Recommended Citation
Malaki, Negin and Sajeesh, Sajeesh, "See Lower Price in Cart: Impact of Consumer Knowledge on Price Obfuscation Strategies" (2026). AMTP Proceedings 2026. 39.
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/amtp-proceedings_2026/39
