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PERCEPTION AND UNITED STATES NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

Katherine Ellen Fitch

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Perception and United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

by

Katherine Ellen Fitch

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty

of the College of Graduate Studies

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Perception and United States
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear weapons are classed as weapons of mass destruction because of their ability to indiscriminately inflict massive damage.[1] Despite continued attempts by the US and other countries to integrate them into conventional force structures, for the most part, they have been defined by scholars, politicians and militaries as unconventional and unusable.[2] Their only value lies in not using them. In 1996 the International Court of Justice even declared that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons" was generally unlawful except in extreme instances of self-defense.[3] No nation has employed nuclear weapons during a conflict since World War II despite numerous conflicts with nonnuclear states.[4] A type of

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[1]Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

[2]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed., rev. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 33. This statement does not reflect the view of all states, leaders or militaries as reflected in the continued drive by some states to develop nuclear weapons. See also Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 38.

[3]Mike Moore, "World Court Says Mostly No to Nuclear Weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 52, no.5 (September 1996): 39.

[4]T.V. Paul, "Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (December 1995): 697.

taboo against their use has developed because they violate both ethical considerations and the principle of proportional retaliation.[5] This principle states that a state must respond to aggression with a level of force in proportion to the original act of aggression.

Despite the fact that they have not been used in over fifty years, the spread of nuclear weapons is considered a problem by the majority of states because of the fear that proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear warfare. Nuclear proliferation can be defined as the creation or possession of a nuclear device by any state. By this definition, the creation of one nuclear device by any state, including those already possessing them, constitutes proliferation. This definition acknowledges both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of proliferation. Horizontal proliferation refers to the acquisition of nuclear technology by states not currently possessing it. Vertical proliferation refers to increases in existing arsenals. Both types of proliferation are thought to increase the chance of nuclear use.

States which have newly acquired nuclear weapons may not have the security arrangements necessary to safeguard against unintentional use, theft, or accidents.[6] These states may also be engaged in enduring conflicts which increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons may be used.[7] Studies of deterrence suggest that it may not be applicable in all

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[5]Ibid., 698; and, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 114-152.

[6]Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 75-85.

[7]Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models," *American Political Science Review* 87 (March 1993): 61-73.

situations, especially if a state is unable to create a secure second strike capability.[8] Finally, norms of nonuse which have developed among the acknowledged nuclear states may not be as salient to the identities of new nuclear nations.[9] Vertical proliferation also increases the chance that nuclear weapons will be used. The more time and resources a state has devoted to the development of a large nuclear arsenal, the more it may be forced to depend upon it and justify its development. A nuclear war between two large arsenals would probably not remain limited to one or two weapons but employ hundreds.

There is an alternative theory of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics which sees nuclear weapons as a stabilizing force.[10] The crux of this argument is that nuclear weapons have been the cause of the "long peace" among Western nations since World War II and that if every nation possessed them states would find the costs of waging war too high. The result would be global peace. Even if this theory was found to be accurate, it highlights the other problem associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. Proliferation limits the ability of states to act in the international system. For instance, if all states possessed nuclear weapons they may not engage in warfare, but they would also be prevented from engaging in many other activities such as humanitarian interventions and acting to stop ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses and environmental degradation. A world free from international warfare would not mean a world free from violence and conflict.

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[8]Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 66-68.

[9]Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," 125.

[10]Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 1-45.

The US has generally opposed the spread of nuclear weapons for both of these reasons. The most feared consequence of nuclear proliferation has been the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used by an enemy, terrorists or an irresponsible leader against the US or its allies. Yet the US also realizes that proliferation would severely limit its ability to pursue its goals and interests internationally.[11]

The US has also opposed the spread of nuclear weapons because it fears a proliferation domino effect. A strong argument exists that the USSR developed nuclear weapons in response to the US, which in turn motivated China, India, and Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons.[12] There are several reasons why states seek to develop nuclear weapons such as prestige, technological momentum, and domestic factors.[13] Yet, security concerns are the predominate reason why a state begins to develop nuclear weapons.[14] All states originally began their programs in response to perceived threats. When an enemy develops nuclear weapons, it increases the insecurity of other states and may push them to develop nuclear weapons.

Although the US's main goal in promoting nonproliferation was self-interest, there also existed the concern that these weapons presented a danger to humanity. The moral and ethical dilemmas of possessing weapons of mass destruction influenced its decision

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[11]Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *Security Studies* 4 (Spring 1995): 465.

[12]Ronald J. Bee, *Nuclear Proliferation: The Post-Cold-War Challenge*, Headline Series, no.303 (Ithaca, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1995), 14.

[13]Gary T. Gardner, *Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 80.

[14]Thayer, *The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation*, 482.

to advocate nonproliferation. This concern can be seen in such proposals as the Baruch Plan which proposed placing all nuclear materials under international controls.[15]

Theory and Practice in US Policy

In theory, the US considers all proliferation a threat to its national interests and opposes the spread of nuclear weapons to any state. Though mainly concerned with horizontal proliferation, it also advocates, in theory, the reduction of current nuclear arsenals, including its own, in the interest of promoting nonproliferation and reducing the threat of nuclear war. Yet the history of US nonproliferation policy clearly reveals a gap between theory and practice. The US has not consistently opposed proliferation among nuclear or nonnuclear states. The nuclear programs of some states have been ignored while others have incurred harsh military and economic sanctions. Technology has been denied to nonnuclear states while the nuclear powers continued to build their arsenals. These discrepancies have been a noted feature of US nonproliferation policy for the last fifty years and have led to the characterization of its policy as "ambivalent, equivocal, and selective."[16]

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[15]Peter A. Clausen, *Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers, 1993), 17. Some scholars argue that the US never intended the Baruch Plan seriously and only proposed it to ensure that the Soviet Union rejected it. See Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 181-182.

[16]Clausen, *Nonproliferation*, xii.

Due to the prominent role the US plays in global nonproliferation, some scholars find this discrimination counterproductive and believe it undermines support for nonproliferation within the international community.[17] A state which has chosen to forego nuclear weapons may rethink its position if it believes that other states are being provided with the opportunity to build nuclear weapons. Several states, most notably India, have pointed to discriminatory standards as a basis for opposition to US led nonproliferation initiatives such as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). They believe that the only way to create an international climate in which nuclear weapons are perceived as illegitimate and unproductive is to hold all states to the same standards and uniformly apply nonproliferation policies.

US policymakers, however, often consider discrimination a natural consequence of foreign policy making. While they may agree that discrimination sometimes does not promote nonproliferation, they feel that all policy must be subject to a "political rationality" in which trade-offs and compromises are necessary to balance the competing interests of the state whether they be economic, strategic, or political.[18] They believe US policy should discriminate because it serves the self-interest of the state. While both sides of this debate make valid points, the purpose of this study is not to resolve whether

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[17]Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky and George Bunn, "The Doctrine of the Nuclear-Weapon States and the Future of Non-Proliferation," *Arms Control Today* 24, no.6 (July 1994): 3-9; and, Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, "U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no.1 (January/February 1995): 14.

[18]Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 21.

or not US policy should discriminate, but instead aims to explore why the US chooses to discriminate against some states and not others.

Although bias has been present in US nonproliferation policy since the creation of the bomb, this thesis will focus upon policy since the end of the Cold War for two reasons. First, nonproliferation has become a high priority on the foreign policy agenda, especially in the Clinton administration. The issue not only receives more attention, but more resources, monetary and military, are devoted to it. Second, the biases in US policy have become more evident. Since the early 1990s the US has focused its nonproliferation efforts upon a group of states which it has termed "rogue" or "outlaw" states. No concrete definition exists for what a rogue state is nor is the list of states in this category static; however, all are defined by their ambitions to create or develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.[19] The states most often identified as rogues are Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.[20] These states have been subject not only to US sanctions and export controls, but potentially to military action to prevent and slow their nuclear programs. In contrast, other states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel have been subject to far fewer reprisals and recriminations than the advanced nature of their programs should warrant. All three are acknowledged to already possess nuclear weapons and India and Pakistan have openly tested.

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[19]Michael Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), 23.

[20]Occasionally Syria, Algeria, and Cuba are included in this category. Cuba is the only state not commonly considered to be pursuing nuclear weapons.

Social Identity Theory

Why has the US chosen to focus its nonproliferation efforts upon the so-called rogue states and exert much less pressure against de facto nuclear states? Realist explanations which focus upon the material capability of states do not explain US policy because from a material stand point India, Pakistan, and Israel are better equipped to threaten the US with nuclear weapons. Other explanations which focus upon the national interest also fail to explain US policy because they do not explain exactly what the national interest is. Without a basis for determining what the national interest is, this type of explanation becomes tautological and can be used to explain almost any US policy.

This thesis intends to apply social identity theory as an explanation for why the US applies discriminatory standards of nonproliferation among states. This theory suggests that how the US defines its interests and perceives threat is influenced by its group memberships and identity.[21] In short, states form groups based on shared identities and the need to protect and enhance this group identity leads to collectively held perceptual biases. This study will focus upon one type of misperception, attribution bias. Attribution bias says that a state will attribute the bad behavior of an enemy to the internal character of the enemy and not to external or situational factors such as security

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[21]See Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

concerns.[22] These cognitive biases can lead to overestimations of threat which may lead to discriminatory standards and excessive policy options such as military strikes.

Social identity theory downplays the influence of the international system on US foreign policy and focuses upon the domestic determinants of policy. This "second image" approach argues that the internal structure and characteristics of the state, such as identity, determine state behavior.[23] This theory provides a better explanation for US policy in several ways. It explains the imbalance between threat perception and capability in US policy. It also accounts for the US's exaggerated perception of the rogue states as the greatest current threat to international peace and security by clarifying how the US defines its national interest.

A better understanding of the cognitive biases affecting policymakers is important because perception influences judgment and judgment is integral to policy making. Misperceptions on the part of policymakers can lead to the adoption of harsh nonproliferation policies which may actually encourage proliferation and discourage policy options which deal with the underlying reasons for proliferation. The intense focus upon the rogue states may encourage them to continue their nuclear programs by giving them recognition and attention. Thus, if policy is to be improved, both academics and policymakers can benefit from "a better understanding of how their own beliefs and tacit assumptions about the international system, international politics, and other actors in the

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[22]Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 35-48.

[23]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 125.

state system influence their perception of developments, their diagnoses of situations, and their judgments."[24]

Many factors influence US nonproliferation policy and the decisions of policymakers to apply discriminatory standards. The cognitive biases generated by the social identity of a state represent only some of these factors. Throughout this study other factors which influence the process such as domestic, economic, and international issues will be discussed to help explain US policy; however, many of these factors are influenced by cognitive biases because these biases influence how the national interest is defined.

The application of psychological theory to nonproliferation policy is relatively unexplored and therefore this thesis will only begin an inquiry into the subject by establishing the existence of attribution bias. While most scholars acknowledge the existence of biases within US policy, there has been little work on why they exist beyond references to the national interest. Social identity theory has been used to explain the psychology behind the formation of the nonproliferation regime.[25] This thesis adopts the same premise that shared identities affect how decisionmakers perceive threat, but focuses more narrowly upon biases in US nonproliferation policy. This study will not detail the nuclear programs of the states included in the study beyond what is necessary to establish a background for the reader. Many books have been written on the subject with much

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[24]George, *Bridging the Gap*, 14.

[25]Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *The Journal of Politics* 57 (August 1995): 743-775.

greater detail than could be accomplished here.[26] What it will do is provide support for an alternative explanation for the biases in US nonproliferation policy and link it to the policy choices of decisionmakers.

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[26]See Leonard S. Spector, and Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Michael J. Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Alan Friedman, *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993); and, Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).

CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORY OF US NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

The application of discriminatory standards has been a feature of US nonproliferation policy since 1945. Although its policy has evolved from strict technology denial and bilateral arrangements to support for the international nonproliferation regime and universal standards, it has continued to apply its policies selectively in order to advance other goals. Discriminatory standards were usually justified by the Cold War and the need to defend US interests. Yet the history of US policy reveals patterns of bias which have continued into the policies of the 1990s despite the end of the Cold War with the USSR.

The Development of Policy: 1945-1989

The US's first attempts to prevent proliferation centered around technology denial and control. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was passed in 1946 which restricted all data and technology related to the production or use of fissile materials for both peaceful and military purposes.[1] The exception to this act was Great Britain which did receive

[1]Bee, *Nuclear Proliferation*, 15.

technological aid from the US in the early stages of its program.[2] The AEA reflected the widespread belief within the scientific and military communities that control over uranium sources, then thought to be very limited, and denial of technology were the keys to preventing proliferation.[3] In 1949 this belief was shattered when the USSR tested its first nuclear device five years earlier than expected.

During the 1950s, strict technology denial gave way to nuclear cooperation and technology control. President Eisenhower initiated the Atoms for Peace Program which pledged the US to share its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This sharing was to be facilitated through the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which would promote and monitor the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The Atoms for Peace program was the genesis for what was later to be called the "nuclear bargain."[4] The US would share its technology with other countries in return for commitments not to build nuclear weapons. These bilateral agreements allowed the US to both maintain its dominance over nuclear technology and increase its influence overseas with the many states eager to explore this new energy source. It was also during this period that the AEA was rewritten to allow industry participation in the nuclear field. This was seen as economically beneficial and by the end of the 1960s the US was supplying 90 percent of the world reactor market.[5]

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[2]Clausen, *Nonproliferation*, 16-22.

[3]Ibid., 7.

[4]Ibid., 28.

[5]Ibid., 41.

Yet the US was slowly beginning to realize the potential for nuclear proliferation inherent in the nuclear bargain. India provided the first example of a weapons program developed from peaceful technology provided by the US.[6] In 1963, India purchased two power reactors from the US. They were the first to be exported to the developing world. It was from these two reactors in Tarapur that India produced the plutonium for its weapons program and the nuclear devices which were tested in 1974 and 1998. In addition, China's first nuclear test in 1964 raised concern in Washington that nuclear weapons had moved beyond the industrialized world. That same year the US began pursuing a comprehensive international ban on the spread of nuclear weapons which culminated in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The NPT which entered into force on 5 March 1970 is the most comprehensive international nonproliferation arrangement with over 170 signatories.[7] Under Articles I and II, parties to the treaty agree not to aid any nonnuclear state in acquiring nuclear weapons and nonnuclear states pledge not to receive nuclear devices or attempt to acquire them. Under Article III, all nuclear activities in nonnuclear states are subject to IAEA inspections. The IAEA's role was expanded from facilitating nuclear sharing to include verifying that countries receiving nuclear technology for peaceful purposes were not diverting it to produce weapons. These inspections act as a confidence building measure and also provide the basis upon which sanctions may be imposed for violations. In

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[6]Ibid., 102-103.

[7]For text of the NPT and related documents see *The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, The United Nations Blue Book Series, vol.3 (New York: Dept. Of Public Information United Nations, 1995).

return, the nuclear states, which are defined as the US, Russia (formerly the USSR), Great Britain, France, and China, pledge to share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to work toward universal nuclear disarmament (Articles IV and VI.)

Although many nonnuclear states participated in the debates over the treaty, the final document reflected the concerns and preferences of the nuclear powers and the US in particular. The US gave few concessions to the nonnuclear states in return for their pledges to forego nuclear weapons. The treaty does not specify a time period for disarmament to occur and Article IV does not create a legal obligation for nuclear states to cooperate with nonnuclear states. The US also refused to extend security guarantees to the signatories which would have pledged US support had they been attacked with nuclear weapons. Additionally, the nuclear weapons states did not have to submit to IAEA inspections. Many states did, and still do, denounce the treaty as discriminatory.

The NPT and IAEA inspections form the backbone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.[8] A regime is defined as "an authoritative arrangement among international actors that facilitates the accomplishment of specific goals through a process involving coordination of expectations and modification of certain behavior patterns."[9] The

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[8]There is an extensive literature on regime theory and formation which debates the existence and utility of international regimes. For further readings on the nonproliferation regime and security regimes in general see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Joseph S. Nye, "Maintaining the Non-Proliferation Regime," *International Organization* 35 (Winter 1981): 15-38; Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41(Spring 1987): 253-281; and, Michael Brzoska, "Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment on Trevor McMorris Tate," *Journal of Peace Research* 29 (1992): 215-220.

[9]Trevor McMorris Tate, "Regime-building in the Non-Proliferation System," *Journal of Peace Research* 27(1990): 402.

nonproliferation regime consists of the NPT, suppliers groups, and regional organizations whose goal is to slow and/or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by creating transparency and confidence among states. The US helped create many of these treaties and arrangements. The domestic legislation and restrictions enacted by individual states also comprise part of the regime.

Although the regime has become an important barrier to proliferation, it suffers from several weaknesses which compromise its effectiveness and call into question its utility. First, the regime relies mainly upon technology denial and control which is becoming less effective as nuclear technology diffuses. Second, IAEA inspections are conducted with notice and only on declared facilities. Although the revelations of Iraq's program have led to the adoption of more intrusive verification methods and special inspections, issues of sovereignty still limit its inspection abilities. Third, the discriminatory aspects of the regime have prejudiced support for it. The regime reflects the interest of the nuclear states by maintaining their monopoly over nuclear weapons while providing few assurances or benefits to the nonnuclear states.

Renewed concern over proliferation arose during the mid-1970s in response to two emerging realities. First, the line between peaceful and military uses of nuclear technology was becoming more blurred as many states which had imported technology for peaceful purposes now had or were developing active nuclear programs. These states included India, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Iraq, and South Africa. In 1974, India conducted what it referred to as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Second, Europe began competing in the nuclear reactor market. The first of these developments

called into question the adequacy of US nonproliferation policies. The second raised fears of further proliferation due to unregulated European competition for reactor sales.

In response the US initiated the creation of the Zangger Committee which was to keep an up-to-date list of "trigger" materials and equipment that could be used to build weapons.[10] The goal of the committee was to raise awareness among the supplier states of the potentials for technology misuse. The London Suppliers Group, later renamed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), was also created at this time to regulate technology transfers.[11] It urged the nuclear states to restrict the export of dual-use technologies and to insist on full-scope IAEA safeguards by any country importing nuclear technology.[12] Dual-use technologies are those which have both civilian and military applications such as supercomputers.

Domestically the US chose to strengthen its export criteria. In June 1976, the Symington Amendment was passed which barred economic aid to states importing fuel enrichment technology not under full-scope IAEA safeguards.[13] In 1978, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) became law and mandated stricter export criteria, terminated US cooperation with countries pursuing a weapons program or failing to submit to inspections, and set new standards for granting consent for reprocessing nuclear

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[10]Tate, "Regime-building," 406.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Bee, *Nuclear Proliferation*, 27.

[13]Gerald C. Smith and Helena Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no.3 (Summer 1989): 58.

fuel of American origin.[14] Additionally, both Presidents Ford and Carter worked to remove the US's domestic nuclear program from dependence on plutonium which is considered more of a proliferation hazard than uranium.[15]

During the 1960s and 1970s, the US also began a dialogue with the USSR on arms control. In 1963, they initiated restrictions on their own nuclear programs by concluding the Limited Test Ban Treaty.[16] Later efforts included the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (1972), and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974).[17] Although these treaties did not prevent nuclear build-ups by both states, they did lay a foundation for later treaties such as the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which began to limit vertical proliferation and fulfill the disarmament pledge under the NPT.

The Reagan and Bush administrations did not actively pursue nonproliferation. Export controls and policies remained in effect and were enhanced by the passage of the Solarz Amendment which banned aid to countries violating US export laws to acquire nuclear weapons.[18] Yet both administrations promoted nuclear exports and stressed the need for cooperation on nuclear issues. The strategic needs of the Cold War outweighed nonproliferation concerns and nuclear cooperation with states considered to be low

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[14]Gerald M. Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy: Global Regimes and Regional Realities," *Contemporary Security Policy* 15, no.3(December 1994): 135.

[15]Clausen, *Nonproliferation*, 135.

[16]Bee, *Nuclear Proliferation*, 26.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy," 136.

proliferation risks was advocated.[19] These states were either allies or client states. States considered to be high proliferation risks were still routinely denied exports. These states were usually either hostile toward or unneeded by the US. The country-by-country approach taken under Presidents Reagan and Bush was a continuation of the tendency to selectively apply nonproliferation policies to serve the national interest.[20]

Trends and Biases in US Policy

The history of US nuclear nonproliferation policy from 1945-1989 reveals several trends which reflect the biases and inconsistencies within US policy. These trends reflect the tension between maintaining a consistent nonproliferation policy and calculating the costs to other interests.

The first trend is a continuing conflict between reliance on nuclear weapons and efforts to deny them to other countries.[21] Despite the US's attempts to downplay the utility of nuclear weapons and promote the benefits of nuclear restraint, its own dependence on them countered this proposition. When the US decided to initiate a nuclear build-up to counter the perceived Soviet threat, it enshrined the atomic bomb as the ultimate weapon. Nuclear weapons became not only the ultimate security guarantor, but

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[19]Clausen, *Nonproliferation*, 160.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., xiii.

the key to international status and prestige. They were a symbol of a modern state.[22] The fact that all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are nuclear powers is not lost on aspiring regional hegemons.

The second trend present in US nonproliferation policy has been the tension between limiting the burden of overseas commitments while still addressing the security concerns of potential nuclear powers.[23] Throughout the Cold War period the US provided extended deterrence to its allies to prevent them from seeking independent nuclear arsenals. Extended deterrence played a major role in the decisions of Japan and Germany not to acquire nuclear weapons even though they were technically capable.[24] Likewise, US security assurances contributed to the decisions of South Korea and Taiwan to abandon their nuclear programs.[25] In contrast, uncertainty over the US's commitment to Europe prompted France to develop an independent nuclear arsenal during the 1950s.[26]

The third pattern in US nonproliferation policy has been its reluctance to exert pressure against the nuclear programs and industries of close allies and client states.[27]

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[22]Scott D. Sagan, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," *Current History* 96, no.609 (April 1997): 154.

[23]Clausen, *Nonproliferation*, xiii.

[24]Other factors also contributed to the decisions of Germany and Japan such as the development of anti-military political cultures after World War II. See Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317-356.

[25]The US also exerted economic pressure against Taiwan and South Korea to induce their compliance.

[26]Clausen, *Nonproliferation*, 59-60.

[27]Ibid., xiii.

Israel and Pakistan are two examples of this reluctance. Although the US attempted to restrain its nuclear program in the early stages, by 1968 the US Central Intelligence Agency was aware that Israel possessed nuclear weapons.[28] Despite its refusal to join the NPT or submit to IAEA inspections, the US maintained close ties with Israel throughout the 1970s and 1980s and continued its economic and military aid in violation of US domestic legislation.

In 1978, aid to Pakistan was withdrawn due to its nuclear program. However, in 1979 after the USSR invaded Afghanistan, aid was reinstated so that the US could continue to send aid to a country in the forefront of containing Soviet aggression.[29] Pakistan was not bound by the Symington Amendment nor by the Solarz Amendment. In 1985, Congress passed the Pressler Amendment which required the President to certify every year that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device as a condition on foreign aid. Presidents Reagan and Bush continued this certification until 1990 despite knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear program.[30]

Besides ignoring the nuclear programs of allies and clients, the US has also been unwilling to apply sanctions for nonproliferation policy violations. In a study of sanctions from 1968-1991 the US never sanctioned a member the Liberal Security Community.[31] Membership in the LSC is defined as "a group of established liberal democracies

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[28]Seymour M. Hersch, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991). 241.

[29]Smith and Cobban, "A Blind Eye," 58.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Chafetz, "Political Psychology."

that self-consciously identify their security interests collectively on the basis of shared core values and a history of cooperation."[33] States not included in the LSC were routinely sanctioned. For instance, South Africa was sanctioned several times between 1975 and 1991 for failing to adhere to nuclear safeguards and attempting to develop missiles. France, Switzerland, and Israel, all of whom contributed to the South African program, were not sanctioned.

This brief history of US nonproliferation policy from 1945 through the late 1980s has shown that although the US accepted the idea of global nonproliferation standards, it continued to apply its policies selectively. The prevailing explanations for these biases were the Cold War and the need to defend the national interest. The strategic need to contain the USSR justified subordinating nonproliferation goals and continuing the build-up of the US's nuclear arsenal. It was used to justify continued aid to allies and client states such as Pakistan and Israel and to justify overlooking their violations of the international nonproliferation regime. When the US did support nonproliferation efforts among these states, it was not a priority and only occurred when it was not politically costly.

Although the Cold War did influence the discriminatory standards in US policy, it is inadequate in two ways. First, it is almost tautological to say that the US pursued its best interests without saying exactly what those interests are. If interest is defined as countering the USSR, then it would be expected that every act of discrimination was linked to a

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[33]Ibid., 745. States considered to be members of the Liberal Security Community are listed in Appendix 1.

Cold War interest. Second, although the Cold War rivalry between the US and USSR is over, the same patterns still persist in US policy.

CHAPTER 3
US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Changes in the International System

The fall of the Berlin Wall in December 1989 seemed to symbolize the end of the Cold War although the process had been in motion for years. Throughout the early 1990s, as dramatic changes were taking place in superpower relations, many dramatic occurrences were also taking place with regard to nuclear nonproliferation. Several states renounced their nuclear ambitions, the Iraqi nuclear program was discovered, North Korea threatened withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and the NPT review conference was scheduled for 1995. It was also during this period that the US found itself for the first time in fifty years without the Soviet Union as a guiding principle behind its military build-up, strategic alliances, and foreign policy decisions. All of these events served to renew attention to proliferation issues within the US.

In the fifty years since the bomb was developed, the international environment and nonproliferation issues have changed dramatically. Five nations are declared nuclear powers, three others, India, Pakistan and Israel, have nuclear capability, and many others have attempted to develop these weapons. Despite the nonproliferation regime, suppliers groups, and export controls, the spread of nuclear technology and the globalization of the

arms industry has made nuclear weaponry more accessible than ever before.[1] The main lesson learned from the Iraqi program is that creating a nuclear device is now possible through more technologies and more states than ever before.[2] For a determined proliferator, current export controls can only slow the process, not prevent it.[3]

The spread and diversity of nuclear technologies has complicated the task of defining proliferation and determining which states are proliferating. As already mentioned nuclear proliferation can basically be defined as the creation or possession of a nuclear device by any state. Beyond this basic definition, problems arise when trying to determine what level of development constitutes proliferation. Does it mean having a fully assembled nuclear device and the ability to launch it or has proliferation occurred when a state possesses the technical capability to build a device? The types of technology that could indicate a nuclear weapons program have expanded enormously and most have dual-use capability. Further, missile technology is increasingly defined as a form of proliferation; however, many states have interests in this technology for satellite programs, not weapon delivery systems. These gray areas in the definition of proliferation

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[1]Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge," *International Security* 19, no.2 (Fall 1994): 170-198.

[2]Peter A. Zimmerman, "Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology is Enough," *Orbis* 38 (Winter 1994): 67-82; Peter A. Zimmerman, "Technical Barriers to Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Studies* 2 (1993): 345-356; William C. Potter, "The New Nuclear Suppliers," *Orbis* 36 (Spring 1992): 199-210; and, George Perkovich, "The Plutonium Genie," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (Summer 1993): 153-165.

[3]Mark D. Mandeles, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Implications for the U.S. of Third World Nuclear Weapon and Ballistic Missile Proliferation," *Security Studies* 1 (Winter 1991): 240; and, Paul L. Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: Why Bother?" *Orbis* 36 (Spring 1992): 167-180.

have complicated the task of determining which states are proliferation risks and created a situation in which proliferation is often determined by perception. In other words, a state depends as much upon its perception of another state's intentions to determine if it is a proliferation risk as upon the actual material capability of the state.

Patterns of Proliferation

When the Cold War ended, many scholars began predicting how systemic changes in the international system would affect proliferation. One view was that proliferation would become more likely because a multipolar world created more uncertainty which would lead states to look to their own security.[4] Others argued that proliferation would be less likely because of reduced security threats and reductions in the arsenals of the nuclear states.[5] The growing historical trends toward free market economies and democratization were also seen to promote nonproliferation.[6] Many states pursuing economic liberalization would embrace nonproliferation standards in order to gain access to international capital.[7] While this seems to have occurred in Brazil and Argentina, India and

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[4]Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," in "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results)," eds. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, *Security Studies*, special issue, 2 no. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 37-78.

[5]Lawrence Freedman, "Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons," *Survival* 36, no.4 (Winter 1994): 35-36.

[6]Leonard S. Spector, "Neo-Nonproliferation," *Survival* 37, no.1 (Spring 1995): 76.

[7]Etel Solingen, "The New Multilateralism and Nonproliferation: Bringing in Domestic Politics," *Global Governance* 1 (1995): 210; and, Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy

Pakistan have moved toward more open nuclear stances with their nuclear tests in 1998 and have endangered their access to foreign aid and World Bank loans. Another theory suggests that proliferation would decrease among the core states (liberal/democratic states) because they do not perceive each other as military threats and increase among the peripheral states because of continued security concerns and ambitions.[8]

Looking at the pattern of proliferation since 1990, an asymmetrical pattern has emerged with many states moving toward a nonnuclear position while others have continued or accelerated their nuclear programs. South Africa voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons program, joined the NPT and submitted to IAEA inspections in 1991.[9] As liberal reforms have taken place, Brazil and Argentina both apparently have abandoned their nuclear programs, placed all their nuclear facilities under bilateral and IAEA inspections, and are working on confidence building measures.[10] The nuclear states which were created when the USSR disintegrated, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, all chose to return their nuclear weapons to Russia and join the NPT as nonnuclear weapons states.[11] In addition, France and China both signed the NPT in 1992.

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of Nuclear Restraint," *International Security* 19, no.2 (Fall 1994): 126-169.

[8]Glenn Chafetz, "The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective," in "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results)," eds. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, *Security Studies*, special issue, 2, no.3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 127-158.

[9]See Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 7-43.

[10]Ibid., 45-88.

[11]Ibid., 89-182.

On the other hand, many states maintained nuclear ambitions. Several states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and North Korea continued to affirm their intentions to develop nuclear weapons. Iraq's program, discovered after the Persian Gulf War, was found to be far more advanced than previously suspected. The seriousness of North Korea's program sparked a crisis in 1993 when it threatened to withdraw from the NPT over IAEA inspections.[12] Another set of states, India, Pakistan and Israel have continued to remain outside the NPT and to advance their programs. In light of the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by India and Pakistan, these states may be moving towards an arms race in South Asia.

Nonproliferation Policy Under Presidents Bush and Clinton

In some ways the Bush and Clinton administrations did not deviate from the nonproliferation policies of previous administrations. Both worked to promote nonproliferation among all states by strengthening existing nonproliferation agreements. The US was instrumental in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and supported efforts to expand the inspection authority of the IAEA after evidence of Iraq's evasion was discovered. In 1994, the US proposed the Fissile Material Cut-Off which would prohibit the further production of fissile material, uranium and plutonium.[13] Several initiatives to strengthen export controls have been proposed such as the Wassenaar

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[12]Ibid., 247.

[13]Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, and Evan S. Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), 98.

Arrangement and the New Forum which would be a successor to the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM.)[14] These new arrangements would redirect export controls from an East-West focus to a global one. The US also supported the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to expand its export controls to cover dual-use items which effectively precluded nuclear commerce with India, Israel, and Pakistan.[15]

Progress was made on arms control agreements with the signing of START I in July 1991 and START II in January of 1993 which reduced the US's nuclear arsenal and helped to legitimize its nonproliferation goals. It has also worked on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which would prohibit all nuclear testing. In line with supporting the CTBT, in 1994 the US Congress passes the Glenn Amendment which would impose sanctions against any state conducting a nuclear test. These sanctions could include the termination of economic and military aid as well as financial assistance from international sources such as the World Bank.

In many ways, the end of the Cold War reduced the US's reasons for tolerating proliferation. No longer did the nuclear programs of clients need to be ignored in order

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[14]Lynne E. Davis, "The Wassenaar Arrangement," (address at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 23 January 1996) *US Department of State Dispatch* 7, no.5 (29 January 1996): 19-21, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996); and, Thomas E. McNamara, "1995 Arms Control Accomplishments and Replacing COCOM," (statement before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 21 September 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.42 (16 October 1995): 752-754, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[15]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 14.

to maintain their friendship. The resources which had been devoted to the Cold War were now available for other goals such as nonproliferation. Nonproliferation became one of the US's main foreign policy goals and the Clinton administration called it the greatest danger to US and international security in the post-Cold War period. The commitment to preventing proliferation was more than rhetorical as indicated by the increased resources devoted to it and the creation of the Nonproliferation Center which is designed to coordinate the government's intelligence efforts on proliferation issues.[16]

Yet instead of shifting to more universal standards, US policy seemed to become even more polarized. With the nuclear renunciations of several midlevel proliferators such as Brazil and Argentina, the disparity between the policies enacted against the remaining states was much more obvious. Among most states, including the advanced programs of states such as India and Israel, US policy continued to use the international regime, diplomacy and incentives, and sanctions, when necessary to try and move these states toward a nonnuclear stance. Among the rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya, US policy moved toward enacting broad, indefinite sanctions and threatening military action to halt their nuclear programs.

US Policy and Non-Rogue States

Among states not defined as rogues, nonproliferation strategy in the 1990s has been one of diplomatic and political pressure, economic incentives, and sanctions when

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[16]Henry Sokolski, "Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence," *Orbis* 38 (Spring 1994): 255.

necessary. There was more emphasis on economic assistance as a tool than ever before and less emphasis on technology denial. The US recognized the security and other concerns behind the nuclear programs of these states and tried to develop strategies to meet them.

One indication of these changes was a new willingness to consider regional arms control arrangements. In a reversal of previous policy, the US lent its support to the creation of several nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) in Africa and the South Pacific and has shown interest in a Middle East NWFZ proposed by Egypt.[17] Previous administrations felt regional arrangements undermined the authority of the NPT and international regime. Although support for universal arrangements such as the NPT continue to be the preferred policy, the acceptance of regional arrangements indicates its recognition of the need to be flexible with specific regional tensions and issues.

In South Asia, the US began to move from preventing proliferation to encouraging regional nuclear nonproliferation initiatives as mandated by the 1992 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act.[18] This initiative requires the President to submit reports twice yearly on the ballistic and nuclear capabilities of India, Pakistan, and China, but does not impose sanctions of any kind. Instead of rolling-back the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan, the US encouraged confidence building measures and acceptance of IAEA inspections on all nuclear facilities.[19] The US also proposed five-way talks between

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[17]Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy," 143.

[18]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 98.

[19]Ibid., 90.

itself, India, Pakistan, China and the Russia as a way to deal with the tensions contributing to proliferation in the region.[20] Even after the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan and the imposition of sanctions, the US continued to stress the need to deal with the underlying tensions driving the nuclear programs of these states.

Israel has received little pressure from the US to abandon its nuclear program, but was persuaded by the US in 1991 to abide by the export controls of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[21] Israel's participation in the MTCR, however, only limits its aid to other countries and does not affect its own missile program.

A new aspect of nonproliferation policy was the use of "dollar diplomacy" to induce states to renounce their nuclear weapons.[22] Some policymakers felt that economic incentives would only encourage more proliferation, but others saw it as a necessary concession to meet the concerns of these states. In 1991 Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (Nunn-Lugar) which pledged $400 million to assist in safely dismantling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union (FSU).[23] Related to this was the creation of the International Science and Technology Center which provides employment to scientists in the FSU so that their knowledge and expertise would not be sold on the

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[20]Ibid., 98.

[21] Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy," 137. The MTCR is designed to limit transfers of technology that could be used to create ballistic missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons.

[22]Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 326-328.

[23]Ibid., 150.

international market.[24] In addition to the original $400 million pledged, the US pledged to Belarus an additional $65 million after it ratified START I and the NPT.[25] Extensive negotiations yielded the "Trilateral Statement" between the US, Russia, and Ukraine. Ukraine agreed to yield all nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia and in return it received political, economic, and security benefits.[26] Security guarantees by the US were indispensable to gaining this agreement. The US also promised an additional $200 million in assistance to Ukraine in exchange for signing this agreement.[27]

The biggest economic incentive given to a state in exchange for pledges to cap its nuclear program was to North Korea. Under the Agreed Framework, a multilateral consortium--the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)--was to be developed in order to supply North Korea with two light-water reactors.[28] This type of reactor produces very little plutonium and thus is considered proliferation-resistant. The estimated cost on these reactors is $4 billion. The US contribution would be $20 to $30 million a year until the reactors were operating.[29]

Export controls, long considered to be one of the key aspects of preventing proliferation, continued to be laxly enforced among select states.[30] In 1993 and 1994 steps were

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[24]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 29.

[25]Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 150-152.

[26]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 28.

[27]Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 153.

[28]Ibid., 276-280.

[29]Ibid., 276-277.

[30]Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks," 169.

taken to ease export restrictions for many dual-use items such as supercomputers and micro-electronics.[31] The easing of export controls for most states was an indication of the US's new willingness to utilize diplomacy than more restrictions and sanctions.

When sanctions were applied to non-rogue states, they were applied in response to a specific violation and were removed once the violation was rectified. For example, sanctions were imposed on Russia in May 1992 for sales to India in violation of the MTCR.[32] Once the sales were halted, the sanctions were lifted with no further repercussions. In October 1990, all economic and military assistance to Pakistan was terminated when President Bush was unable to certify to Congress that it did not possess a nuclear device under the Pressler Amendment.[33] Yet tensions over these sanctions did not preclude US trade with Pakistan nor did they prevent the US from pursuing other avenues of pressure. Likewise, the sanctions imposed upon India and Pakistan for their 1998 nuclear tests can be removed when they sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and possibly the Nonproliferation Treaty.

US Policy and the Rogue States

During the Clinton administration, the rogue image became more concrete and integrated into official rhetoric. US policy toward the rogue states took two forms: increased

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[31]Frank J. Gaffney Jr., "Shortsighted U.S. Policies Mean Nuclear Proliferation," *Insight* 10, no. 29 (18 July 1994): 36.

[32]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 91.

[33]Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 187.

sanctions and potential military action. There was decreased emphasis on diplomacy and negotiation with these states.

The US's focus upon these states began in the late 1980s as the Soviet threat diminished. The Pentagon found itself without a guiding principle or rationale for its defense budget. The search for a new enemy led military planners to construct what is now known as the "Rogue Doctrine."[34] This doctrine, which began to form in the Bush administration, substituted the threat of Third World proliferation for the Soviet threat. While this doctrine at first focused upon the military capabilities of states, this presented two problems for military planners. First, even the best armed Third World nation did not present enough of a threat to justify the budget enjoyed during the Cold War.[35] This eventually led to the conclusion that the military needed to be able to fight two wars simultaneously. It also led military planners to focus upon the most potentially threatening aspect of these states, their quest for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, by focusing upon potential military and WMD threats from the Third World, many states which were current allies of the US had to be included on the list of potential rogues. This led military planners to focus upon the political character of these states with emphasis upon those least friendly with the US.[36]

By 1990 a rogue state could be classified as "a hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World state with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities...bent on sabotaging

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[34]Klare, *Rogue States*, 22.

[35]Ibid., 28.

[36]Ibid., 24-25.

the prevailing world order. Such regimes were said to harbor aggressive intentions vis-a-vis their less powerful neighbors, to oppose the 'spread of democracy,' and to be guilty of circumventing international norms against nuclear and chemical proliferation."[37] The rogue image drew heavily from the literature on international terrorism which helped to link these two images and reinforce the danger of these states.[38] When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the Rogue Doctrine was given a face for its enemy. Iraq came to symbolize the evil and aggressive nature of states which violated international norms and developed weapons of mass destruction.[39]

The creation of the rogue image was the result of several converging factors: renewed interest in nonproliferation, domestic politics, and the actions of the rogue states themselves. As already discussed, several international events dramatized proliferation concerns within the US. Domestically, the Defense Department, national laboratories, and ethnic lobbies such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) all favored targeting these states as potential military threats because it furthered their own interests.[40] The Defense Department could continue to justify its defense budget.[41] Several

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[37]Ibid., 26.

[38]Ibid., 26-27. For literature on terrorism see Noam Chomsky *The Cult of Terrorism* (Boston: South End Press, 1988); and, Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1986.)

[39]Ibid., 37.

[40]AIPAC is a powerful interest group of American Jewish community which lobbies for pro-Israeli policies and is often suspected of controlling America's Middle East Policy. See Edward Tivnan, *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.)

[41]Klare, *Rogue States*, 21.

national laboratories which were feeling cut-backs in the post-Cold War period now had a new goal--to help develop technology for detecting, monitoring, and fighting proliferation.[42] Although business and industry generally opposed the targeting and subsequent sanctions placed on the rogue states, other interest groups such as AIPAC were very influential in wanting to maintain the image of states such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria as military threats.[43] In this way, military and foreign aid to Israel would remain a priority.

Yet it was also the actions of these states which classified them as rogues. All of these states have engaged in behavior and rhetoric considered unacceptable by the majority of the international community, including human rights abuses, support for terrorism, repression, and the use of chemical weapons. All have violated, or are suspected of violating, the international norm against acquiring nuclear weapons and their obligations under the NPT to which they are signatories. In addition, all have at some point espoused anti-Western or anti-American sentiments, opposed US interests, and/or been engaged in conflicts with the US. All of these factors made them likely candidates for classification as rogues.

The rogue states are routinely denied nuclear exports and placed under broad sanctions. Iran and Iraq are under the most stringent export controls as mandated by the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992.[44] In 1994, Congress expanded the term terrorism to

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[42]Christopher Anderson, "Nonproliferation Boom Gives a Lift to the National Labs," *Science* 263 (4 February 1994): 627-629.

[43]Raymond Tanter, *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 60-63.

[44]Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, "Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1992-93): 128.

include efforts by any nonnuclear state, group or individual to acquire or create nuclear explosives.[45] Therefore, many of the restrictions and sanctions which were created to deal with terrorism were now applicable to the nuclear programs of the rogue states, all of which are classified as state sponsors of terrorism.

Sanctions placed on these states are in response to a wide variety of behaviors including their WMD programs. Since sanctions are not just in response to nuclear violations it is difficult to have sanctions removed because a list of grievances must be rectified, not just the nuclear violation. In 1992, the UN Security Council, with the support of the US, declared proliferation to be a threat to international peace and security which opened the way for using multilateral sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[46]

The US also strengthened sanctions against individuals, states and companies which contribute to the nuclear programs of the rogue states. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994 imposes sanctions on individuals which contribute to proliferation through export activities.[47] The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prohibits assistance to terrorist states by US firms or individuals.[48] The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act applies this law to any person, foreign or US, trading or investing with Libya or Iran.[49]

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[45]Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, x.

[46]Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, "Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles," *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no.2 (Spring 1995): 146.

[47]Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, 285.

[48]Ibid., 80.

[49]Ibid.

The Persian Gulf War and the subsequent revelations of Iraq's nuclear program laid the groundwork for more active military involvement in nonproliferation. The military action against Iraq provided the prototype of a rogue state for defense planners. During the war, sites which were known to be involved in nuclear and chemical weapons design were targeted in an effort to destroy Iraq's capabilities.[50] After the war, the US supported all UN resolutions mandating the destruction of Iraq's WMD capabilities and has been willing to threaten military action in order to force Hussein to allow inspectors access to all suspected sites.

Iraq's program highlighted the need to be able to deal with a successful proliferator and helped shift the focus of nonproliferation from preventing to fighting it.[51] The Pentagon is now challenging the traditional centers of nonproliferation activity, the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), whose focus has been on diplomacy, exports and sanctions.[52] In 1993, the Clinton administration unveiled its first major defense initiative, the Defense Counter Proliferation Initiative. The core of this initiative was to apply military resources and planning to address the threats posed by emerging WMD capabilities around the globe.[53] The exact meaning of counterproliferation has not been ascertained and has changed over several years. The Pentagon has argued that this initiative is to supplement, not replace diplomatic efforts to prevent

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[50]Klare, *Rogue States*, 57.

[51]Spector, "Neo-Nonproliferation," 66.

[52]Ibid., 79.

[53]Muller and Reiss, "Counterproliferation," 143.

proliferation; however, the potential for pre-emptive military strikes has alarmed many within the US and abroad that the US may be willing to unilaterally use force to prevent the development of WMD by certain states.[54] This has led the Pentagon to focus on the defensive aspects of the program while admitting that it is applicable to offensive strikes.

The US also considered military strikes an option for ending North Korea's nuclear program. During the crisis over inspections, the US prepared plans for a possible cruise missile attack on the Yongbyon nuclear complex.[55] This option was never publicly advocated.

Another issue which raised questions about the role of the military in nonproliferation policy was the White House statement in 1996 that the US would retain its options to use nuclear weapons if attacked by a state, party to a nuclear weapons free zone or the NPT, that employed weapons of mass destruction.[56] The US has maintained its right to use nuclear weapons in self-defense against a nuclear attack. The 1996 statement, however, expanded this option to include chemical and biological weapons. This opens the possibility that the US would allow nuclear retaliation against a state such as Libya if it used chemical weapons. Whether or not this scenario is likely, the statement symbolically shows the US's willingness to use whatever means it deems necessary in the fight against WMD.

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[54]Ibid., 146.

[55]Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 258-259.

[56]George Bunn, "Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating its Non-Use Pledges?" *Arms Control Today* 26, no.4 (May 1996): 7.

As can be seen from an overview of US policy toward the rogue states, it is difficult to separate nonproliferation policy from other issues. Policy is affected by the actions of these states, but it is also affected by their history of interaction, political differences, and other behaviors by these states. Several issues of concern coincide with these states. For instance, all have been defined as state supporters of terrorism and cited for human rights abuses. They also all espouse radical ideologies with anti-Western or anti-American elements.[57] This runs counter to another high priority on the foreign policy agenda within the Clinton administration, the doctrine of "democratic enlargement."[58] One of the main arguments for containing these states and preventing them from acquiring WMD is the fear that they would threaten the democratic order.[59] Separating policies designed to counter the proliferation activities of these states from policies designed to alter their government, end their support for terrorism and human rights abuses is almost impossible because all of these elements are seen as part of their rogue character.

As an example of the nonspecific nature of US policy, both Iraq and Iran are currently under the broad policy of "dual containment."[60] This policy seeks to contain the activities of both states at the same time without favoring one state to balance the other. In

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[57]Michael Mandelbaum, "Lessons of the Next Nuclear War," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no.2 (March/April 1995): 34.

[58]Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy* 106 (Spring 1997): 116.

[59]Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no.2 (March/April 1994): 45.

[60]F. Gregory Gause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no.2 (March/April 1994): 56-58.

Iraq, it is hoped that this policy will bring about a regime change. In Iran it is meant to contain several activities deemed unacceptable by the US. These include support for international terrorism, opposition to the peace process, efforts to subvert other Arab governments, a military build-up and efforts to acquire WMD. This broad policy makes it almost impossible to separate the various issues of concern.

US Policy in Comparison

The US has focused its nonproliferation efforts upon the states it considers rogues. The emphasis on sanctions and military planning to prevent proliferation among these states has been considered overly harsh, punitive, and counterproductive by some. While not denying that the actions of these states require action, current nonproliferation policy can be judged as harsh by making three comparisons: to past policy, to the policies of other Western nations, and to policies toward other states.

First, as the history of US policy showed, technology denial and diplomatic efforts formed the basis of nonproliferation efforts for forty years. Not until the late 1980s did the military become involved in nonproliferation. Threats of military action, the bombing of Iraq's nuclear facilities during the Gulf War and military planning represent a new aspect of policy.

Second, other Western nations do not concur with the US policy of sanctions or the designation of certain states as rogues. They fear that the US has allowed favoritism to color its choices and are concerned by the idea that it may unilaterally make itself judge,

jury and executioner over the nuclear programs of rogue states.[61] Instead they see engagement with these states as the best way to foster change in their policies. They have refused to emulate the trade bans which the US has imposed upon Iran.[62] Dissent is also gathering over the continuation of sanctions on Iraq.[63] While acknowledging these states as potential threats, they view them more as opportunities and feel that US policy magnifies the misbehavior of these states by over-emphasizing the threat and devoting excessive resources to combating it.[64]

There is also a gap between US and IAEA assessments of threat from these states. In 1994 the IAEA stated that it had found no signs of unpeaceful nuclear activity in Iran.[65] Yet the US maintained sanctions because of its belief that Iran has a hidden program. Similarly, the IAEA has declared that it believes Iraq's ability to manufacture WMD has been eliminated, but the US insists upon the continuation of sanctions.[66]

Third, in comparison to other states, the US applies harsher sanctions to the rogues than other states. Although discriminatory standards have always been a part of US policy, the differences in approaches have rarely been as stark. This chapter has outlined the major differences in policy between the rogue states and others. While the rogue

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[61]Muller and Reiss, "Counterproliferation," 146-147.

[62]Paul F. Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues in Global Perspective," *Middle East Policy* 4, no.1-2 (September 1995): 200.

[63]Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no.1 (January/February 1995): 70.

[64]Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, 21.

[65]Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues," 199.

[66]Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy," 66.

states are subject to sanctions and possibly military action, the US has preferred diplomacy and incentives among other states.

The post-Cold War policies show a continued discrepancy of standards among states. Despite the rhetoric proclaiming proliferation to be the greatest threat to international peace and security, policy has remained ambivalent to the nuclear programs of several states, while reacting strongly to those of the rogue states. Why has the US continued to apply discriminatory standards? Policy is not based upon the material capabilities of the states. India and Pakistan have both advanced to the point of conducting nuclear tests. In light of the revelations of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli defector, Israel is believed to possess between fifty and two hundred nuclear devices.[67] All these states have refused to join the NPT. In contrast, none of the rogue states has assembled, tested, or is yet able to create a nuclear device. Iraq is under international monitoring. Iran is believed to be five to eight years away from developing a nuclear device. Libya does not possess the infrastructure to build a nuclear weapon and attempts to purchase one have been rebuffed. The extent of North Korea's program is uncertain and some believe it may have been able to create one or two nuclear devices although this has not been confirmed.[68] Nor is policy based solely upon the breaking of international obligations. Each state which is proliferating has broken international norms, including many Western nations which have contributed to the nuclear programs of other states.

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[67]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 135.

[68]Ibid., 103.

The answer seems to lie in how the US perceives threat. Threat perception is tied to how the US defines its interests and its relationships with other states. The US perceives the actions of the rogue states as more threatening to its interests than the nuclear programs of other states. This leads to overestimations of threat and the implementation of harsh and often punitive policies. In the next section this theory will be developed to explain how and why the US perceives the actions of the rogue states differently from other nuclear proliferators and how this leads to overperceptions of threat.

CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL IDENTITY, PERCEPTION, AND ATTRIBUTION BIAS

Social identity theory offers an explanation for why the US applies discriminatory standards of nonproliferation among states. This theory is rooted in social psychology and suggests that the "constructed identities of states, governments, and other political actors" influence how they define their security interests and perceive threats.[1] In contrast with realist and liberal theories that assume interests as given, this theory sees interests as something which the state must learn through its interactions with other states and actors in the international system.[2] An examination of how identity shapes security interests and affects the perceptions of policymakers provides a better explanation for the bias within US nonproliferation policy than theories which focus upon material capability.

Social identity theory has been used to explain or clarify several types of state behavior which have not been adequately explained by other theories such as the

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[1]Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4.

[2]Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 34.

democratic peace[3] and how nationalism influences conflict.[4] One study has found that by including identity protection as a goal of foreign policy, specific US foreign policy stances could be better predicted.[5] Changes in the identity and core values of a state are also being used to predict changes in the general direction of foreign policy.[6] In these studies, social identity theory provided a basis for determining what the national interests of a state were. This thesis builds upon a study which used social identity theory to explain the formation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and why discriminatory standards have been applied among its members.[7] The study proposes the existence of a liberal security community (LSC) led by the US, and based upon a shared liberal-democratic identity. Members of this in-group discriminate in favor of their own group members even when it leads to less than optimal results.[8] In support of this theory, sanctioning practices within the nonproliferation regime were examined and a discriminatory pattern was found in favor of the LSC members.[9] This thesis adopts the same

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[3]Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley Jr., "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (1995): 511-533.

[4]Daniel Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective," *Mershon International Studies Review* 38(1994): 43-68.

[5]William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs," *International Studies Quarterly* 39(1995): 313-331.

[6]Jack Citrin et al., "Is American Nationalism Changing? Implications for Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 38(1994): 1-31.

[7]Chafetz, "Political Psychology."

[8]Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517.

[9]Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 755.

premise that shared identities affect how decisionmakers perceive threat, but focuses more narrowly upon biases in US nonproliferation policy.

Social Identity Theory

Identity can be defined as the basic character of a state and is composed of factors which are intrinsic to the state and those which are relational.[10] Intrinsic characteristics include type of government, culture, history, and other factors specific to the state. Relational characteristics are those which are relative to other actors in the international system. For instance, a state is only sovereign in relation to other states. Through social interaction states also engender "values, norms, beliefs, role conceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, and other cognitive and motivational phenomena."[11] Thus both domestic and international politics determine the identity of a state. This identity, however, is neither unitary nor static. While there is usually a core of relatively stable identities, there may be may competing identities within a state with various levels of support and saliency. This allows for identities to change, although usually only very slowly or in response to social upheaval.

Although identity theories begin at the individual level, it is possible to speak of the collective identities of states and governments because identity is in part socially derived. Psychoanalytic theory has suggested processes by which the individual's identity is

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[10]Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," 33.

[11]Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 747.

transferred to a national identity and the ways in which the two are linked and often reinforce each other.[12] Some studies, such as Heradstveit's study of the Arab/Israeli conflict, have moved away from the individual level and used states or entire societies as the basic unit of identity.[13] Yet the individual remains the source of identity even though that identity may be collective. Therefore, when speaking about the identity of the state or other political actor it must be remembered that it is only though the actions and perceptions of individuals that the collective identity is constructed.

Social identity theory suggests that states derive their identity in part from their group memberships.[14] States seek to enhance and protect their identities by sharing them with other states possessing similar characteristics and interests. States need both allies and enemies is order to define and enhance their self-esteem.[15] This is not to suggest that states which identify with each other are identical or share all interests in common. It is better thought of as a continuum where the more areas of similarity that exist, the more likely that there will be a strong identification. The intensity of the identification also depends upon both the saliency of a particular identity and its centrality to the actor.

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[12]Mary Caputi, "National Identity in Contemporary Theory," *Political Psychology* 17(1996): 683-694; and, Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty," 44-46.

[13]Daniel Heradstveit, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1979).

[14]Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 748. See also Tajfel, *Human Groups*; and, Henri Tajfel, ed. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.)

[15]Vamik D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," *Political Psychology* 6 (1985): 219-247.

Identifying with some states and not others leads to the formation of in-groups and out-groups.[16] The in-group can be trusted because it is similar while out-groups are viewed with suspicion because they are different.[17] By perceiving one's own group in positive terms, members enhance their own self worth. Members of the in-group are considered good, moral, as conforming to acceptable standards of behavior, and generally "better" than other groups. Out-group members are considered bad, immoral, weak and as engaging in unacceptable behavior. Classification as either part of an in-group or out-group is not always clearly defined but is dependent upon how strongly the states identify with each other. This process of in-group/out-group differentiation helps define the identity of the state and thus its interests.[18] The need to enhance its identity leads group members to discriminate in favor of their in-group even when it leads to less than optimal results.[19]

The in-group/out-group distinction forms an important basis for determining who is an enemy and who is ally and thus helps to define a state's security interests. "Identification with or against a group allows actors to make relatively quick and easy judgments, including predictions about who will be friendly and who will not in a given

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[16]David A. Wilder and Warren E. Cooper, "Categorization into Groups: Consequences for Social Perception and Attribution," in *New Directions in Attribution Research* vol.3, eds. John H. Harvey, William Ickes, and Robert F. Kidd (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), 253-260.

[17]Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517.

[18]Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 475.

[19]Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517.

environment."[20] In-group members, are perceived as allies on the basis of shared characteristics and common interests. Out-group members are perceived as enemies because they do not share the same values and thus are bad. This is not to suggest that other factors do not influence this determination. A history of conflict, competing interests, lack of economic or diplomatic ties all contribute to the characterization of a state as an enemy; however these factors often reinforce or are a product of the in-group/out-group classification.

For instance, the role of culture has independently been studied as a source of conflict. Predictions of future conflict based upon cultural factors recently received attention[21] and research has shown support for the theory that culture influences threat perception.[22] One theory argues that war is not due to the innate nature of man, but is a cultural phenomenon that depends upon a number of complex sociological and psychological conditions.[23] Social identity theory also sees culture as a factor which influences conflict because it is a component of identity. Those whose culture is familiar are perceived as part of the in-group while those who are dissimilar are viewed with suspicion. Thus the distinction between the role identity plays and other factors in influencing threat perception is not clear. They often reinforce each other and are not mutually exclusive.

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[20]Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 749.

[21]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

[22]Valerie A. Sulfaro and Mark N. Crislip, "How Americans Perceive Foreign Policy Threats: A Magnitude Scaling Analysis," *Political Psychology* 18 (1997): 103-126.

[23]Ofer Zur, "The Psychohistory of Warfare: The Co-Evolution of Culture, Psyche and Enemy," *Journal of Peace Research* 24, no.2 (1987): 127.

Misperception and Attribution Bias

Images of the enemy or out-group are often subject to distortion and misperception. Image theory has explored the question of how the enemy is perceived.[24] There are four basic elements which make up the image of the enemy.[25] First, the enemy is often perceived to be the opposite, or the "mirror-image" of a state's perception of itself. Whatever characteristics a state finds positive about itself it finds lacking in the enemy. Second, contradicting images of the enemy can exist at the same time. A state may be perceived as both extremely dangerous and weak with no apparent conflict. Third, the image of the enemy is dynamic. An enemy today can easily become an ally tomorrow. Fourth, there is the need to de-humanize the enemy. This can be seen in the tendency to demonize the enemy.

Theories on enemy images have benefitted from work on schemas. A schema is a cognitive tool which aids a person is sorting and classifying new information based on generic knowledge and previous experience.[26] Certain images which are related tend to be invoked together. For instance, the knowledge that a state is a democracy may invoke

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[24]Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," *Journal of Social Issues* 17(1961): 46-56; Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Ralph K. White, *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars* (New York: Doubleday, 1970); Richard D. Ashmore et al., "An Experimental Investigation of the Double Standard in the Perception of International Affairs," *Political Behavior* 1(1979): 123-135; and, Zur, "Psychohistory."

[25]Zur, "Psychohistory," 131.

[26]Deborah Welch Larson, "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *Political Psychology* 15 (1994): 18-20.

images such as peaceful, ally, and liberal. Schemas can help to fill in gaps in knowledge. Thus, if a state is perceived to be an enemy, other characteristics associated with the enemy schema will be attributed to that state.

Besides distorting the images of enemies and allies, the need to enhance its identity leads a state to discriminate in favor of its in-group. These in-group biases, which may be motivated or cognitive, affect how policymakers interpret the behavior of states and perceive and cope with threat.[27] Motivated biases consist of failures to recognize, consider relevant, or act on information which is inconsistent with the need to perceive in-group members as good and out-group members as bad.[28] For instance, subjects have been found not to recall information inconsistent with their conception of their own nations.[29] Cognitive biases on the other hand arise from "the decision-makers' inherently limited capacity for perception, recall, and attribution of meaning."[30] In essence these biases are the result of misperception. Several types of cognitive bias affect decision-makers such as attribution bias and the inability to empathize.[31]

Misperception within the field of foreign policy has been found to occur in some predictable patterns, one of which is attribution bias.[32] This study plans to focus upon

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[27]Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 754.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Matthew S. Hirshberg, "The Self-Perpetuating National Self-Image: Cognitive Biases in Perceptions of International Interventions," *Political Psychology* 14 (1993): 77-98.

[30]Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 754.

[31]Ibid., 755-758.

[32]Jervis, *Perception*, 35-48.

attribution biases which occur in response to the need to enhance identity. Just as with identity theory, studies of attribution bias begin at the individual level; however, researchers have noted that "the cognitive and motivational biases impairing rationality that have attracted attention are rooted not only in the information-processing proclivities of individuals but also in the operational codes, understandings, and worldviews shared by decision makers and diffused throughout society."[33] This British school approach which focuses upon societal attributions has been used to study collectively held misperceptions and how patterns of misperception may vary across cultures.[34]

In general, attribution theory refers to "an area of study in social psychology regarding the causal inferences people make about social behavior."[35] Attribution bias says that a state will attribute motivations differently based upon whether a state is an enemy or ally. This fundamental attribution error overestimates dispositional factors and underestimates situational factors.[36] Dispositional factors are those which are intrinsic to the state such

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[33]Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture," 49.

[34]Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, "Attribution Theory and Arab Images of the Gulf War," *Political Psychology* 17(1996): 275; and Miles Hewstone, *Causal Attribution: From Cognitive Processes to Collective Beliefs* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989). Not all cultures misperceive in the same patterns. For criticism of Western bias see Joan G. Miller, "Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46 (1984): 961-978; and, Miles Hewstone and Colleen Ward, "Ethnocentricism and Causal Attribution in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48 (1985): 614-623.

[35]Thomas M. Ostrom, "Attribution Theory: Whence and Whither?" in *New Directions in Attribution Research* vol. 3 eds. John H. Harvey, William Ickes, and Robert F. Kidd (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981), 405.

[36]Heradstveit and Bonham, "Attribution Theory," 274-275; and, Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," in *Political Psychology: Classic and Contemporary Readings*, ed. Neil J. Kressel (New York: Paragon

as type of government and characteristics of the state such as neutral or fundamentalist. Regular patterns of behavior are also dispositional factors providing they are not in response to a sustained unusual event. Situational factors are unusual external events over which the state has little or no control.

Later work on this theory found more support for it when evaluative aspects were taken into account.[37] For instance, it was found that an enemy's negative behavior was attributed to internal factors, but that positive behavior was attributed to situational factors. Conversely, a state's own positive behavior was attributed to its internal character, while negative behavior was seen as induced by the situation. This self-serving bias results from the state's attempt to defend its identity and usually leads to an overestimation of threat from an enemy.[38]

An important point needs to be made about misperception and identity. Cognitive processes and perception play a large role in defining the identities of states and in the creation of in-group biases; however, a state's perception of identity, both its own and others, does not necessarily reflect reality. A state may want to believe itself to be democratic, but this does not make it true. Yet a state will take action based upon its perception, not upon reality. Conversely, perceptions are not always wrong. While in-group biases make misperception more likely, they do not make it unavoidable or automatic. Sometimes a state perceives threat because there really is a threat; however,

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House, 1993), 376.

[37]Heradstveit and Bonham, "Attribution Theory," 274.

[38]Stein, "Building Politics," 376.

unless the state understands how it misperceives it cannot tell the difference between an imaginary and a real threat.

US Identity and Perceptions

It has been a source of debate as to what values or characteristics comprise the identity of the US in part because there are so many competing subcultures and identities within American political culture.[39] Most studies on US identity or nationalism find that the values of economic and political liberalism are central to how the US defines and perceives itself.[40] Basically liberalism can be defined as the belief that "legitimate political power arises only from the consent of the governed."[41] This is extended to the economic sphere to mean acceptance of free market capitalism.

In relation to US nonproliferation policy, social identity theory says that the US will be motivated to enhance its identity by discriminating in favor of its in-group or allies, and discriminating against its out-group or enemies.[42] Thus the same behavior by an enemy and an ally will be perceived differently.

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[39]Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 5th ed.(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 257.

[40]Ibid., 160.

[41]Ibid., 623.

[42]All enemies must be out-group member, but not all out-group members will necessarily be enemies.

States which share a liberal, democratic identity with the US will be perceived as friendly, trustworthy, and complying with international norms. Violations of norms will be discounted, ignored, or attributed to forces beyond the control of the state and explanations will be accepted.[43] Thus the nuclear program of an ally will be attributed to situational factors and not to the character of the state. Since this behavior is seen as an aberration and not reflective of the true desires of the state, it is considered understandable and thus less threatening. The US is able to empathize with this state because it perceives it as being forced to develop nuclear weapons by factors beyond its control. This is similar to the US's argument that it must maintain a nuclear arsenal to deter aggression, not because it is aggressive.

Conversely, states with which the US does not identify itself will be "viewed more suspiciously and are often pejoratively classified as an out-group with a set of derogatory attributes that differentiate them from the community of democratic states."[44] The nuclear program of a rogue state is attributed to the disposition of that state which the US sees in negative terms and in contrast to its own positive characteristics. Since this behavior is perceived as an innate desire of the state, it is perceived as more threatening. Perceptions of states which do not clearly fit into the in-group or out-group categories will be more ambiguous.

The presence of attribution bias among US policymakers will be determined by a content analysis of official documents from the executive branch. These documents will

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[43]Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 754.

[44]Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517.

be examined in order to reveal whether the US attributes the motivations behind the nuclear programs of enemies and allies differently.

CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Content Analysis

Content analysis is defined as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context."[1] There are many techniques available for conducting content analysis such as frequency counts[2] or thematic density[3]; however, there is no single correct way to do content analysis.[4] The technique used should be dependent upon the nature of the study. While using a previously designed methodology provides the researcher with a proven method, it is possible and sometimes necessary to apply content analysis in new ways as long as it conforms to the criteria of replicability and validity.[5] Although content analysis is a relatively common technique, there are criticisms of its

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[1]Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980), 21.

[2]Krippendorff, *Content Analysis*, 100.

[3]Ronald L. Hatzenbuehier and Robert L. Ivie, *Congress Declares War: Rhetoric, Leadership, and Partisanship in the Early Republic* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1983), 40-44.

[4]Robert Philip Weber, *Basic Content Analysis*, 2d ed. (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990), 12.

[5]Ibid.

utility. Can intentions, motivations, or actual beliefs be inferred from what a person says? Do written statements really reflect policy or are they merely rhetoric or outright lies? Undoubtedly statements do not reflect a situation or belief with complete accuracy. While this may be more troubling for an analysis of an individual, it creates less problems for a study using a social group as its unit of analysis. Since the purpose of this study is to study a phenomenon which exists socially, attribution bias, there must be some connection between it and the way in which it is expressed--language.

Discussing the problems of content analysis leads to a similar problem with reliance upon official documents and statements. There are two problems, the use of rhetoric and, for lack of a better term, a political restraint, in the language of official documents. Rhetoric can be basically defined as "the management of symbols in order to coordinate social action"[6] and its presence is not a hindrance to this study. The nationally held beliefs and images of the enemy which are invoked by attribution bias are almost assuredly a part of political rhetoric. Rhetoric is often used to help create and sustain a nation's perception of its identity.[7]

The second problem with reliance on official documents for content analysis is more problematic. Political restraint is being used to mean the act of refraining from saying what might be true, but which is imprudent to say. It is almost a political correctness. For instance, policymakers rarely refer to states specifically when discussing

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[6]Gerard A. Hauser, *Introduction to Rhetorical Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 2.

[7]Murray Edelman, "Language, Myths and Rhetoric," *Society* 35, no.2 (January 1988): 131-139; and, Nathan Light, "Pizza in 30 Minutes, or How to Order a War: A Study of the Political Institution of Time," *Journal of American Culture* 17 (Spring 1994): 5-10.

nonproliferation in universally applicable terms. This is because it is unwise to single out some states for criticism and not others when trying to promote universal standards. Similarly, Israel's nuclear program is rarely mentioned. This is not because it does not exist or they do not have views on it; however, to acknowledge it is to invite criticism and questions of discrimination.

In this study, content analysis will be used to infer beliefs or assumptions made by the sender of the message. The sender of the message will not be the individual, but the policy making establishment of the United States government. In order to test the hypothesis that US policymakers are subject to attribution bias, a content analysis of official statements and documents emanating from the executive branch will be undertaken. The focus will be on the executive branch because it is primarily involved in the creation and implementation of nonproliferation policy.[8] The purpose of this content analysis is to infer from these documents whether the US exhibits attribution bias and associates the nuclear programs of enemy states with their character which is perceived in negative terms.

Research Design

A post-1990 time frame was chosen because nonproliferation has become a more prominent foreign policy goal since the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War.

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[8]Walton L. Brown, "Presidential Leadership and US Nonproliferation Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24(Summer 1994): 563-575.

Since more attention has been focused on the issue, it appears more frequently in official documents.

Five states have been chosen for a content analysis of US statements toward them and will be presented in a case study format. Four of the states are those most commonly referred to as rogues by the US during this time period. They are Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea and are perceived as enemies of the US based on the following factors. First, the US government, by referring to these states as rogues, has itself defined them as supporting policies which conflict with its national interest. Second the US has a history of conflict with each of these states. Third, the US does not maintain diplomatic ties with these states nor strong economic ties.

For comparative purposes, statements toward Pakistan will be examined. Pakistan is perceived as an ally based on the following factors. First, the US defines Pakistan as an ally and as maintains good diplomatic relations with it. Second, the US has a history of cooperation and friendship with it. Although Israel represents a better example of an American ally, its nuclear program is so overlooked that it has never been acknowledged, nor is it mentioned in official statements.

The first part of the case study will reflect the findings of the content analysis in quantitative terms. The description of the research design will be presented in four sections: 1) how the sample was derived, 2) how the text was coded and the recording scheme, 3) what the construct for inference is, and 4) how the results will be analyzed. The second half of the case study will be devoted to a qualitative discussion based upon selected sections of text.

Deriving the Sample

Deriving a sample of documents for the content analysis is necessary because the population of possible documents is enormous and would include at a minimum all presidential speeches and statements, all Congressional testimony given by members of the executive branch, and all interviews, speeches and press releases from all executive agencies and departments. The population could even be expanded beyond the executive branch to include statements by members of Congress, political analysts, and news commentators. The argument this thesis makes is that attribution bias is found across the spectrum of government policymakers and is a widely held assumption; however, this thesis has limited itself to the perceptions of the executive branch because it is most active in nonproliferation policy.

A sample of documents from the executive branch has been chosen using as a source *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM*, Volume 4, Number 1 which covers a time period of January 1990 to May 1996.[9] Although the sample of documents contained on the CD was not chosen randomly from the entire population, it is still random in the sense that the documents were chosen with no regard for the research of this study. The benefit of using this source instead of drawing an independent sample is that it makes it possible to search a large number of documents, thereby expanding the reliability of the findings.

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[9]The information included on the CD spans 6 major publication groups and includes approximately 492 separate publications and eight regional maps. The six major publications are the *US Department of State Dispatch*, *Dispatch* Supplements, Country Background Notes, Daily Press Briefing Transcripts, Congressional and Special Reports, and Regional Maps.

The documents drawn for the sample were those contained in the "speeches, testimony, statements" category. Documents within this category are mainly composed of speeches and testimony by a member of the executive branch published in the *US Department of State Dispatch.*

To obtain the document sample for each state, the name of the state was searched for within the database. The subject search was not used because it excluded documents which only briefly mentioned one of the states, but which could be relevant to the study. This is because it is the text of the documents which is important to this study, not the documents themselves nor, to lesser extend, their context. Therefore, even fairly meaningless references to the state become important for what they say or do not say.

Coding and Recording Scheme

In order to analyze the text, the concepts of interest must be given indicators. The three concepts of interest are the nuclear program of each state, references to character or dispositional factors, and references to situational factors. Differences between situational and dispositional attributions are not always clear as "most situational explanations imply assumptions about relevant dispositions."[10] This has created problems for the measurement of attribution bias. In order to clarify the distinction the following

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[10]Thomas C. Monson and Mark Snyder, "Actors, Observers, and the Attribution Process," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 13 (1977): 90.

definitions will be used.[11] Situational attributions are those explanations that state or imply no dispositions on the part of the actor beyond those typical of all or most actors. Dispositional attributions are those explanations that state or imply something unique or distinguishing about the actor. Another problem in the measurement of attribution arises from the difference between character and behavior. Information on whether attributions related to character and behavior are different have been mixed.[12] For the purposes of this study, no difference will be assumed; behavior will be considered an indicator of character. Other research has found that in order to be meaningful, behavior must also be distinguished by whether it is intentional or unintentional.[13] This study avoids this problem by focusing upon a behavior which cannot be considered anything but intentional--the creation of a nuclear weapons program.

A reference to the nuclear weapons program of a state will be indicated if the terms "nuclear weapons," "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)," "unconventional weapons" or "sensitive, dual-use technology" are mentioned in relation to the state's attempts to produce or acquire them. Subsequent references made indirectly by referring back to the program will also be included as long as the reference is clear. For instance, if the WMD program has already been mentioned and then a reference is made to the state's "efforts"

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[11]Lee Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 5.

[12]Judith A. Howard, "The Conceptualization and Measurement of Attributions," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 23 (1987): 47.

[13]Peter A. White, "Ambiguity in the Internal/External Distinction in Causal Attribution," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 27 (1991): 261.

or to "the program", this will be considered a reference to its nuclear program. Although WMD can refer to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, a reference to WMD will be taken as an indicator of its weapons program because it is usually meant to refer to all of these weapons. A reference specifically to a chemical or biological program will not be considered. Nor will general references to arms sales be considered unless it is made clear within the document that the arms include nuclear technology.

The definition for a reference to the character of a state is more subjective. The US's perception of each state's character will not be assumed but will be derived from the text. Therefore, a reference to the character of a state will be taken to mean any adjective that is used to describe the state, its actions or its government. References to the actions, behavior, or intentions of the state will also be taken as indicators of character. Through a preliminary examination of the documents for the rogue states, character references were found to fall into three broad categories: direct character references, behaviors, and intentions. While these categories do have some over-lap, each characteristic will be placed into the one category it most closely fits.

Direct character references are descriptions about the nature of the state. These would include descriptions of the government such as dictatorship or nondemocratic. Other direct character references could be isolated, fanatical or rejectionist. All these terms describe a relatively permanent aspect of the state. Other terms which will be considered direct character references will be rogue, outlaw and pariah. Although the definition of these terms includes ideas about behavior, character and intentions, they are intended as a description of the state.

Behavior is any action, physical or symbolic, taken by the state. This would include sponsoring terrorism, using violence, developing chemical and biological weapons, and opposing the peace process. In general these behaviors are seen to violate current international standards of behavior.

Intentions are considered to be any description of the purpose behind the actions and character of the state. In many cases, intentions and behavior may overlap. For example, references to threats from a state may be taken as behavior, or as its intention to threaten. In general, intentions will refer to actions which the US thinks or expects a state may take. Intentions are usually vague such as mention of offensive capabilities, blackmail, threats, and efforts to control or dominate a region or resources.

References to situational or external factors refer to factors beyond the control of the state. These may include changes in the international system, security concerns or economic pressure. External factors are unusual circumstances which the majority of states do not encounter on a regular basis.

Although it does make coding problematic, this type of open-ended coding provides greater flexibility and allows for characteristics which the coder may not anticipate.[14] This technique is especially useful when no previous research has been conducted.

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[14]Timothy W. Elig and Irene Hanson Frieze, "Measuring Causal Attributions for Success and Failure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37 (1979): 621.

Construct for Inference

In order to be able to infer an association between the nuclear weapons program of a state and its character from the sample of documents, a recording scheme for the indicators was created to determine if a pattern of co-occurrence exists. Co-occurrence refers to frequencies and patterns of word pairs within a document.[15] This type of inference is also called contingency analysis which involves counting how often a symbol appears in conjunction with another symbol.[16] Work done thus far on co-occurrences suggests that "above and below chance co-occurrences of references to concepts within a stream of discourse indicate cognitive associations and dissociations, respectively."[17] Thus frequent and spatially close references to both the nuclear program of a state and its character traits would indicate a cognitive association between the concepts.

The recording scheme for determining co-occurrence will be as follows. All references to the nuclear program of a state within each document will be noted, if they occur. References to both dispositional and situational factors will also be noted, if they occur in the same sentence as the reference to the nuclear program or if it appears within one sentence of the reference, before or after. This will be considered a co-occurrence. Although character references will be separated by type (i.e. character, behavior, intentions), the important distinctions for this research are whether or not a characterization was made

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[15]Krippendorff, *Content Analysis*, 107.

[16]Louis A. Gottschalk, *The Measurement of Psychological States Through the Content Analysis of Verbal Behavior* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 8.

[17]Krippendorff, *Content Analysis*, 107.

and if it is positive or negative. A narrow range for the co-occurrence is used to enhance the validity that the two terms are associated.

There are two limits to the reliability of the recording scheme. First, only one coder is being used; however, the instructions are explicit enough that judgment calls are minimized and replicability is possible. Second, because of the limited search capability of the database, all counts, except for the sample number of documents for each state, must be done by hand; however, this does allow for greater flexibility in determining indirect indicators. The question of reliability will be minimized by the qualitative discussion of the findings.

The construct for inferring a co-occurrence will be based on "the relative frequency of the observed contextual dependencies."[18] If a reference to the nuclear program of a state is mentioned, then does a character reference also occur? The analysis of the relative frequency of these two indicators occurring together will have two parts. First, the relative frequency of co-occurrences for each state will be determined using each reference to the nuclear program of the state. Support for attribution bias would be indicated by a high relative frequency of co-occurrences; however, it could be possible that a high co-occurrence would be due to other factors such as the terms are logically co-dependent. Therefore the second part of the analysis will compare the results of each state to the same analysis for Pakistan. By comparing the four rogue states to Pakistan it can be determined whether or not the distribution of the two concepts among the rogue states is normal for all states, or is specific to the rogue states. Even if the relative frequency of

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[18]Ibid., 100.

co-occurrences among the rogue states is low, a significantly higher or lower frequency for Pakistan would indicate a difference. Additionally, the results will be analyzed by type of characteristic to see if any patterns emerge.

Example

The following excerpt will be used to demonstrate how the text will be coded.

> When such leaders sit atop regional powers, such as Iran and Iraq, they may engage in violence and lawlessness that threaten the United States and other democracies. Such reactionary, "backlash" states are more likely to sponsor terrorism and traffic in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies. They are more likely to suppress their own people, foment ethnic rivalries, and threaten their neighbors.[19]

The reference to the nuclear program of both Iran and Iraq occurs in the second sentence of the example and the sentence before and after are included. References to character include "reactionary", "backlash" and "regional power". References to behavior include engaging in violence, lawlessness, sponsoring terrorism, suppressing their own people, fomenting ethnic rivalries and threatening neighbors, the US and other democracies. At first it would appear that the references to behavior would be coded as intentions; however, it has been established that the US sees these states as engaging in these activities, not merely intending to do so. No situational references were noted.

Table 1 provides an example of how the text will be coded into quantitative data.

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[19]Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," (address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 21 September 1993) *US Department of State Dispatch* 4, no.39 (27 September 1993): 658-664, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

Table 1. Coding Example for Content Analysis

Total Documents	1
References to Nuclear Weapons Program	1
Number of Character Co-occurrences	1
Number of Situational Co-occurrences	0

The total number of co-occurrences is based upon each reference to the nuclear weapons program. Therefore, although many references were made to the character of Iraq in the example, since there was only one mention of the nuclear program, there can be only one co-occurrence. In Table 2, the types of co-occurrences are broken down to provide more information about what types of references were made.

Table 2. Coding Example for Dispositional Co-occurrences

Type of Co-occurrence	#	%
Direct Character	1	100
Intentions	0	0
Behavior	1	100

Note: Percentages based upon 1 dispositional co-occurrence. Percentages will not add to 100%.

This breakdown acknowledges that several different character references may be made in conjunction with one reference to the nuclear weapons program; however, although several different direct character and behavior references were made, they were counted as one co-occurrence. This was done to prevent the data from distorting how often these types of references are made.

The second part of the analysis will be qualitative and use text examples from the sample of documents. The qualitative examples will highlight any patterns found in the quantitative data. This discussion will also provide greater detail such as variation across time, emergent patterns and differences between the cases.

CHAPTER 6
IRAQ

Iraq's nuclear program began in the 1970s when it contracted to purchase the Osiraq research reactor from France.[1] Although Iraq was party to the Nonproliferation Treaty and its nuclear facilities were under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Israel, fearful of Iraq's intentions, bombed Osiraq in June 1981.[2] After the destruction of the reactor, Iraq began a clandestine program in 1982 code named "Petrochemical 3."[3] It was not until after the Persian Gulf War, that the extent of this program was discovered.

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 which established procedures for "the destruction of Iraq's unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities and a subsequent monitoring program to prevent their reconstruction."[4] When inspections were begun under the auspices of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), the IAEA discovered that Iraq had made substantial

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[1]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 187.

[2]Spector and Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions* , 188.

[3]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 188.

[4]Ibid.

progress in developing uranium enrichment technology and weapon designs. Some estimated that Iraq had been only a couple of years away from having a fully assembled device. This research occurred in violation of Iraq's NPT obligations and while under IAEA inspections.

Since 1991 numerous inspection teams have discovered, documented and destroyed Iraq's capacity to build weapons of mass destruction; however, the delays and deceit by Iraqi officials have raised fears of hidden materials.[5] Also, many of the scientists and technicians who contributed to the program remain in Iraq. Even so, Iraq's current ability to produce weapons of mass destruction is curtailed by the destruction of its facilities, sanctions, and continued monitoring by the IAEA and UN.

US Relationship and Policy

Throughout the 1980s, the US and Iraq enjoyed semi-friendly relations. The US supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, maintained diplomatic and economic relations, and provided loans in the form of grain credits. US nonproliferation policies were laxly enforced against Iraq and many of the materials used in its weapons program were procured from the US and other Western nations. Further, the bulk of the funding for its nuclear weapons program went through an Atlanta branch of the Italian National Bank. This relationship drastically changed when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Soon Iraq had changed from an ally to a state compared to Nazi Germany and the Soviet

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[5]Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks," 173.

Union.[6] Iraq became the first official rogue state targeted by the US. The subsequent discovery of its nuclear weapons program added to the image.

US nonproliferation policy toward Iraq since 1990 is closely intertwined with the broad array of policies designed to oust Iraq from Kuwait, protect its minority populations and end its support for terrorism. Unofficially it is hoped that these policies will remove Saddam Hussein from power. Iraq has been subject to numerous UN Security Council Resolutions. These have mandated Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, the destruction of its nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities, an end to its repression of minorities, an end to its support for terrorism, and war reparations to Kuwait. Until Iraq complies with these resolutions, it remains under UN sanctions restricting both its imports and exports. The US insists that Iraq must meet all UN Resolutions before any sanctions are lifted. Despite Iraq's compliance with many of the resolutions and increasing opposition from other states such as France which feel it is time to begin removing sanctions, sanctions remain in effect.[7] In several instances, the US unilaterally changed the requirements for the lifting of sanctions.[8]

The hypothesis of this thesis is that US policymakers are affected by attribution bias in their perceptions of Iraq. These biases are generated in part by the relationship between the US and Iraq. This leads to an overperception of threat which is reflected in the harsh policies adopted. Iraq's nuclear program is considered the result of its aggressive and

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[6]William A. Gamson, "Hiroshima, the Holocaust, and the Politics of Exclusion," *American Sociological Review* 60 (1995): 7.

[7]Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy," 70.

[8]Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues," 196.

ambitious government and is a symbol of its hostile intentions. This perception linking the nuclear program to the character of the state heightens the sense of threat and discourages diplomacy.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 466 documents which pertained to Iraq between the period January 1990 and May 1996. The qualitative results showing the dispositional and situational co-occurrences for Iraq are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

	# of co-occurrences	%
Dispositional (negative)	151	74.8
Situational	1	0.0

Note: Percentages are based upon a total of 202 references to the nuclear program of Iraq.

Of the 202 separate references to the nuclear program of Iraq, 151 co-occurred with a negative reference to the character of Iraq resulting in a 74.8% co-occurrence. There was only one situational co-occurrence. These data indicate that US policymakers associated the character of Iraq with its nuclear program. In Table 4 the breakdown of specific dispositional and situational references by type is shown.

Table 4. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational References

DIRECT CHARACTER REFERENCES
pariah/outlaw/rogue/renegade
backlash/reactionary
repressive dictatorship/undemocratic/despot
ambitious
madman
untrustworthy
malevolent
isolated

INTENTIONS
attack other states
  target capitals
  offensive missile capability
  weapons beyond defensive needs
threat to regional and international peace and stability
threaten neighbors and US interests
rebuild WMD
blackmail
sow violence and disorder
dominate the Middle East
control energy supplies of the world
regional hegemony
revive a hot war
expansionistic

BEHAVIOR
threatens/intimidates
  neighbors
  United States
  other democracies
  democratic rights of its citizens
enemy of the Middle East peace process
sponsors terrorism
contributing to tensions
possesses biological and chemical weapons
used chemical weapons
uses violence
militarizing
invaded its neighbors and Kuwait
continued dispute with Kuwait
foments ethnic rivalries
human rights abuses

Table 4--Continued
inhumane policies
dangerous
repressive
aggressive
lawless
brutal
unpeaceful
contempt for civilized rules
manipulates hostages
noncompliance with UN resolutions and IAEA
  hiding biological program
  intimidates the UN
  noncooperation
  deceives and threatens inspectors
  denies nuclear program
  lied
  interfering with humanitarian efforts
unconditionally accepted UN Resolution 687

SITUATIONAL
insecurity due to the collapse of the USSR

All of the dispositional references made were negative except one. The one positive behavior reference, Iraq's unconditional acceptance of UN Resolution 687 mandating the destruction of its WMD facilities, occurred in June 1991, before Iraq began evading compliance. The term "isolated" could be taken as an indicator of Iraq's insecurity. Yet in the context used, it referred to Iraq's isolation from the international community brought about by its behavior. The frequency of dispositional references by type in Table 5 shows that the majority of dispositional references were to Iraq's behavior.

Table 5. Iraq: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

Type of Co-occurrence	#	%
Direct Character	37	24.5
Intentions	49	32.5
Behavior	114	75.5

Note: Totals based upon 151 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (202): direct character, 18.3%; intentions, 24.3%; and, behavior, 56.4%.

The majority of the character references to Iraq concerned its behavior which occurred in 75.5% of the co-occurrences. The predominant themes of behavior were Iraq's aggression and its unwillingness to comply with international standards and UN Resolutions.

There was a low co-occurrence with direct character references, 24.5%. Many of the character references, such as madman, malevolent, dictator, ambitious, and untrustworthy, referred specifically to Saddam Hussein. This suggests that the US attributes the actions of Iraq, including its nuclear program, to the personality of Saddam Hussein. This is supported by the frequent statement by the US during and after the Gulf War that its quarrel was not with the people of Iraq, but with its government.[9]

The co-occurrence of intentions, 32.5%, reveals that the US has little trust in Iraq and believes that it fully intends to continue its aggressive policies and weapons program as soon as sanctions are removed.

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[9]Ronald Neumann, "Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Iraq," (address at the Meridian International Center, Washington DC, 27 January 1994) *US Department of State Dispatch* 5, no.7 (7 February 1994): 66-68, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribution bias in its perceptions of Iraq's nuclear program. Iraq's nuclear program is a reflection of its character, embodied in Saddam Hussein, and its unacceptable behavior. The program was not attributed to situational factors.

Discussion

Between January 1990 and 1 August 1990, there were no references to Iraq's nuclear program. References began after its invasion of Kuwait. During the Persian Gulf War there was a 100% co-occurrence between references to its nuclear program and negative character references. Since the end of the war, the percentage of co-occurrences remained above 63%.

Although the most prominent character reference was "rogue", many character references centered on Saddam Hussein and attributed the nuclear program to his personal ambitions. As George Ward, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs, said,

> Coupled with the continuation of his tyrannical practices, Saddam Hussein's efforts to evade the eliminations of his weapons of mass destruction complete the portrait of a classic dictator, dangerous both to his own people and to his neighbors.[10]

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[10]George F. Ward Jr., "Iraq's Non-Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions," (statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 29 July 1992) *US Department of State Dispatch* 3, no. 31 (3 August 1992): 602-611, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

By linking the nuclear program to the personality of Hussein, the US feels it is unable to trust Iraq until he is removed from power.

The most frequent type of co-occurrence links the behavior of Iraq to its quest for nuclear weapons. By linking its violations of international standards to its nuclear program, the idea is reinforced that Iraq would not hesitate to violate other standards such as the use of nuclear weapons. In a 1995 speech, Deputy Secretary Talbott cited several of Iraq's concerning behaviors in conjunction with its nuclear program.

> As we reward the makers of peace, we must also deal firmly and consistently with the enemies of peace. That is why it is so important to continue our opposition to Iran and Iraq, the Middle East's most dangerous actors. These two nations are not only the most ardent opponents of the Middle East peace process; they are also the world's most flagrant state sponsors of terrorism--and they both seek to become nuclear powers.[11]

References to its support for terrorism especially increase the perception of threat posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of Iraq.

Although references to its behavior predominated, the statements about its intentions most clearly reveal how the US perceives the nuclear program of Iraq. The next three text examples incorporate references to character, behavior and intentions. The US perceives Iraq's intentions for developing nuclear weapons to be solely for the purpose of aggression. Vice President Quayle made this perception explicit in a 1991 speech.

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[11]Strobe Talbott, "American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World," (remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 24 April 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.18 (1 May 1995): 372-376, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

> They [the American people] know that over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has bankrupted his people to bankroll his army. They know that he has launched two wars of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at the cost of some 1 million casualties. They know that he is acquiring a stockpile of chemical and biological agents and has used chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people. They know he has launched an intensive campaign to acquire nuclear weapons. And they know that unless he is stopped today, nuclear- armed Iraq will control the bulk of the world's energy supply tomorrow, thereby holding a gun to all our heads.[12]

President Bush also expressly linked Iraq's nuclear program to Saddam Hussein.

> I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors should he possess a nuclear device. We've seen him use chemical weapons on his own people. We've seen him take his own country, one that should be wealthy and prosperous, and turn it into a poor country - all because of (his) insatiable appetite for military equipment and conquest.[13]

And Secretary of State James Baker stated in a 1990 speech,

> We understand that we can sacrifice now, or we can pay an even stiffer price later as Saddam moves to multiply his WMD: chemical, biological and, most ominous, nuclear. And we know that Saddam Hussein has never possessed a weapon that he hasn't used. And we will not allow the hope for a more peaceful world to rest in the hands of this brutal dictator.[14]

The US perceives Iraq as hostile and ambitious. It intends to develop nuclear weapons in order to dominate the Middle East and blackmail other states. These ambitions are

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[12]Dan Quayle, "America's Forces in the Gulf are Ready," (address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, CA, 8 January 1991) *US Department of State Dispatch* 2, no.2 (14 January 1991): 26-29 , reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[13]George Bush, "The Gulf: A World United Against Aggression," (opening statement at a White House news conference, Washington DC, 30 November 1990) *US Department of State Dispatch* 1, no.14 (3 December 1990): 295-296, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[14]James Baker, "Gulf Crisis: At a Crossroads," (remarks before the UN Security Council, New York City, 29 November 1990) *US Department of State Dispatch* 1, no.14 (3 December 1990): 297-298 ,reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

part of the character of Iraq and will not be changed by the imposition of sanctions or UN monitoring. If Iraq were to be released from sanctions, the US believes that it would instantly revive its nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. This belief is used to justify the continuation of sanctions even after Iraq has complied with UN Resolutions.

The character of Iraq is personified by Saddam Hussein. Many of the behaviors, intentions, and character references are made specifically about him. This suggests that the US's perception of Iraq could change dramatically if he were removed from power.

Although Iraq's program has been dismantled, it remains in the rogue category because of its efforts to prevent inspections and unwillingness to comply with UN Resolutions. Iraq's past and present actions have shown it to be aggressive and in violation of many international standards. Yet US policy has also been influenced by the perception that Iraq is determined to build nuclear weapons. While US fears may be justified, the experience of Iraq has influenced the US's perceptions of the other states classified as rogues.

CHAPTER 7
IRAN

Iran's nuclear program began under the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and was inherited by the Khomeini government when it seized power in 1979. The weapons research continued, but was slowed by the turmoil of the revolution and the following eight year war with Iraq.[1] In 1988, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran began to re-build its nuclear infrastructure and to cultivate relationships with foreign suppliers which included Argentina, Pakistan, China, North Korea, South Africa, and Russia.[2]

Despite the acceleration of Iran's nuclear weapons program in the 1990s, it is believed to be rudimentary and eight to ten years from producing a nuclear device.[3] This time could be shortened with substantial foreign assistance. Iran is a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its nuclear facilities are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Iran officially denies that it is pursuing nuclear weapons and two IAEA inspections have revealed no evidence of NPT violations. Iran says its nuclear program is intended solely for energy purposes.

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[1]Spector and Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions*, 203.

[2]Ibid., 213-214.

[3]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 119.

US Relationship and Policy

The US's relationship with Iran has suffered due to their history of conflict. The US enjoyed good relations with Iran under the Shah's pro-Western regime. This changed when the revolution occurred and fifty-two American diplomats were taken hostage. The US severed diplomatic relations with Iran which have yet to be restored. Iran has been placed under increasing trade and investment restrictions by the US. These sanctions are in response to a number of behaviors which include its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism, opposition to the Middle East peace process, threats against its neighbors, and its poor human rights record.[4] Despite tensions, the US has not ruled out the possibility of improved relations if Iran were to modify its behavior.

Since the 1980s, Iran has been subject to a number of export and trade controls from the US. All dual-use and military items are prohibited from export as well as any additional items forbidden under anti-terrorism legislation.[5] In 1994 the President issued an executive order that banned all direct and indirect trade and investment with Iran.[6] The 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act takes sanctions to an extreme and allows the US to sanction foreign firms doing business with these states. The US has pressed to create multilateral sanctions on Iran, but has failed to gain the support of the international

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[4]US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, *Background Notes-Iran* 5, no.8 (Washington DC: GPO, July 1994.)

[5]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 119.

[6]Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues," 200.

community. It has persuaded some third parties not to make loans or grant debt relief to Iran.[7]

After the Persian Gulf War, the US began focusing upon Iran's weapons programs. In 1994 and into early 1995, the US implemented a policy of complete nuclear denial to Iran.[8] Iran argued that this violated Article VI under the NPT which requires the sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and hinted that it would terminate its NPT membership. Also in 1994 Russia was pressured into halting the sale of two reactors to Iran. Although no specific threats were made to Russia, it was implied that if the sale occurred, Russian aid would need to be reevaluated and that its relationship with the US would be undermined.[9]

The hypothesis is that due to the US's antagonistic relationship with Iran, US policymakers are affected by attribution bias in their perceptions of Iran. Iran's nuclear program will be attributed to its internal character which the US perceives as aggressive and unaccepting of international norms. This perception leads policymakers to overestimate threat and prefer sanctions and threats to diplomacy.

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[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., 199.

[9]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 120.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 201 documents pertaining to Iran between January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 6 the qualitative results showing the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences for Iran are shown.

Table 6. Iran: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

	# of co-occurrences	%
Dispositional (negative)	75	67.6
Situational	0	0

Note: Percentages are based upon a total of 111 references to the nuclear program of Iran.

Of the 111 separate references to the nuclear program of Iran, 75 co-occurred with a negative reference to the character of Iran resulting in a 67.6% co-occurrence. There were no situational co-occurrences. These data indicate that US policymakers attributed the nuclear program of Iran to its character, not external factors. In Table 7 the break-down of specific dispositional references by type is shown.

Table 7. Iran: Dispositional References

DIRECT CHARACTER REFERENCES
pariah/rogue/outlaw/renegade
reactionary/backlash
irresponsible
intolerant
truculent
isolated
important

Table 7--Continued

INTENTIONS

threat to peace, security and stability
engaged in a military build-up
security risk
blackmail
sow violence and disorder throughout the region and beyond
energetically seek to develop WMD
potential adversary

BEHAVIOR

supports terrorism
opposes the Middle East peace process
threatens and menaces neighbors and the US
human rights abuses
concerning/unacceptable policies and behavior
uses violence and terror
dangerous
supports extremist groups
intimidates and eliminates opponents
outlaw behavior
assassination
supports terror and subversion
pursues destabilization policies
violates norms and basic standards of international conduct
lawless
suppress its own people
undermines peace
heavy-handed assertion of authority

All of the dispositional references made were negative except one, the character reference "important." The frequency of dispositional references by type in Table 8 shows that the majority of these references were to Iran's behavior.

Table 8. Iran: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

Type of Co-occurrence	#	%
Direct Character	21	28.0
Intentions	17	22.7
Behavior	57	76.0

Note: Percentages based upon 75 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (111): direct character, 18.9%; intentions, 15.3%; and, behavior, 51.4%.

The majority of the character references to Iran concerned its behavior which occurred in 76% of the co-occurrences. In general the references were to Iran's threatening behavior and its violations of international standards. Of the 57 behavior co-occurrences 45 included reference to Iran's support for terrorism.

There were lower co-occurrences with direct character references and intentions. These references indicated that the US perceived Iran as developing its nuclear program for aggressive purposes.

These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribution bias in its perceptions of Iran's nuclear program. Iran's nuclear program is a reflection of its character which is most clearly exemplified by its unacceptable behaviors. There were no references, either directly or indirectly, to any external motivations.

Discussion

No mention was made of Iran's nuclear program during 1990-91, the Persian Gulf War period. During this time, US references to Iran were cautiously positive, citing its

noninterference and support for sanctions during the Gulf War. In 1992, the US began increasingly to focus upon the nuclear program of Iran as a potential Iraq.

By linking Iran's quest for nuclear weapons with other unacceptable behaviors such as terrorism, the US heightens the perception of threat posed by its program. As Secretary of State Christopher stated,

> Iran's role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism makes its secret quest for weapons of mass destruction even more alarming. We must stand together to prevent Iran from acquiring such threatening capabilities.[10]

Although support for terrorism is the predominate behavioral reference, the US also links Iran's nuclear program with a number of other unacceptable behaviors. In a 1995 speech, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff said,

> On April 30 of this year, President Clinton announced his decision to sever all trade and investment ties between the United States and Iran. These new sanctions represent American willingness to take actions - even those that may hurt competing US interests - to increase the cost to Iran of its irresponsible behavior. Iran engages in terrorism, obstructs the Arab-Israeli peace process, pursues weapons of mass destruction, pursues a threatening military build-up in the Persian Gulf, and abuses the human rights of its citizens. These activities, which threaten important US interests, should be unacceptable to all members of the international community.[11]

By associating Iran's nuclear program with other unacceptable and aggressive behaviors, the intentions behind its program become more suspect. The US also

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[10]Warren Christopher, "The U.N.: The Momentum for Reform Must Accelerate," (address at the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 25 September 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.40 (2 October 1995): 711-714, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[11]Peter Tarnoff, "Sanctions on Iran," (statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Washington DC, 11 October 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.43 (23 October 1995): 768-770, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

perceives parallels between the programs of Iran and Iraq which casts further doubts upon the intentions of Iran. In 1995, Secretary of State Christopher said,

> Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons also poses enormous dangers - for countries in the region and for all of us. Every responsible member of the international community has an interest in seeing those efforts fail. There is absolutely no room for complacency. Remember Iraq: Five years ago, too many were willing to give Saddam Hussein the benefit of the doubt. We must not make the same mistake with Iran.[12]

Since the US emphasizes the behavior of Iran, not its form of government or leader, it is possible that the US would be willing to improve relations with Iran if its behavior were modified. As Secretary Christopher stated,

> Iran is an important country that could make significant contributions to the international community. But first it must end behavior which threatens its neighbors and seeks to undermine the pursuit of peace. Iran must end its support for terrorism, its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and its efforts to undermine the peace process. We will work with our friends in the region and with other nations to make sure that Iran's leaders under stand the high costs of continuing to pursue destabilizing policies.[13]

The US attributes Iran's nuclear program to its hostile character, behavior, and intentions. Iran is not developing nuclear weapons because of security concerns with Iraq or Israel, but because of its ambitious and aggressive nature. This perception is reflected in the US's unwillingness to trust Iran with any type of nuclear technology.

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[12]Warren Christopher, "American Leadership in the Middle East: Supporting the Friends and Opposing the Enemies of Peace," (address before the National Leadership Conference of the Anti-Defamation League, Washington DC, 4 April 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.15 (10 April 1995): 292-295, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[13]Warren Christopher, "U.S. Commitment to the Middle East Peace Process," (address before the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Arlington, VA, 23 April 1993) *US Department of State Dispatch* 4, no.18 (5 May 1993): 309-311, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

CHAPTER 8
LIBYA

Libya's first attempt to acquire nuclear weapons occurred in 1970 when it tried to purchase nuclear arms from China.[1] Although this attempt failed, Libya, under the leadership of Muammer Khadafi, continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons by beginning an indigenous program and through repeated attempts to purchase them. This behavior occurred despite Libya's accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975.

Libya failed to make substantial progress in its nuclear program via either of these routes. As of 1995, Libya has made little progress in developing the necessary infrastructure to manufacture a nuclear device. It currently possesses one 10 MWt light water research reactor located at Tajoura which is operating under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.[2] Likewise, its continued attempts to purchase a nuclear device, especially since the breakup of the USSR, have been unsuccessful.

The embryonic nature of its nuclear program has not prevented a rhetorical stance by Libya which identifies it as a proliferation concern. Khadafi has continued to assert that

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[1]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 141.

[2]Ibid., 143. This type of reactor uses low-enriched uranium as fuel and is considered a low proliferation risk.

the Arab states should possess a nuclear device against other nuclear nations such as the US and Israel. In a 1987 speech, Khadafi stated,

> If there is going to be a game using atomic bombs, then it should not be played against the Arab nation. The Arabs should have it, but we undertake not to drop it on anyone. However, if someone is going to drop one on us, or if someone is going to threaten our existence and independence even without the use of an atomic weapon, then we should drop it on them. This is an essential defensive weapon.[3]

US Relationship and Policy

The US's perception of Libya is influenced by both its behavior and its rhetoric. Libya obviously has ambitions to develop nuclear weapons; however, the US's perception is also influenced by its relationship with Libya. This relationship has continued to decline since Khadafi came to power in 1969 and the US was forced to evacuate in 1970.[4] The US has not maintained diplomatic relations with Libya since 1981 when it closed the Libyan embassy in Washington. In 1986, the US bombed Libya for its suspected involvement in the Berlin discotheque terrorist bombing.[5]

As with Iraq and Iran, the US has implemented nonproliferation policies against Libya which are harsher and broader than those applied to other countries. Libya is denied

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[3]"Al-Qadhdhafi Lectures University Students," Tripoli Television Service, 2032 GMT, 2 November 1987, translated in *FBIS-NES*, (3 November 1987): 19, quoted in Spector and Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions*, 178.

[4]Mansour O. El-Kikhia, *Libya's Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997), x.

[5]US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, *Background Notes-Libya* 5, no.8 (Washington DC: GPO, July 1994.)

nuclear exports. It is also under the same trade and investment restrictions as Iran, including bans on imports and exports, travel and commercial contracts. These sanctions are in response to a multitude of behaviors including its support for international terrorism, specifically its involvement in the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings. These incidents also led to UN Security Council Resolutions which the US fully supports.

The hypothesis is that US policymakers are affected by perceptual biases which attribute the nuclear program of Libya to its internal character. It wants to develop nuclear weapons because it is violent, aggressive, and ambitious. The US perceives its nuclear program as both a result and an indicator of its hostile intentions and character. This perception heightens the sense of threat from this state. As with Iraq and Iran, this demonization does not allow for diplomacy or negotiation in dealing with this state.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 100 documents which pertained to Libya between the period January 1990 and May 1996. Table 9 shows the quantitative results of the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences.

Table 9. Libya: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

	# of co-occurrences	%
Dispositional (negative)	18	85.7
Situational	0	0

Note: Percentages based upon 21 references to the nuclear program of Libya.

Of the 21 separate references to the nuclear program of Libya, 18 co-occurred with a reference to the character of Libya, resulting in an 85.7% co-occurrence. There were no situational co-occurrences. These data indicate that US policymakers attributed the nuclear program of Libya to its character, not external factors. In Table 10 the break-down of specific dispositional references by type is shown.

Table 10. Libya: Dispositional References

DIRECT CHARACTER REFERENCE
rogue, outlaw, pariah
isolated
force of rejection
no accountability of leaders

INTENTIONS
poses a threat
weapons for attack

BEHAVIOR
sponsors terrorism
enemy of the peace process
uses violence
destabilizing activities
threatens its citizens
possesses chemical weapons
destabilizing activities
threatens others

All of the references to Libya's character, intentions, and behavior were negative. The frequencies of dispositional references by type in Table 11 shows that the majority of the references pertained to Libya's character.

Table 11. Libya: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

Type of Co-occurrence	#	%
Direct Character	13	72.2
Intentions	4	22.2
Behavior	11	61.1

Note: Percentages based upon 18 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (21): direct character, 61.9%; intentions, 19.0%; and, behavior, 52.4%.

The most prominent references were to its character which occurred in 72.2% of the co-occurrences. The most common character reference was rogue, which encompasses its character, behavior and intentions. The term rogue, pariah, or outlaw occurred in 57.1% of the co-occurrences. Also there was a strong co-occurrence with its behavior, especially its support for international terrorism, which occurred in 52.4% of all references to its nuclear program.

The character reference of "isolated" could be understood to mean that Libya is insecure and therefore feels the need to defend itself; however, as with Iraq, in the context of the speeches examined, "isolated" referred to the idea that Libya's behavior has isolated it from the international community and that it needs to be isolated in order to control its behavior.

These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribution bias in its perceptions of Libya's nuclear program. Libya's nuclear program is a reflection of its character and an example of its unacceptable behavior. There were no references, either directly or indirectly, to any possible external motivation such as pressure by another state or security concerns.

Discussion

As with Iran, no mention was made of Libya's program during 1990-91, the Gulf War period. Beginning in 1992 and steadily increasing each year, the US began focusing upon Libya as a rogue state and comparing it to Iraq.

Libya provides the fewest references to a nuclear program of the four rogues discussed. In addition, Libya is often mentioned in conjunction with Iraq and Iran; therefore, only two additional examples will be discussed here to illustrate the points already made.

First, the US associates Libya's nuclear program with the nature of its regime and attributes hostile intentions to it. As Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, said,

> The situation is particularly grim in Iraq and Libya. These outlaw states illustrate the general point I made earlier: regimes which threaten their citizen's democratic rights also threaten other regimes and peoples. Acting without accountability, their leaders have poured their national treasure into militarization and efforts to produce WMD - biological, chemical and nuclear. Although the drive to acquire such horrific weapons was largely designed to attack other states and peoples, Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons on his own people in northern Iraq showed that the line between domestic and international violence of despots is blurred.[6]

This statement clearly reflects the belief that Libya's (and Iraq's) purpose in developing nuclear weapons is for offensive purposes. By linking its behavior to Iraq, the inference becomes that Libya would not hesitate to use WMD if acquired, just as Iraq has done. It also suggests that their drive for WMD is linked to the undemocratic nature of

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[6]Robert H. Pelletreau, "Political Reform in the Middle East: America's Stake" (remarks made before the Foundation for Democratization and Political Liberalization in the Middle East, Washington DC, 20 October 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.44 (30 October 1995): 800-802, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

these regimes by saying that the leaders have no accountability and threaten their citizens' democratic rights. As with Iraq, Libya's WMD programs are seen to be the product of the state's desire, embodied in its leadership.

Second, the US also associates Libya's nuclear program with other unacceptable behaviors and violations of international standards, especially terrorism. Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated,

> We are cooperating closely with the United Nations and a coalition of allies to end Libyan- sponsored terrorism. The United States is playing a leading role in the international effort to ensure that the Libyan Government complies with all aspects of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748, including bringing the perpetrators of the Pan Am [flight]103 and UTA [flight] 772 bombings to justice and ceasing its support for terrorism and pursuit of non-conventional weapons.[7]

The association between terrorism and WMD suggests the belief that Libya would use these weapons in terrorist attacks or provide them to terrorist organizations. In addition, by associating other unacceptable behaviors with the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the possibility that Libya would violate international standards and use nuclear weapons is enhanced. References to its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process reinforces Libya's unpeaceful image.

While Libya has made the least progress in its weapons program, it has had an antagonistic relationship with the US longer than Iraq or Iran. Virtually no ties between Libya and the US exist. Its nuclear program is the most consistently cast in threatening terms and attributed to the internal character of the state.

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[7]Edward P. Djerejian, "Review of US Efforts to Achieve Near East Policy Goals," (statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 24 June 1992) *US. Department of State Dispatch* 3, no.26 (29 June 1992): 514-518, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

CHAPTER 9
NORTH KOREA

Although North Korea's interest in nuclear weapons dates from the 1950s, there was no indication of substantial progress until 1984 when the US detected the construction of a large reactor at Yongbyon.[1] North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but did not conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until April 1992. During that time, North Korea developed an extensive nuclear weapons program and may have reprocessed enough plutonium to create one or two nuclear devices.[2] When the IAEA was allowed to inspect North Korea's facilities in May 1992, it found discrepancies in its records for plutonium production.[3] When the IAEA called for a special inspection to resolve the discrepancy, North Korea refused and announced it would withdraw from the NPT.

The crisis over inspections lasted until 21 October 1994 when the US and North Korea concluded the "Agreed Framework." Under this agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze construction on its nuclear facilities, allow the IAEA to verify the freeze, not to reprocess

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[1]Michael Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea," *International Security* 20, no.2 (Fall 1995): 94.

[2]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 103.

[3]Ibid.

its spent fuel, and ultimately, to ship all its spent fuel out of the country and dismantle all its facilities of proliferation concern. In return, North Korea would receive two light-water reactors, aid in meeting its energy needs, and security assurances. Light-water reactors are considered proliferation resistant because they produce only small amounts of plutonium. The US and South Korea would also work to improve relations with North Korea.[4] Improving relations and addressing other issues of concern were considered vital by the US in the negotiation of the Framework.

Subsequent to the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, the status of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is uncertain. The US government is optimistic that its program has been halted and will ultimately be completely dismantled. Critics of the agreement, however, believe North Korea may be hiding nuclear materials and using the agreement to give it more time to develop weapons. Their biggest criticism is that North Korea does not have to submit to inspections until the two light-water reactors are completed. This could take from four to six years. During that time, North Korea could produce enough plutonium for several weapons.

US Relationship and Policy

The US and North Korea had a hostile relationship throughout the Cold War period. They engaged in open hostilities during the Korean War and tensions continued when North Korea aligned with the Soviet block. The US's security commitment to South

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[4]Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 276-280.

Korea kept tensions alive through the 1980s. During this time the US and North Korea maintained no diplomatic or economic ties.

After the collapse of the USSR, there was potential for improved relations. During this time, North Korea began a dialogue with South Korea and the US on security issues. In September 1991 President Bush announced the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. Later that year, North and South Korea signed a Non-aggression and Reconciliation Agreement and agreed to conduct bilateral inspections on their nuclear facilities. It also cooperated with the US on MIAs from the Korean War. These small steps at reducing tensions were hindered when the crisis over inspections erupted.

Some scholars and politicians believe that North Korea used its nuclear program as leverage to gain diplomatic recognition from the US and improve relations.[5] With the end of the Cold War, North Korea had lost its major supporter and now found itself more isolated from the international community than ever before. While Russia and China moved to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, the US did not extend similar overtures to North Korea. The worsening economic conditions further undermined the regime. The inspections crisis gave North Korea the leverage to begin a dialogue with the US on political and economic issues which has improved its international position.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the US had no nuclear dealings with North Korea. As a client of the USSR, it was considered the Soviet's nonproliferation concern. Since the breakup of the USSR, the US has followed a policy of strict technology denial toward

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[5]Ibid., 231.

North Korea. Although concerned over its missile sales to other countries, the US did not become overly involved in nonproliferation efforts toward it until its attempted withdrawal from the NPT. At this time the US's immediate response was to sanction North Korea by banning arms imports and exports, followed by termination of international financial dealing if it continued to refuse inspections.[6] There was also discussion of military strikes to destroy its nuclear facilities. Allies of the US such as Japan and South Korea, opposed sanctions, fearing that they would prompt further proliferation by North Korea. The crisis was averted when former President Jimmy Carter began mediation with North Korea which resulted in the "Agreed Framework."

Unlike policy toward the other rogue states, US policy mixed sanctions and threats with diplomacy and economic incentives. Although the US's initial response was to treat North Korea as other rogues, two factors prevented this. First, allies pressured the US to negotiate with North Korea. Second, North Korea's program was more advanced than the other rogues. It possibly already had a nuclear device. Further, North Korea's isolation would weaken the impact of any sanctions imposed. At that point, threats would achieve little where as incentives could induce compliance.

The hypothesis is that US policymakers exhibit attribution bias in their perception of North Korea's nuclear program. Attributing its program to internal characteristics of the state leads to overperceptions of threat and possibly to excessive policy options. However, since US policy has not been consistently harsh toward North Korea, less attribution bias may be expected.

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[6]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 104.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 200 documents pertaining to North Korea between January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 12 the quantitative results indicating the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences are shown.

Table 12. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

	# of co-occurrences	%
Dispositional (negative)	112	38.6
Situational	6	2.1

Note: Percentages based upon 290 references to the nuclear program of North Korea.

Of the 290 separate references to the nuclear program of North Korea, 112 co-occurred with a negative reference to the character of North Korea, resulting in a 38.6% co-occurrence. In addition, there were 6 situational co-occurrences. These data indicate that US policymakers do not consistently attribute its nuclear program to dispositional factors. While the situational co-occurrences were not significant, the percentage of dispositional co-occurrences was much lower than for the other rogue states. In Table 13 the breakdown of specific dispositional and situational references by type is shown.

Table 13. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational References

DIRECT CHARACTER
pariah/rogue
isolated
like Iraq
ambitious
fearful of the future

INTENTIONS
threaten
  US
  South Korea and Japan
  Northeast Asia
  international peace and security
blackmail
provoke destabilizing nuclear arms race
undermine nonproliferation efforts
sell nuclear weapons to outlaw regimes
military confrontation
target South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and others
extort terms for reunification
undermine regional security
threaten use

BEHAVIOR
dangerous
created a crisis
noncompliance with safeguards agreement and NPT obligations
refused to permit full inspections
internal repression
at odds with international community
developed ballistic missiles
military build-up
sold technology to rogue states
threatened NPT withdrawal
support for terrorism

SITUATIONAL
regional political instability
economic hardship
underlying sources to insecurity and instability
difficult relations with Japan
tensions on the peninsula
4 decades of military confrontation

All of the dispositional references were negative and similar to those made about the other rogue states. North Korea's nuclear program was associated with its rogue character, hostile intentions, and unacceptable behavior. Yet these associations were not consistently made and the frequencies of the dispositional references by type in Table 14 show that the majority of them were to North Korea's intentions.

Table 14. North Korea: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

Type of Co-occurrence	#	%
Direct Character	16	14.3
Intentions	78	69.6
Behavior	42	37.5

Note: Percentages based upon 112 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (290): direct character, 5.5%; intentions, 26.9%; and, behavior, 14.5%.

The most prominent references were to its intentions which occurred in 69.6% of the co-occurrences. In 64 of the references, the intent to threaten was mentioned. US policymakers demonstrated the most concern over what North Korea might do, not its current behavior or character.

These finding provide weak support for the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribution bias in its perceptions of North Korea's nuclear program. It did not consistently attribute its nuclear program to its character and occasionally acknowledged some situational factors which might contribute to its program. Why the US's perception of North Korea is different from the other rogues is not clear from the content analysis; however, pressure from allies and the advanced nature of its program account for the

willingness to negotiate. It may be that once the US began negotiating it felt the need to moderate its rhetoric and once an agreement was reached, it felt confident in giving North Korea the benefit of the doubt.

Discussion

In some ways the US perceives North Korea like the other rogues. It expresses concern over its past behavior and government and also compares its behavior to Iraq's. In 1995, Secretary of State Christopher stated,

> This remains a dangerous world....We have to be constantly vigilant to make sure that countries like Iraq and North Korea are denied weapons of mass destruction and prevented from menacing their neighbors. [7]

The majority of the references are to what North Korea would do if it obtained nuclear weapons. The focus upon its intentions suggests that the US perceives North Korea as a potential threat, but one that can be prevented. As Craig Johnston, Director of Resources, Plans, and Policy said,

> The agreements which will keep North Korea from developing a nuclear weapons capability will cost $22 million next year. Compare this with the $4 billion the Japanese and South Koreans are putting up! Compare this with the costs we will pay if the effort fails and North Korea develops nuclear weapons with which to blackmail the world.[8]

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[7]Warren Christopher, "Resources for Leadership," (statement at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, 20 September 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.39 (25 September 1995): 703-705, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no. (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[8]Craig Johnston, "Foreign Policy on the Cheap: You Get What You Pay For," (address before the Seattle World Affairs Council, Seattle, WA, 6 June 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.42 (16 October 1995): 743-745, reproduced in *U.S.*

Despite the perception of hostile intentions, the US has also shown an awareness of North Korea's security concerns. Although there were only six references to situational factors, they indicate that the US is not unaware of the external motivations of North Korea. Thomas McNamara, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, indicated this when he said,

> The breakup of the FSU has, in some cases, increased the level of insecurity of the FSU's former clients and their motivation to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-D.P.R.K.-are cases in point.[9]

Additionally, the US made 65 references to the fact that the North Korean nuclear program was now frozen and would be dismantled. This references could be taken as an indication of North Korea's behavior, but were not counted as such because the US usually attributed the freeze to its negotiating powers or to the Agreed Framework and not to the willingness of North Korea.

Both US statements and its policy reflect a less critical view of North Korea's nuclear program and a willingness to negotiate. Two factors may account for this. First, relations with the US were beginning to improve with the end of the Cold War with the USSR. Second, North Korea's program is more advanced than the other states. The US may have felt more of an imperative to negotiate with North Korea because it could quickly assemble a nuclear device. However, the more moderate rhetoric may simply be

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Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[9]Thomas E. McNamara, "Rethinking Proliferation In the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenge of Technology," (address to the Wilton Park Special Conference, London, UK, 8 December 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.50, 51, 52 (December 1995): 928-931, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

attributed to the fact that the US was engaged in negotiations with North Korea and did not want to jeopardize any agreement. Once negotiations began, it nuclear program was often referred to as the "nuclear issue" or "nuclear situation" and not as a weapons program. In this way the threatening aspects of the program were downplayed as the US negotiated.

US policymakers did not exhibit strong attribution bias in their statements about North Korea's nuclear program. Although they did not attribute it to situational factors, they did not consistently see it as a reflection North Korea's desire or hostile intentions. Despite this ambiguity, North Korea is still classed as a rogue which suggests that the US may have only moderated its rhetoric due to the negotiations; however, if the Agreed Framework is successful and relations improve, North Korea may move out of the rogue category.

CHAPTER 10
PAKISTAN

Pakistan became interested in nuclear power as an energy source during the 1950s.[1] It was not until 1972, after defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, that Pakistan secretly began its nuclear weapons program.[2] By the early 1980s, it had made substantial progress by acquiring materials and expertise from abroad. Pakistan's Cold War relationship with the US during the 1980s exempted it from the majority of US nonproliferation legislation and allowed it to acquire technology it otherwise would not have been able to obtain. There were also rumors of Chinese assistance is the form of weapons designs.

By the late 1980s, the US was aware that Pakistan's program had reached the advanced stages. After 1990, the US assumed that Pakistan was able to manufacture a nuclear device within a few days, although most intelligence sources agreed that Pakistan had chosen not to assemble a completed nuclear device. Any doubts about Pakistan's ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon were dispelled when it tested five nuclear devices in late May 1998 in response to a series of Indian tests earlier in the month.

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[1]Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 116.

[2]Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation*, 97.

Pakistan is not a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The majority of its nuclear facilities are not under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.[3] Pakistan has been willing to discuss joining the NPT, but only in tandem with India. Until its 1998 tests, Pakistan remained officially vague about its nuclear capabilities.

US Relationship and Policy

In comparison to the rogue states, Pakistan has enjoyed a better relationship with the US. Yet it has not been without tension. Since Pakistan's creation in 1947, their relationship has fluctuated between friendship and alliance to distrust and apathy.[4] During the 1950s and again in the 1980s the two states cultivated a relationship based on security interests. At other times their interests have diverged because US security interests focused upon the USSR while Pakistan's main concern was India. For instance, when the US provided arms to India in 1962 in response to its conflict with China, Pakistan became distrustful of the US's commitment to it. The relationship also stagnated during the 1970s while the US pursued detente with the USSR because Pakistan's strategic value as a buffer state was lessened.[5] After the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the relationship again improved as the US began supplying Pakistan with large amounts of military aid in order to combat Soviet aggression.

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[3]Ibid., 101.

[4]Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan.*

[5]Ibid., 10.

These types of fluctuations have also occurred in the US's relationships with several of the rogue states; however, there are some notable differences. First, unlike the rogue states, the US and Pakistan have not engaged in open hostilities. Downturns in relations with Iraq and Iran led to military actions and the severing of diplomatic ties. Second, the US sees Pakistan as pro-Western and acknowledges its democratic institutions. There is also cooperation between them on issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking.

When the rogue image began to take shape in the late 1980s, Pakistan was considered a potential rogue;[6] however, it remained outside of this category in part because of its continued strategic value. In addition, the history of cooperation between the two states allowed the US to identify in some ways with Pakistan and thus influenced its perception of Pakistan. Pakistan was seen in a better light and given the benefit of the doubt in many cases. For instance, the US is quick to acknowledge Pakistan's development of democratic institutions despite the fact that before 1988 there had not been a democratically elected government in almost two decades. In comparison, Iran is rarely given credit for its democratic institutions by the US. Thus areas of common interest and a history of co-operation create a better relationship and a basis for identification between the US and Pakistan.

US nonproliferation policy toward Pakistan has been a mixture of sanctions and diplomacy. In the 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear program was overlooked in order to maintain its friendship. The US finally took action in 1990 when President Bush failed to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and sanctions were imposed under the Pressler

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[6]Klare, *Rogue States*, 25.

Amendment. Despite tensions over the imposition of sanctions, the US has maintained diplomatic and economic ties with Pakistan.

During the 1990s US policy has focused on diplomatic pressure and sanctions to induce India and Pakistan to implement confidence building measures and to work in parallel in cap and eventually roll-back their nuclear programs. White House officials feel that the sanctions imposed under the Pressler Amendment impede their nonproliferation efforts rather than enhance them because it prevents closer relations.[7]

In 1998, new sanctions were imposed under the Glenn Amendment for Pakistan's testing of nuclear devices. Yet even this behavior has not prompted the US to implement sanctions of the variety imposed on Iraq or the other rogue states.[8] Following Pakistan's tests, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while acknowledging the need not to reward India and Pakistan, also emphasized that these countries should not be isolated or made pariahs by the international community.[9]

The hypothesis is that due to its relatively good relationship with Pakistan, US policymakers should attribute Pakistan's nuclear weapons program more to situational

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[7]Robin L. Raphel, "South Asia After the Cold War: India and Pakistan," (statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 14 September 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.39 (25 September 1995): 706-708, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[8]As of June 1998, the US had not terminated all economic and diplomatic ties with Pakistan.

[9]Madeleine Albright, "NPT Will Not be Amended to Accommodate India, Pakistan," in *USIS Washington File* [database on-line]; available from http://www.usia.gov/current/news/latest/9... It.html?/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml; Internet; accessed 8 June 1998.

factors than internal characteristics. The US is able to understand and justify Pakistan's program because it identifies with it. Although this identification is not as close as with Israel, it is far more than with any of the rogue states. Since the program is not seen as reflecting the true nature of Pakistan, the program is seen as less threatening and the US is able to use more diplomatic tactics to deal with the underlying reasons for Pakistan's program.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 103 documents which pertained to Pakistan between the period January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 15 the qualitative results indicating the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences are shown.

Table 15. Pakistan: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

	# of co-occurrences	%
Dispositional (negative)	14	32.6
Situational	31	72.1

Note: Percentages based upon 43 references to the nuclear program of Pakistan.

Of the 43 separate references to the nuclear program of Pakistan, 31 co-occurred with a reference to a situational factor resulting in a 72.1% co-occurrence. There were 14 co-occurrences with a negative dispositional reference resulting in a 32.6% co-occurrence.

These data indicate that US policymakers attributed the nuclear program of Pakistan more often to situational factors, than to its character. In Table 16 the breakdown of specific situational and dispositional factors is shown.

TABLE 16. Pakistan: Situational and Dispositional References

SITUATIONAL
India
  tensions with
  possesses nuclear weapons
  political differences
  Kashmir dispute
  producing ballistic missiles
Regional context of proliferation in South Asia
National Security

DIRECT CHARACTER REFERENCE
democratic
US ally

INTENTIONS
seeks ballistic missiles
threat to regional and international stability and security

BEHAVIOR
concerning behavior
unsafeguarded nuclear energy program
inflexible policies and attitudes
drains scarce national resources
damages international relations
undermines US interests

Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons is clearly attributed to its security concerns, specifically its conflict with India and that state's possession of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's relationship with India was mentioned in 29 of the 31 situational co-occurrences.

Although much fewer, the US does associate character with Pakistan's nuclear program. There was a 32.6% co-occurrence of negative character references with its nuclear program; however, these references vary significantly from those used in conjunction with the rogue states. None of the direct character references were negative. In addition, the behaviors and intentions mentioned refer to actions associated with Pakistan's nuclear program and not to other unacceptable types of behavior such as terrorism and human rights abuses. The frequencies of negative dispositional references by type in Table 17 show that the majority refer to Pakistan's behavior.

Table 17. Pakistan: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

Type of Co-occurrence	#	%
Direct Character	0	0
Intentions	5	35.7
Behavior	9	64.3

Note: Percentages based upon 14 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (43): direct character, 0.0%; intentions, 11.6%; and, behavior, 20.9%.

These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribution bias in its perception of Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan's program is driven by its security concerns with India and not because of the character of Pakistan. It is not indicative of Pakistan's true nature.

Discussion

The US attributes Pakistan's nuclear ambitions to its security concerns with India. Although the US does find that Pakistan's program is of concern and could become a larger regional problem, it has demonstrated an understanding, if not acceptance, of the security concerns of Pakistan and has been willing to diplomatically deal with these concerns in order to try and cap its nuclear program. As President Clinton stated in 1995,

> As Secretary of Defense Perry noted during his recent visit to South Asia, we understand that both India and Pakistan need a capable defense. Secretary Perry's visit strengthened the framework for defense cooperation between the United States and each country, seeking to establish a transparency that would help them make realistic defense choices. The question is whether India and Pakistan can find reasonable solutions to their security requirements without nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, while moving in parallel to deal with their underlying differences.[10]

The character references made in conjunction with the Pakistani program do not diminish the perception that security concerns motivate Pakistan's program. First, the only direct character reference made is to Pakistan's democratic character and is not negative. The references to Pakistan's democratic system are used to explain it nuclear program and justify flexible US policies. Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, said,

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[10]William Clinton, "The U.S. and Pakistan Reaffirm Their Long-Standing Relationship," (joint statement with Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, Washington DC, 11 April 1995), *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.17 (24 April 1995): 356-358, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

> ...we also realize that nuclear weapons are a political as well as a security issue in India and Pakistan. Possession of these systems has strong public support. Such opinion is important in the democratic systems of both countries. This presents us with a different kind of challenge from what we face in such states as Iraq or North Korea. We look to our strategy of cooperative engagement at the global, multilateral, bilateral levels as the best way to build a public consensus in favor of non-proliferation. While working to promote such a consensus, we continue to look for ways to encourage both governments to brake the nuclear weapons dynamic in their countries.[11]

Second, in 10 of the 18 dispositional references, a situational factor was also mentioned.[12] Thus when Pakistan is said to be inflexible, the US acknowledges that India is also inflexible and attributes this to their dispute. Similarly, when the US says that Pakistan's nuclear program is a threat to regional and international stability, it acknowledges that tensions with India are driving it. This makes the threat posed by Pakistan's nuclear program seem to be unintentional.

Third, unlike the rogue states, references to its program are not linked to other issues and problems such as Pakistan's repression of minorities, involvement in narcotics trade, or the presence of terrorist groups within its borders. The behaviors linked to its nuclear program reflect the consequences to Pakistan of pursuing nuclear weapons such as damaging international relations and draining national resources. These behaviors do not give the impression that Pakistan is willing to violate international law or engage in other irresponsible behaviors.

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[11]Robin Raphel, "Non-proliferation Policy in South Asia," (statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 9 March 1995) *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no.12 (20 March 1995): 222-224, reproduced in *U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom* [CD-Rom] 4, no.1 (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)

[12]There were 18 total positive and negative dispositional references.

US policymakers did exhibit attribution bias in their statements about Pakistan's nuclear program. Due to their friendly relationship, the US attributed Pakistan's program to the situational factor of its dispute with India. Character references were much less frequent and not extremely negative. Thus Pakistan is not developing nuclear weapons because of any inherent aggressive tendencies, but in order to defend itself. Even Pakistan's nuclear tests have not moved it into the rogue category. Although this does not mean the US supports Pakistan's nuclear program, it does indicate an awareness of the underlying factors which contribute to it and a willingness to adapt its policies to deal with them.

CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION

US nonproliferation policy has historically shown more concern over who has nuclear weapons than with the actual weapons. This trend has continued into the post Cold War period as the three states which have the most advanced programs, Israel, India and Pakistan are viewed with the least concern, while Libya, a state with little nuclear infrastructure, is classed as a rogue. This trend has also led to the discriminatory standards enforced among states because the US determines which states pose a nuclear threat based upon its perception of threat, not upon material capability. States discriminate in favor of other states with which they identify either through shared characteristics or interests. This occurs because of the need to defend and enhance its own identity. By perceiving states similar to itself to be good and moral, a state assures itself that it also is good and moral. Conversely, by perceiving states with which it does not identify as evil and immoral, a state also enhances its identity by distancing itself from characteristics and behavior it considers unacceptable. This in-group/out-group distinction explains the pattern of bias within US nonproliferation policy. The US has consistently pursued lenient policies toward in-group members and often failed to enforce existing legislation against them, while enacting harsh and punitive policies against out-group members.

This study has used one indicator, attribution bias, to show how the US perceives the nuclear programs of in-group and out-groups members differently. Attribution bias argues that the US will attributes the motivation behind a state's nuclear program differently depending on whether that state is part of the in-group or out-group. The nuclear programs of out-group members will be attributed to the internal characteristics of the state thereby increasing the perception of threat. The programs of in-group members will be attributed to external factors thereby decreasing the perception of threat.

A connection between the in-group/out-group distinction, US policy, and the presence of attribution bias was found in all five case studies. An antagonistic relationship with the US resulted in harsher nonproliferation policies and more dispositional co-occurrences. Table 18 shows the percentages of dispositional and situational co-occurrences for each state in order of decreasing dispositional co-occurrences.

Table 18. Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences for All States

	% dispositional (negative)	% situational
Libya	85.7	0
Iraq	74.8	0
Iran	67.6	0
North Korea	38.6	2.1
Pakistan	32.6	72.1

Two patterns emerge from this table. First, the worse the relationship with the US, the more often US policymakers attributed the state's nuclear program to its internal characteristics. Although it is arguable whether Libya or Iraq has the worst relationship with

the US, Iran does have a better relationship than either of them and North Korea's relationship has improved considerably since the end of the Cold War. Pakistan has the best relationship of all the states and its program was consistently attributed to the situational factor of its dispute with India.

Second, the frequency of dispositional co-occurrences is inversely related to the program's level of development. Once again it can be disputed whether Libya, with its one reactor, or Iraq, whose program has been dismantled, has the least developed program; however, the programs of both these states are most consistently attributed to dispositional factors. North Korea's program, the most advanced among the rogue states, was attributed to dispositional factors only 38.6% of the time. Finally, Pakistan, which has been able to manufacture a device since 1990, received the least dispositional attributes. This pattern contradicts the idea that the US bases its threat perception on a program's level of development.

The bias in the perception of US policymakers is most clearly revealed by comparing Iraq, Iran and Libya to Pakistan. The programs of these three rogue states were consistently attributed to their characters which were perceived to be aggressive and unaccepting of international standards. In contrast, the Pakistan's program was attributed almost entirely to its dispute with India. This difference in perception accounts for why the US has continued to try and work with Pakistan on the issues driving its nuclear program even after it openly tested nuclear devices in 1998, while enacting broad sanctions and planning military strikes against these rogue states.

The case of North Korea best illustrates the link between relationship, policy, and perception. Although North Korea was still classed as a rogue state, its relationship with

the US improved since the end of the Cold War. This improved relationship is reflected in the US's mixed policy toward North Korea. The US threatened sanctions and military action, but also used diplomacy and economic incentives to reach the Agreed Framework. Likewise, these mixed policies reflect the ambiguities in US rhetoric. North Korea's nuclear program was linked to its character 38.6% of the time. This was 29% less than the dispositional co-occurrences for Iran and only 6% higher than those for Pakistan.

The North Korean case study also raises questions about the use of rhetoric by US policymakers. This study has argued that the rhetoric of US policymakers reveals perceptual biases regarding the nuclear programs of the rogue states and that these biases influence the harsh policies adopted toward these states. However, policymakers also use rhetoric for their own purposes: to influence the public and other countries and to legitimize the policies they have adopted. The perceptions of policymakers may shape their policies, but the rhetoric they use may be shaped by their policies. As North Korea showed, US rhetoric changed in response to a change in policy; it did not change the policy itself.

Further research into this subject may include a longitudinal study on how US perceptions of individual states have changed over time and what prompted these changes. What factors seem most salient in the perception of threat from a state's nuclear program? Another avenue of inquiry may be to look at how closely the international nonproliferation regime mirrors US interests. It is undeniable that the US exerts significant pressure over the agenda of the nonproliferation regime, but is it simply an extension of US policy or has it developed significant independence?

Effects of US Policy on Nonproliferation

Global concern over nuclear weapons springs from the fact that they are qualitatively different from conventional weapons. A nuclear detonation inflicts immediate and indiscriminate damage upon an enemy against which there is no defense. Their effects cannot be confined to a specific geography or to military targets. Although the threat of global nuclear war between the superpowers has diminished, nuclear weapons remain a threat. It does not take an arsenal filled with thousands of weapons, but only one to create a nuclear threat and provide a state with a disproportional advantage. After a certain point, numbers become meaningless in relation to nuclear weapons. These qualitative and quantitative differences conventional weapons drive the US effort to prevent other states from acquiring even one nuclear device.

The goal of US nonproliferation policy is to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons and to convince states which already have to roll-back their nuclear programs. However, the US often adopts and implements policies which undermine this goal in the name of competing interests, economic factors, or domestic pressures. Three aspects of US policy undermine its long-term nonproliferation goals.

First, US policy discriminates against some states and not others. By allowing some states to develop nuclear weapons and not others the US undermines the basic premise behind the nonproliferation regime--that all nuclear weapons should be eliminated; however, the regime also reflects the contradictions found in US policy. The regime legalizes nuclear weapons for some states and not others. The nuclear states cannot create an environment of trust and transparency by maintaining a monopoly over nuclear

technology and condemning states for developing these weapons when they retain thousands. These biases within US policy and the regime prejudice support for nonproliferation.

Second, the US's original policy of technology denial to prevent proliferation has become increasingly ineffective. While this has slowed the nuclear programs of many states, but it has not stopped them because proliferation has become a political decision not a technological one. As nuclear technology becomes more available, it becomes more important for the US and the global nonproliferation effort to discover why a state decides to pursue nuclear weapons, what factors influence their decision, and how other states can motivate them to decide against nuclear weapons.

Third, harsh sanctions and threats have not induced any state to renounce nuclear weapons. The states which recently abandoned their programs were subject to some sanctions and reprisals. All of the so-called rogue states have been subject to much harsher policies and none have given up their nuclear program voluntarily. It remains to be seen whether North Korea will comply with the terms of the Agreed Framework. Sanctions and threats often have the effect, as in Iraq, of hardening a state's resolve to develop nuclear weapons by providing it with attention and increasing its level of insecurity.

These three weaknesses in US policy are exacerbated by misperceiving the motivations behind the nuclear programs of the rogue states. While these states most likely do have some aggressive motivations, there are also other factors driving their programs which US policymakers either ignore or overlook. By becoming more aware of the other concerns influencing these states the US may be able to create incentives for

abandoning their nuclear programs. When other factors are opportune, the US can influence a state to accept nonproliferation standards. The examples of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus show how it can use its resources and negotiating powers to induce states.

Yet US policy cannot move a state toward a nonnuclear stance by itself. A state may be influenced by global nonproliferation norms which reflect US policy, but US policy by itself usually plays only a marginal role in changing nuclear stances. Three states which recently renounced nuclear weapons, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, said the US played little role in their decisions.[1] The decisions to abandon their nuclear programs were all driven by domestic changes. Brazil and Argentina brought liberal regimes to power and in South Africa the apartheid regime relinquished power. Prior to these changes, nuclear weapons were considered vital to the security of these nations as well as being symbols of national prestige and sources of power for the military and bureaucracies. US policy had little effect in comparison to the domestic influences.

US nonproliferation policies toward the rogue states have failed to end their nuclear ambitions. There may be little the US is capable of doing; however, until it becomes willing to explore methods of influencing these states aside from threats and sanctions, it will not know what it could accomplish and the nuclear programs of these states will continue.

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[1]Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 32, 70.

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APPENDIX 1

Member States of the Liberal Security Community

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United States