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Presidential Strategy: Analyzing the National Security Strategies of the United States

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PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGY:
ANALYZING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES

by

AARON DILDAY

(Under the Direction of William T. Allison)

ABSTRACT

The Second World War forced American politicians to reevaluate the nation's security preparedness. This resulted in the National Security Act of 1947, which, among many things, created the National Security Council and an ad hoc system for American strategy-making. The Cold War revealed many of the deficiencies in this strategy-making system. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sought to reform the nation's defense establishment to meet the evolving needs of the Cold War; part of this included revision of strategic development. Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols required the president to annually submit to Congress a national security strategy report and it established guidelines for how to construct proper strategy. This thesis analyzes the National Security Strategies of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush to determine whether or not Section 603 effectively provided guidance to these presidents in creating strategic plans and if it led to a coherent method of strategic development. To accomplish this, strategic theory is discussed and a rubric, titled "Tenets of Strategic Planning," is created to evaluate each National Security Strategy. This thesis contends that presidents have been successful in following the rudimentary principles established by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act as well as the

more stringent guidelines of the Tenets of Strategic Planning to regularly produce proper strategic plans.

INDEX WORDS: National Security Strategy, Strategy, United States National Security, United States Strategy, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

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NOTE ON CITATIONS

Notation references for National Security Strategies will receive a full citation for the first reference to each unique National Security Strategy in each chapter. However, on successive citations in the same chapter the format will be truncated as the example below demonstrates.

Format: President's Last Name, NSS, Year, Page Number.

Example: Bush, NSS, 1991, 27.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NMS	National Military Strategy
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Act of 1947
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
WMD	Weapon of mass destruction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	6
NOTE ON CITATIONS	7
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	8
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION	10
2 ON STRATEGY	25
3 "TIT FOR TAT" CONTAINMENT	41
4 A NEW WORLD ORDER	54
5 ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT	74
6 PREEMPTION	92
7 CONCLUSION: TRENDS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING	110
REFERENCES	123
APPENDICES	
A TENETS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING	128
B GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986: SECTION 603	129

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The consequence of politicians pretending that policy is strategy and of soldiers focusing on operations has been to leave strategy without a home.

—Hew Strachan, “Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq”

Among its many sweeping reforms, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 refocused the relationship between military advisors and civilian leadership.¹ Goldwater-Nichols, as the legislation is commonly known, established a streamlined system of advisement to better serve the needs of the president, but more importantly it required that the president continually reevaluate national security objectives and delineate how to achieve them in an annually-prepared National Security Strategy report, or NSS. Military historian Hew Strachan succinctly described this process: “the principle purpose of effective civil-military relations is national security; its output is strategy.”² The primary purpose of requiring the president to annually report to Congress is to explain the state of national security through a written articulation of an NSS. A thorough discussion of strategy and analysis of American strategic planning since World War II demonstrates that NSSs are properly constructed strategic plans, adhering to the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols. The proposed Tenets of Strategic Planning will be used to assess the NSSs against their intended purpose.

If the president is indeed the supreme strategist of the land and thus directed by law to develop an annual NSS, has Congress, through Goldwater-Nichols, guided the president on how to create an effective national strategy? Has Goldwater-Nichols resulted in true strategic

planning year-to-year? Do all of the National Security Strategies qualify as proper strategic plans?

Goldwater-Nichols successfully established guidelines to direct presidents to create properly formatted strategic plans. When they are published, the majority of the National Security Strategies fulfill the requisite principles needed to be considered strategy. Though certain presidents have been better than others at establishing proper strategy, they all by-and-large have been successful in following the rudimentary principles established by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act as well as the more stringent guidelines of the Tenets of Strategic Planning set forth in this thesis.

Chapter 2, "On Strategy," discusses the theory of strategy and how that evolves into practical applications as strategic planning. Theory is melded into a definition of national strategy, which is a framework for applying all of the national resources available to achieve large political purposes directed against an opponent through war and peace. From this definition, several essential elements necessary for a properly constructed strategic plan are erected into a framework of analysis; these elements comprise the Tenets of Strategic Planning. The Tenets of Strategic Planning focus on the core of strategy—means and ends. The first tenet requires that a proper strategic plan explicitly defines objectives and correlating means. The second tenet also concerns objectives, requiring that the strategic plan include both short-term and long-term objectives; true strategy looks beyond the current conflict to the peace ahead. The third tenet, harkening back to the definition of strategy, focuses on means, dictating that strategists should look beyond military force and utilize all available resources for obtaining the objectives. The fourth tenet builds upon the first, declaring that proper strategy take into account capabilities and resources available for implementing the means. The fifth tenet notes that a

strategic plan, especially in democratic states, should consider public opinion. The sixth tenet observes that strategic planning does not occur in a vacuum, and should therefore acknowledge the activities of outside actors. The final tenet notes that there will always be friction and uncertainty; therefore a strategic plan should be flexible and adaptable over time and to changing circumstances. The chapter then concludes by comparing the Tenets of Strategic Planning to the defined parameters of an NSS as set forth by Congress.

Chapters 3 through 6 depart from the theoretical discussion of strategy found in Chapter 2 for more practical application. These chapters apply the Tenets of Strategic Planning to the National Security Strategies of Presidents Ronald Reagan through George W. Bush, with each chapter discussing the overall vision that each president attempted to establish. Chapter 3 looks at how President Ronald Reagan first attempted to interpret the new law and analyzes his version of Cold War containment. Chapter 4 investigates President George H. W. Bush's "New World Order" and whether or not he was able to construct an effective strategic plan around his principles of internationalism. Chapter 5 delves into President William Clinton's post-Cold War vision of "engagement and enlargement" and how he attempted to integrate domestic politics and an economic focus into a national strategy. Chapter 6 looks into how President George W. Bush took a radically different approach to the Goldwater-Nichols Act by incorporating interventionist policies designed to protect America in a post-9/11 world. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by discerning trends in strategic planning, identifying successes and failures, and speculating on the future of American national strategy and how future administrations will interpret Goldwater-Nichols. However, before looking to the future, the discussion must return to the beginning of strategic planning in the United States.

A second world war caught the United States underprepared for its call to action and the subsequent war brought many of the existing problems in the military establishment to light. Notably, the United States lacked a coherent strategy-making system to guide the war effort. President Franklin Roosevelt ran the war out of the oval office and created an ad hoc Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprised of Navy admirals Ernest King and William Leahy and Army generals Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of the Army Air Forces Hap Arnold, to advise him on matters of national strategy.³ This arrangement resulted in a confused (yet surprisingly effective) American wartime strategy. However, once the war ended, the United States had to confront some of the central national security problems that arose during the war: competition instead of coordination between the Departments of the Army and Navy; a need for an independent Air Force; and strained civil-military relations from a lack of systematic advisement to the president on strategy and military matters.⁴ Essentially, the United States needed a process to guide strategic development and advisement to the president. The National Security Act of 1947 represented the first step towards an effective strategy-making system.⁵

The National Security Act sought “to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.”⁶ The National Security Act implemented these goals through creating: an independent Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; a Secretary of Defense to oversee the new Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the National Security Council. Establishing this new structure facilitated an organized budgeting process and cooperation in the strategy-making process.

Specialist in national security policy Charles A. Stevenson remarked on the ironies of the National Security Act of 1947 noting that it “arose as a measure to reorganize the military, yet it became basic law for foreign policy and for the intelligence community. It was crafted as a means to impose restraints on military spending, yet it provided the framework for the Cold War military buildup.”⁷ For all of its ironies, the 1947 law represented the beginning for further refinement in the strategy-making process.

The National Security Act also created the National Security Council (NSC), which serves as an advisory body under the direction of the president. The National Security Act delegated a specific mission to the NSC, stating that “the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.”⁸ The advisement role of the council often resulted in strategic recommendations, released as strategy reports. Several of these memoranda established a cohesive direction for national strategy. One of the most important of these early documents was “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.”⁹

Inspiration for the basic concepts in NSC-68 can be traced back to George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of 1946, publicly released a year later as the famous “X” article.¹⁰ Kennan’s article introduced the public to the term, and underdeveloped concept of, containment.¹¹ Kennan’s concept of containment concluded that the United States faced limited capabilities for confronting the Soviet threat. Therefore, priorities of interest needed to be established with the United States focusing on spheres of vital importance.¹² Furthermore, historian John Lewis Gaddis noted that, according to Kennan, “the objective of containment should be to limit Soviet

expansionism, and that communism posed a threat only to the extent that it was the instrument of that expansion.”¹³ In 1947, Kennan did not expect the Soviet Union to risk war (more specifically offensive military operations beyond Soviet borders) for Soviet expansionist policies; however, he cautioned that it must remain an accounted possibility in American strategic planning.¹⁴ Overall, the Soviet Union need not be destroyed, but could coexist with the United States in a balance-of-power/sphere-of-influence system where the United States sought to contain the ideological spread of communism from vital industrial power centers peripheral to the Soviet sphere of influence.¹⁵ However, international events would soon force the administration of President Harry Truman to veer from Kennan’s original strategy of containment.

After shocking events in 1949 – China’s fall to communism, the Soviet Union’s successful atomic bomb test, and the ever-growing list of international responsibilities of the United States against its apparently limited resources – President Truman realized the need for action. Early in 1950, Truman authorized the development of a “single, comprehensive statement of interests, threats, and feasible responses, capable of being communicated throughout the bureaucracy.”¹⁶ The resulting document was NSC-68, written by the National Security Council without Kennan’s direct participation, but certainly drawing from Kennan’s ideas presented in the Long Telegram and the “X” article.

The National Security Council Report expanded upon Kennan’s basic concept of containment. The document concurred with Kennan that Soviet expansionism should be checked. However, NSC-68 radically deviated from Kennan’s ideas by declaring that the strongpoint defense would no longer suffice – the United States should instead pursue a strategy of perimeter defense. This meant that now all points around the Soviet sphere would be

considered vital, not just the limited number of military-industrial power centers.¹⁷ Led by Paul H. Nitze, Kennan's successor as Director of Policy Planning at the State Department and chair of the ad hoc committee responsible for producing NSC-68, the authors of NSC-68 justified this pivotal change in approach through two essential arguments. First, that the *perceived* balance of power held by foreign and domestic mass opinion was just as important to American security as the *actual* balance.¹⁸ Second, that American resources were not quite so limited, and that the government could stimulate the economy through defense spending and accept short-term deficits until increased tax revenues from the expanding economy accrued. The designers of NSC-68 intended for this expansion of the gross national product to be utilized for increased military expenditures in order to accomplish the peripheral strategy they proposed.¹⁹

The peripheral strategy, supported through an unprecedented military buildup, was instrumental to NSC strategic thinking at the time. The council viewed the coming Soviet threat as equally unprecedented, stating that "the issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself."²⁰ NSC-68 declared that the Soviet plan dictated extension of Soviet authority and "the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority."²¹ Ultimately, the NSC believed that this would culminate in a clash between the Soviet Union and United States: "The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."²² The crafters of NSC-68 believed that the Soviet Union was working towards a cross-over point at which the Soviets would have sufficient military capabilities to defeat the United States. They estimated that this point would be reached in 1954, when the Soviet Union would possess enough atomic weapons to inflict

immense destruction upon the United States. Also, Nitze and his team accepted as true that the Soviet Union already possessed sufficient conventional forces to threaten the interests of the United States and its allies, especially in Western Europe.²³ Furthermore, if the United States did not build up its own forces, the Soviet Union might indeed risk war through a surprise attack.²⁴

Considering the probability of a Soviet attack and eventuality of Soviet dominance if the United States remained dormant, Nitze and his cadre of national security advisors sought to formulate options for an American response. Diplomatically, they sought to develop an international community that would help tip the balance of power, in terms of international opinion and support, to the United States.²⁵ However, NSC-68's authors also noted that the most essential component of national power for implementing the policy of containment was military strength. Without obtaining a position of superior military strength, containment amounted to no more than a bluff.²⁶ Additionally, the document outlined the economic means that needed to be incorporated into this national strategy to facilitate such a military buildup as would be necessary to outpace the Soviet Union.²⁷ This resulted in an American national strategy that fulfilled the definition by looking beyond military power to other aspects of national power during a period of intense, but not direct, hostility.

In addition to its innovative strategic vision, NSC-68 is highly regarded as a coherent strategic plan. John Lewis Gaddis commented that "NSC 68 represented something new in the American political-military experience: It was nothing less than an attempt to set down in the unforbearing medium of cold type a comprehensive statement of what United States national security policy should be. Nothing this daring had ever been attempted before."²⁸ The "daring" of the NSC in creating a strategic plan combined with its remarkable vision of basing its strategy in containment resulted in this extraordinary document. Overall, the NSC created for the first

time in American history a coherent written articulation of national strategy. The strategic plan they produced grew from the post-war need for strategic direction and Kennan's innovational theory of containment. NSC-68 outlined a national strategy that identified American interests and threats to American national security, and drew a plan to manage both according to ends, means, and capabilities. However, for all of its advances in strategic planning, American strategy-making was still an ad hoc process; no mechanism existed to regularize strategic development.

American strategic development, though inconsistent, appeared to function well for the beginning of the Cold War. Yet, as the Cold War became more complex and the American defense establishment became more entrenched and territorial, the 1947 system began to break down. The ten year war in Vietnam, the failed 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt, and the 1983 invasion of Grenada brought some of the problems still remaining in the system to light – the need to limit defense spending; the lack of coordination among the services; and the need to further refine how the United States approached strategic planning. These issues led many in the early 1980s to question American strategic thinking and whether or not the United States could adequately fulfill its Cold War leadership role.

On November 7, 1982, a *New York Times* article written by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David C. Jones identified several major problems existing in the Department of Defense and national security structure: “to sum up, our defense establishment suffers serious deficiencies, including the following: Strategy is so all-encompassing as to mean all things to all men. Long-range planning is relegated to a back seat. Leaders are inevitably captives of the urgent, and long-range planning is too often neglected.”²⁹ While it was apparent that there were problems in the American defense establishment, Jones' article created a

whirlwind of controversy and helped spur public debate and congressional investigations into the nation's military and defense structure. Senator Barry Goldwater, a veteran of World War II and strong supporter of the American military, publicly supported the former chair's arguments, adding "in my opinion, we need a central organization to plan overall strategy and tactics and to plan the weaponry needed for these functions. This group should direct the different members of the defense establishment as to exactly what their roles will be."³⁰

Congressional staffer James Locher later joined Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn on the new Task Force on Defense Organization, a committee of nine senators and staff members working towards creating a bill for correcting problems in the defense establishment. On June 27, 1985, Locher led a briefing for the task force. In *Victory on the Potomac*, Locher later recalled that at the briefing he had "presented considerable evidence on the JCS's inability to provide military advice," and he concluded that "the joint chiefs had been unable to formulate military strategy, preferring instead to do fiscally unconstrained, pie-in-the-sky strategic planning."³¹ This made their advice useless when preparing a budget.³² More importantly, this highlighted the disconnect between military and civilian leaders and the budgetary and strategy-making process.

Reports like Locher's ruffled many feathers across the defense community, mainly from those who preferred the status quo or were only interested in advancing their own agendas or service interests. The services predictably protested any reform fearing that it could come only at the expense of decades of hard-won influence. Throughout the halls of Congress, to the White House, and across the Potomac to the Pentagon, discussion and debate raged over the problems with the current civilian-military command structure. The whole process of military advisement required revisal, but at what cost? After three years of intense debate and inquiry, a defense

reform bill began to take shape. Representative William Nichols and Senator Barry Goldwater organized and proposed the legislation to Congress. Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn eventually, after a long and grueling battle, got the reform bill unanimously approved in the Senate Armed Services Committee.³³ The bill (designated H.R. 3622), was passed by the Senate and House respectively on September 16 and 17, 1986.³⁴

On October 1, 1986, a momentous, and yet uncelebrated, event took place that dramatically shaped the American defense establishment. Without fanfare or even a modest ceremony, President Ronald Reagan signed H.R. 3622. A political battle that raged for almost five years had ended; the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was now law.³⁵ Locher recalled that day, later writing that “as I reached my office and turned the handle to Room SR-232’s massive door, I was exhilarated by anticipation. I could not wait to watch the Goldwater-Nichols Act revitalize and transform the military and improve the odds for American service members put in harm’s way.”³⁶ Locher’s excitement was well placed; Goldwater-Nichols delivered much-needed reforms to the defense establishment, military structure, and civil-military relations. Important to the issue at hand was the law’s intent to “increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning.”³⁷ Goldwater-Nichols reformed the strategy-making process at the highest levels by establishing an improved advisory process to the president and requiring the president to construct an actual national security strategy.

Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols explicitly outlined the president’s role in forming national strategy.³⁸ According to Section 603, “the President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States. . . . The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President

submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year.”³⁹ For the first time in American history, Congress required by law the president to outline the national strategy of the United States. Furthermore, by tying national security policy to the budget process, the president and Congress now had to account for resource capabilities when developing the nation's strategic plan. There now existed a process and guidelines for coherent and consistent strategic planning, and thus further advanced the steps taken by the National Security Act in creating a system of strategic development. Consequently, Goldwater-Nichols effectively established the president as the supreme strategist for national security and for promoting the national interests of the United States through the annual publication of a National Security Strategy.

The new NSSs declare national interests through a written articulation of means and ends. The NSSs create a comprehensive plan to focus the national strategic direction, and they publicly announce that plan through “the unforgiving medium of cold type.”⁴⁰ Yet, it remains ironic that the public pays so little attention to it as the NSSs represent a president’s unified vision for the nation. While media outlets often report on a president's foreign policy, the unclassified National Security Strategies have traditionally received scant coverage.⁴¹ Former Senator and presidential candidate Gary Hart hypothesized the cause of this lack of interest in American grand strategy:

Absent war, however, Americans have resisted ‘centralized planning’ as socialistic, intrusive, and repressive of initiative and enterprise. Thus, one of the great challenges of strategic thinking in the current age is to convince Americans—and particularly those distrustful of their own government—that to have a national strategy is to *liberate* the nation’s energies in purposeful ways rather than approach the world as representing ‘one damn thing after another’ and as requiring only ad hoc responses.⁴²

Providing direction for national interests is essential for accomplishing national objectives. This process, called strategy, connects goals with the means to achieve them.

1. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 will be referred to in an abridged form as either “Goldwater-Nichols” or the “Defense Reorganization Act.”

2. Hew Strachan, “Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq,” *Survival* 48 (2006): 66.

3. Charles A. Stevenson, “The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947,” *Military Review* 89 (2008): 13.

4. Stevenson, “The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947,” 13-14.

5. *National Security Act of 1947*, Public Law 80-253, U.S. Statutes at Large 758 (1947): 495-510.

6. *National Security Act of 1947*, Public Law 80-253, U.S. Statutes at Large 758 (1947): 495.

7. Charles A. Stevenson, “The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947,” 20.

8. *National Security Act of 1947*, Public Law 80-253, U.S. Statutes at Large 758 (1947): 496.

9. National Security Council, April 14, 1950, “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977): 235-292.

10. George F. Kennan, February 22, 1946, “The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State [Long Telegram],” *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946*, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969): 696-709 and X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25 (1947), 566-582.

11. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 26.

12. Kennan viewed American spheres of vital importance as the western hemisphere and centers of industrial power, sources of raw materials, and defensive strongpoints in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 31.

13. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 34.

14. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 34-35.

15. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 35.

16. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 90.

17. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 91.

18. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 92.

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- 93-94. 19. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 93-94.
20. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 238.
21. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 238.
22. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 238.
23. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 249-252.
24. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 266-267, 287-288.
25. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 252.
26. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 253.
27. NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 256-261.
28. John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," *International Security* 4 (1980): 164.
29. David C. Jones, "What's Wrong With Our Defense," *New York Times*, November 7, 1982.
30. "Barry Goldwater On," *New York Times*, January 2, 1983.
31. James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 302.
32. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, 301-302.
33. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, 435.
34. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, 430.
35. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, 432-433.
36. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, 436.
37. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-433, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 992.
38. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, §603.
39. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-433, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 1075.
40. Quoted phrase is from Gaddis and Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," 164.
41. This holds true from President Reagan's first NSS in 1987 to President Obama's in 2011 with the exception of President George W. Bush's 2002 and 2006 NSS. This is largely due to his declaration of the War on Terror coupled with the principle of preemptive attack. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

42. Gary Hart, *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 33.

CHAPTER 2

ON STRATEGY

Strategy is a field where truth is sought in the pursuit of viable solutions.

—Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*

The discussion of American national security strategy up to this point has provided some historical context, but it lacks a definition of the pivotal concept. Strategy, the core component of this thesis, is a complex idea described as both theory (what is strategy) and practice (often referred to as strategic planning).¹ This chapter delves into both realms, constructing a theory of strategy through the evolution of its terminology and then applying that theory to a set of conditions or “tenets” for strategic planning. Modern strategic theory begins with Clausewitz and the “force as policy” tradition, and then grows beyond military strategy to grand strategy and its corollary, national strategy. Following the discussion of modern strategic thought, an analytical framework for qualifying strategic plans as proper planning is established in the “Tenets of Strategic Planning.” This list of qualifications is then compared to the requirements for creating a National Security Strategy outlined in Goldwater-Nichols.

Modern discussion of strategic theory dates to the Napoleonic Wars. Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz witnessed the Napoleonic Wars and, afterwards, utilized his experience to compose a philosophy of war and strategy. Published as an uncompleted draft a year after his death in 1831, Clausewitz’s monumental treatise, *On War*, has influenced strategic thought ever since and is still required reading for military officers and students of national security affairs. Clausewitz succinctly stated his indispensable understanding of strategy: “war is an instrument

of policy.”² Clausewitz further defined strategy as “the use of the engagement [battle] for the purpose of the war,” adding that “[the strategist] will draft the plan of war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.”³ While strategy is more complex than Clausewitz would like it to appear, his definition provides a foundation for discussion of national strategy.

Many modern scholars have incorporated Clausewitz’s concepts of the relation of military force to policy when crafting their explanations of strategy.⁴ Historian Colin Gray closely follows the Clausewitzian model when he explains strategy as “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; ... the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.”⁵ Historian Hew Strachan describes the process of strategy in a similar manner concluding that “the reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to implement it.”⁶ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a historian and veteran of World War I, also follows this methodology defining strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”⁷ Although this list of scholars who follow the Clausewitzian model is by no means comprehensive, Gray, Strachan, and Liddell Hart are three prominent examples of the “force as policy” tradition.

However, Liddell Hart takes his discussion of strategic theory further by establishing a clear distinction between *strategy* and *grand strategy*. He states, “The term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution.’ For the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.”⁸ In

contrast to the Clausewitzian model, Liddell Hart explains that “fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure to weaken the opponent’s will.”⁹ Liddell Hart’s description broadens the concept of strategy beyond the narrow focus on military power in Clausewitz’s definition.¹⁰

Concisely defined then, grand strategy is a framework for applying a nation’s power and resources to achieve large political purposes.¹¹ Though *grand strategy* accurately reflects the overall concepts described here (especially in going beyond a narrow military focus), when discussing the American NSS as a continuous strategic plan with periodic updates, a more accurate construct may be established. A former Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs for Vice President Richard Cheney and current Professor of International Affairs at Princeton, Aaron L. Friedberg, describes this progression of terminology:

It has become fashionable to speak of a need for an American “grand strategy.” This concept is an expansion of the traditional notion of military strategy and it is meant to take account not only of fighting power, but of the full range of financial, commercial, and diplomatic pressures that one society can use to break the will of another. As broad as it is, “grand strategy” properly refers only to periods of open warfare. A new term—perhaps “national strategy”—is needed to cover prolonged intervals of intense but less than all-out international competition. Such a strategy might aim not only at preparing for victory in the military sense, but also at a range of lesser, peacetime objectives from improving the nation’s military, political, and economic standing relative to its competitors (or simply preventing an erosion in that position) to weakening the position of an opponent. National strategy encompasses both planning for the use of the various implements of state power and attention to the domestic policies needed to produce and maintain them over the long-run.¹²

As Friedberg concluded, *grand strategy*, though expansive in its reach, still does not go far enough. *Grand strategy* connotes a time of war, which is not always the case. However, the term *national strategy* takes *grand strategy* beyond the constraints of war into a timeless strategic

application. Historian Samuel P. Huntington further refined the definition of national strategy, noting, “The first question, of course, is what is national strategy?” Huntington answered: “let me first indicate what strategy is not—foreign policy. Foreign policy includes the goals that a government pursues and the means it employs in its external environment, whatever the nature of that environment. What is different about strategy in a meaningful sense is that it is conducted against an opponent.”¹³ Huntington’s musings on national strategy implies that there must be an opponent for a strategy to exist. Without an opponent, an antagonist, there would be nothing to stop a nation from pursuing its goals. Hence, there would be no need for a strategic plan. Thus, while national strategy focuses on the goals throughout times of war and peace, it is also directed at circumventing impediments to achieving national objectives.

Furthermore, a national strategy is vitally important because it provides direction along with a set of goals. International relations experts Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan summarized the historical importance of establishing a national strategy:

National strategy is important because history teaches that a state will be more capable of accomplishing its national objectives if those objectives are balanced against external threats and the type and quantity of available national resources. This conclusion appears to be valid over time and across cultures. States that failed to reconcile means and ends adequately ultimately had difficulty accomplishing their national objectives. Conversely, states that consciously attempted to match means and ends were generally more successful in the pursuit of national interests.¹⁴

For a nation to be successful in protecting its interests and achieving its objectives, a strategy is needed to guide that effort. Without it, a nation is unable to utilize its resources effectively and efficiently to accomplish their objectives. Thus, national strategy is a framework for applying all of the national resources available to achieve large political purposes coherently directed against an opponent through war and peace.

Therefore, after this more or less abstract discussion of strategy, the question remains how is strategic theory put into practice. National security studies expert Bernard Brodie straddled the divide between theory and practice in his discussion of strategy: “strategic thinking, or ‘theory’ if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a ‘how to do it’ study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently.”¹⁵ Brodie aptly illustrated the point that strategic theory is sensible in nature; the discussion inherently contains practical applications. One cannot discuss strategy without wandering into the realm of strategic application. Brodie asserted this notion that theory is linked to application: “above all, strategic theory is a theory for action.”¹⁶ Essentially, then, strategy is a plan of how to achieve objectives.

After developing a fundamental theory for strategy and reaching a more exact definition of the application of theory as a strategic plan, specifically referred to as *national strategy*, the discussion may now turn to essential pillars required for any strategic plan. In order for a plan to be considered a proper strategic plan, it must fulfill basic requirements. These requirements are set forth as the “Tenets of Strategic Planning.”¹⁷

First, it should be noted that the strategic plans as discussed here are documented national strategies. Utilizing the previously established definition of national strategy, a strategic plan must incorporate means of action and resources beyond simply the use of military force. These considerations may be economic, diplomatic, political, or anything else that strategists have at their disposal that may aid them in obtaining their objectives. Thus, the first tenet dictates that a strategic plan must look beyond military force to the utilization of all available resources.

The second tenet notes that the ends and means must be plausible. The plan must reflect achievable goals, as well as demonstrate possible methods to accomplish those goals. This basic, yet crucial component includes, but is not limited to, constraints of geography, time, and

available resources. If objectives are unattainable or fall outside of feasible parameters, then the plan is flawed and will most likely fail. Though this strategic consideration appears obvious, it remains an essential component for a successful strategy.

Additionally, a strategic plan must explicitly state both the objectives and the methods for obtaining them. Enumerated objectives require clarity and specificity. From this point, the next logical step would be to develop a means, methodology, plan, etc., for obtaining those objectives: for, as Clausewitz argued, the objectives would dictate necessary actions.¹⁸ Clearly defined goals coupled with a clear plan of action are crucial for true strategic planning. This consideration represents the third Tenet of Strategic Planning.

The fourth tenet demands that the strategist realizes that objectives must be both short-term *and* long-term. Planning should account for the longer timeline of events, and it should exhibit a longevity that extends beyond crisis-management or the conflict itself. A proper strategy will plan for the future regardless of whether or not the conflict is still occurring; it will plan for the peace after the war and the enemy's reaction to the fallout. Paul Kennedy, historian and Director of International Security Studies at Yale, illustrated the importance of focused strategic planning: "The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in *policy*, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime *and* peacetime) best interests."¹⁹ Thus, the ultimate goal of strategy is the vested long-term interests of the nation and the immediate and future objectives necessary to attain these national interests.

Military historian Dennis Showalter expands the purview of strategy even further while incorporating another important tenet. Showalter describes strategy as "the calculation among means, ends, and will."²⁰ He leaves this definition open to interpretation as to what the means

and ends may entail. In this manner, Showalter avoids restricting strategy to uses of force and political objectives. Yet, the most important contribution from his definition is “will.”

Showalter, as did Clausewitz, rightly highlights the principle of will, which is also commonly referred to as “the will of the people” or “public opinion.” The will of the people is necessary to the success of any strategic plan. Without broad national support, a plan is doomed to fail. In the case of the United States, the will of the people is important because public opinion determines leadership, which in turn dictates strategic direction. Public opinion is essential to any leader (military or civilian) of a democracy. Modern leaders of democracies answer directly to the people. History has demonstrated that when rulers fail to keep the people’s trust, the people will often revolt against their leader. Despots, while not having to answer to public opinion as consistently and directly as democratically elected leaders, still must be wary of public opinion and consider it when devising their strategic plans.

Public opinion is a double-edged sword. A leader must account not only for the will of the people to employ the means as dictated by his strategic plan, but he must also consider how they will react to outside factors. The twentieth century, as described by historian Beatrice Heuser in *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to Present*, witnessed the rise of strategically targeting an enemy’s populace during war with the overt intention of destroying its will to continue fighting. Nations utilized terror to demonstrate to the people the horrific human suffering of war in order to compel a quick resolution to the conflict.²¹ Targeting public opinion developed into a “strategy of terror.” This has been utilized by strategists to justify the establishment of air power strategies such as strategic bombing campaigns, with the goal of targeting cities.²² Heuser further contends that the later nuclear targeting of civilians was a logical outgrowth of the air power “strategic or city bombing school.”²³

Of course, targeting public opinion is not a novel strategy created by modern strategists.

Clausewitz addressed this Tenet of Strategic Planning in *On War*:

The fighting forces must be *destroyed*. . . . The country must be occupied. . . . Yet both of these things may be done and the war . . . cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's *will* has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit.²⁴

Clausewitz understood that the will is one of the fundamental considerations in war and strategy.

He recognized that a conflict will continue for as long as public opinion supports the effort. Yet, if the will of the people was broken, the nation would be deterred from continuing the conflict.

Targeting public will, however, is not unique to war. Modern strategists have realized its potential beyond the battlefield. Such consideration for public opinion also appeared in NSC-68. The authors of NSC-68 understood that public opinion was crucial to implementing any strategy, noting that *perceptions* of the balance of power held by foreign and domestic mass opinion were just as important to American security as the *actual* balance in their situation.²⁵ This account for public opinion transcends open conflict also to include from Aaron L. Friedberg's definition of national strategy periods of "prolonged intervals of intense but less than all-out international competition."²⁶ Thus, the will of the people is a vital consideration in any strategic plan and it, therefore, comprises the fifth Tenet of Strategic Planning.

Another crucial consideration for strategic planning is that plans are not executed in a vacuum. Outside actors also affect plans in action. The sixth Tenet of Strategic Planning acknowledges that other actors, such as an enemy or ally, continue to act and react to the evolving circumstances as they unfold. Many strategic plans fail to consider actions of external actors. In strategic planning, strategists must understand that other actors – directly targeted by the initial actions or not – will react to the changing situation. Winston Churchill once stated that,

“however absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account.”²⁷ The same can be said in times of peace. Colin S. Gray also commented on this crucial observation in strategic planning, stating that “in the face of ignorance about the enemy and his plans, more often than not governments simply assume that he will cooperate and play his pre-designated role as victim-villain. Even when an enemy’s plans are known in advance with high confidence, it is not unusual for political leaders and generals to anticipate benign consequences from that hostile behavior.”²⁸ Though often overlooked, a proper strategic plan must incorporate an understanding of the fact that other actors will undoubtedly make decisions and take actions that affect the pre-designed strategy. A true strategy accounts for this by estimating and anticipating how another actor may react to action (or possibly inaction) taken. After all, one of the fundamental assumptions of strategy is that it takes place against an opponent.

When considering outside actors, it comes as no surprise that a certain degree of uncertainty is inherent to strategic planning. Understanding that the unknown will always occur and that no plan is perfect, the final Tenet of Strategic Planning states that strategic plans should be flexible and adaptable over time. While specific considerations should be accounted for, strategies need to reflect the fact that strategists lack the ability to foresee future events. One of American strategic theorist J. C. Wylie’s basic assumptions for war planning is that “we cannot predict with certainty the pattern of the war for which we prepare ourselves.”²⁹ Therefore, a strategic plan needs to be flexible enough to adapt to the unknown as it arises. Clausewitz originally summarized this tenet:

In war, as we have already pointed out, all action is aimed at probable rather than at certain success. The degree of certainty that is lacking must in every case be left to fate, chance, or whatever you like to call it. One may of course ask that this dependence

should be as slight as possible, but only in reference to a particular case—in other words, it should be as *small as possible in that individual case*. But we should not habitually prefer the course that involves the least uncertainty. That would be an enormous mistake, as our theoretical arguments will show. There are times when the utmost daring is the height of wisdom.³⁰

Strategic plans should be able to withstand a certain degree of uncertainty, or as Clausewitz called it, friction. Events will occur that can derail the best of plans; however, the best plans incorporate a degree of flexibility to account for these events. A strategist should minimize the possibility of uncertainty while not restricting oneself to a predictably un-daring plan.

Clausewitz addressed the unknown at length while discussing strategy as it relates to war. He subdivides the unknown in war into two subcategories: uncertainty and chance. Uncertainty describes decisions that have to be made with only seeing a small portion of the entirety of events. This is often referred to as the “fog of war.” Clausewitz asserts that “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.”³¹ This aspect of war planning connects with national strategic planning in that plans are created without all of the facts.

The unknown in strategy is also a derivative of chance. Chance is the intercession of random events that could affect the outcome of a strategic decision. This idea remains distinct from uncertainty in that chance is random, such as events that derail a plan in motion as opposed to not seeing the entire scope of things as they are. For instance, the weather could dramatically change, thus altering the course of events.³² Clausewitz offered: “War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.”³³ Naturally, the “realm of chance” also applies to national strategy as unexpected events

occur that derail even the most well-thought-out plans. For example, NSC-68, for all of its foresight, makes no mention of the approaching Korean conflict.

Clausewitz's discussion of uncertainty eventually culminated in his notion of "friction," a term that he borrowed from the scientific community. Clausewitz defined friction as "the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."³⁴ Friction is the accumulation of imperfections that separates an ideal plan from real world results. For instance, a plan may dictate that it should take two days to transfer soldiers from Point A to Point B and under ideal circumstances it would take two days. However, real-world imperfections such as logistical bottlenecks, trucks breaking down, poor road conditions, etc. make the transport take longer than the two days originally expected. Clausewitz clarified friction as "countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal. ... Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper."³⁵ Friction, the combination of chance and the fog of war, represents the unknown elements that can set any strategic plan off course. The better strategic plan considers such eventualities.

These Tenets of Strategic Planning represent a rubric for evaluating a strategic plan; a rudimentary set of guidelines for establishing what a proper strategic plan should entail. As such, this analytical framework may be applied to the National Security Strategies of the United States, as these are strategic plans intended to provide vision and direction for securing national interests. As previously described in Chapter 1, Goldwater-Nichols requires the president to submit annually a strategic plan to Congress in conjunction with the annual budget. Furthermore, Section 603 of the Act provides a list of requirements regarding the composition of that strategic plan.³⁶ Those requirements in Section 603 closely resemble the Tenets of Strategic Planning.

The first requirement reflects one of the core parts of strategic planning. Goldwater-Nichols states that a “comprehensive description and discussion of... the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States” is required in the National Security Strategy.³⁷ Essentially, the president must identify and provide written articulation of American national strategic objectives. Goldwater-Nichols does not bind national objectives to objectives during times of war, but implicitly directs strategic planning to continue in times of peace.

In an effort to separate the narrow military means of strategy from the larger vision necessary for national strategy, Section 603 continues to divide strategic planning into the National Security Strategy and its corresponding National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS is a national strategy that is meant to be all-encompassing in its reach. However, the NMS exclusively focuses on the preparation and application of military force to achieve national objectives. The NMS takes direction from the NSS; the NMS supports the NSS by constructing a strategic plan for the use of military force within the parameters established in the NSS.

Section 603 further illustrates the separation of military force as the exclusive function of strategy in the second and third requirements that state that each national security strategy should include “the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States” and “the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives.”³⁸ This broadens the president’s strategy toolkit to employ all means at his disposal to secure the national interests of the United States. These

requirements clearly link means and ends, acknowledging that they are both short-term and long-term in scope while not necessarily being of a military nature.

The fourth delineated condition of a National Security Strategy illustrates that a president needs to consider the means in the strategic plan he recommends to Congress. The Act states that the president must consider and discuss “the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.”³⁹ This component directly correlates to the previously discussed aspects of means in developing strategy found in the Tenets of Strategic Planning. A strategic plan requires means that match up with ends, contain a level of feasibility, and acknowledge the resources available. The means must be balanced, carefully crafted, and comprehensively articulated in the strategic plan.

The final requirement denotes the unknown in strategic planning, stating that the president should include “such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.”⁴⁰ This unbound statement acknowledges that Congress could not see all eventualities or include a complete discussion of the essential components of a strategic plan. Therefore, they left open the possibilities for additional components that the president may include in the strategic plan in order to secure American objectives.

In order for presidential strategy to qualify as a strategic plan, specifically designated as National Security Strategy, the plan must meet the basic conditions set forth by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Furthermore, to be a truly proper strategic plan, the plan needs to fulfill the parameters established in the Tenets of

Strategic Planning. Chapters 3 through 6 will apply these analytical rubrics to the National Security Strategies of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush.

1. Strategy is discussed both as general theory and as specific strategic plans designed for direct application. For instance, Clausewitz has a general theory on strategy, but NSC-68 was a defined strategic plan. Colin Gray separates these ideas by depicting general strategic theory as an unchanging set of ideas that drives human behavior to develop strategic plans to cope with specific problems in a certain time and place. Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8-9.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 610.

3. Clausewitz, *On War*, 177.

4. While much attention is directed towards the influence of military action in strategy, it must be clear that this discussion will only include broad references of the use of military force. Here, strategy, as is customary, will not include tactics or military doctrine as part of its function. Furthermore, this discussion will focus on national strategies that extend beyond exclusive military perspectives. Thus, operational and theater level strategies are also outside the scope of this thesis. Overall, strategy is a discussion of higher level acts and will remain so here.

5. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

6. Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival* 47 (2005): 52.

7. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Meridian, 1991), 321.

8. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 322.

9. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 322.

10. Liddell Hart differentiates between "strategy," which he defines in an exclusively military manner, and "grand strategy," which encompasses everything that can be directed towards attainment of the political objectives. However, for the remainder of this thesis, it should be understood that "strategy" on the level practiced by modern nations is always "grand strategy." Therefore, since this thesis only focuses on the strategic plans of modern nations, higher strategy will often simply be referred to as "strategy."

11. Gary Hart, *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3.

12. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Making of American National Strategy, 1948-1988," *The National Interest* 11 (1988): 65.

13. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Evolution of U.S. National Strategy," in *U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s*, ed. Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 11.

14. Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, "Introduction," in *U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s*, ed. Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 4. Historical examples utilized in their essay include the failed Athenian campaign to conquer Syracuse in the Peloponnesian War; the inefficient utilization of military force and the subsequent demise of the Roman Empire; and Great Britain's loss of its grand empire due to a strategic failure in adjusting its international position. The common thread through these examples is a failure to rectify means and ends.

15. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), 452.

16. Brodie, *War and Politics*, 452.

17. See Appendix A for a list of the "Tenets of Strategic Planning." For other interpretations of "principles of strategy," see Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); US Army, *Operations*, FM 100-5 (Washington, DC: Department, 14 June 1993), 2-4-6; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

18. Clausewitz, *On War*, 177.

19. Paul Kennedy, "Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition," in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 5. Don Snider supports Kennedy's definition stating that "grand strategy is really the idea of allocating resources to create in both the short- and long-term various instruments of power, instruments with which the nation then provides for its defense and the furtherance of its aims in the world" in Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 2nd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), 15.

20. Dennis Showalter, "Total War for Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of German Grand Strategy," in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 108.

21. Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 190-191.

22. Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, 191-192.

23. Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, 351, 356.

24. Clausewitz, *On War*, 90. (Emphasis in original.)

25. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92.

26. Friedberg, "The Making of American National Strategy, 1948-1988," 65.

27. Robert Debs Heinl, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 102.

28. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, 33.

29. J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 70.

30. Clausewitz, *On War*, 167. (Emphasis in original.)

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31. Clausewitz, *On War*, 101.
32. The weather as a component of chance in war is often cited as contributing to the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588 during the Anglo-Spanish War.
33. Clausewitz, *On War*, 101.
34. Clausewitz, *On War*, 121.
35. Clausewitz, *On War*, 119.
36. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, §603.
37. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-433, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 1075.
38. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-433, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 1075.
39. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-433, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 1075.
40. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-433, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 1075.

CHAPTER 3

“TIT FOR TAT” CONTAINMENT

The years ahead are great ones for this country, for the cause of freedom and the spread of civilization. The West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism. It won't bother to dismiss or denounce it, it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.

—Ronald Reagan, “Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame”, May 17, 1981

Throughout his presidency, Ronald Reagan took a unique approach to the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reagan infused his brand of containment into his national strategy. Reagan also faced the challenge of being the first president to develop an NSS following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols. His 1987 National Security Strategy largely met this challenge, fulfilling the requirements established by Goldwater-Nichols and the even more stringent qualifications of the Tenets of Strategic Planning. Reagan's subsequent 1988 National Security Strategy also qualifies as a proper strategic plan, as it updated and adapted the 1987 NSS to the changes in foreign relations and national security of the United States.

The policies of Reagan's two-term presidency revolved around the central question of previous administrations dating back to Harry Truman – how to approach the Cold War. Reagan adopted a policy of aggressive containment, departing from President Jimmy Carter's policies, and even discarding Nixon and Kissinger's détente.¹ Reagan's February 26, 1986 “Address to the Nation on National Security” outlined how he perceived the Soviet threat:

Between 1970 and 1985 alone, the Soviets invested \$500 billion more than the United States in defense and built nearly three times as many strategic missiles. As a consequence of their enormous weapons investment, major military imbalances still exist

between our two countries. . . . But it's not just the immense Soviet arsenal that puts us on our guard. The record of Soviet behavior, the long history of Soviet brutality toward those who are weaker, reminds us that the only guarantee of peace and freedom is our military strength and our national will.²

Reagan brought the Cold War to the forefront with one of his prominent campaign promises to meet this threat by rearming America against a perceived Soviet military advantage. From 1981 to 1988, President Reagan appropriated over \$2 trillion to the Department of Defense to meet his goal of surpassing Soviet military capabilities.³

Reagan found justification in his buildup through the phrase “peace through strength.”⁴ For Reagan, deterrence was the best method for approaching the Soviets.⁵ In his “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security” on March 23, 1983, Reagan described his vision for approaching the Cold War: “‘Deterrence’ means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression.”⁶

Giving remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida on March 8, 1983, Reagan described the Cold War conflict in ideological terms. He asserted that “the real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.”⁷ The struggle facing the United States now transcended simple dollars-and-cents debates surrounding military appropriations and elevated it to a higher level of a moral battle. Reagan clearly portrayed this as a “good versus evil” situation even identifying the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.”⁸ While some of this rhetoric may have been pandering to a conservative Christian audience, much of this harsh language remained evident throughout his presidency.

Foreign affairs commentator Fareed Zakaria contends that Reagan's version of containment followed a "tit for tat" pattern. It first sought to correct the imbalance against Soviet expansionist policies during the 1970s. The Soviet Union directly threatened the United States with its military buildup and through its support of the communist movements throughout the western hemisphere. Reagan sought to contain the spread of communism that had unintentionally been encouraged by lax policies of previous administrations.⁹ Zakaria describes the Reagan Administration approach utilizing the "tit for tat" pattern:

The Reagan strategy of containment followed strikingly similar lines. In response to what it saw as American cooperation during detente, Soviet expansionism in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Afghanistan was viewed as rank defection. The Reagan strategy was to retaliate against this defection with the utmost clarity. When by 1986 the Soviet Union began cooperating, the administration held few grudges and quickly reciprocated that cooperation.¹⁰

Reagan sought to counter the Soviet threat through "tit for tat" containment. It began with a military buildup to match that of the Soviet Union, and then shifted focus to peripheral communist movements. However, this harsh stance towards the Soviet Union began to soften following the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as the new Soviet leader in 1985. Gorbachev, confronting poor economic conditions in the Soviet Union, sought to reduce tensions with the United States. This resulted in a series of summits between Reagan and Gorbachev beginning with the 1985 summit in Geneva, Switzerland and followed by the 1986 summit in Reykjavík, Iceland aimed at strategic arms reductions. Gorbachev's rapprochement and gradual warming to the United States led to a reciprocal response from Reagan. Going into the 1987 and 1988 National Security Strategies the strategic focus was moving towards cooperation and arms reductions.

Ronald Reagan published his administration's first National Security Strategy in January 1987, just a few months after he signed Goldwater-Nichols into law. The 1987 NSS laid out the basic construct for how future National Security Strategies were to be written. The document begins with an enumeration of five specific national interests that guide the administration's strategy:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions intact.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy.
3. The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.
4. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests.
5. The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships.¹¹

The 1987 NSS further elaborates on each of the five stated national interests. The NSS expands on each interest, broadening the description of it and then following it with a list of specific objectives necessary to facilitate and protect the national interests. For instance, in describing the first point of maintaining the national security of the United States, this section explains that "the United States, in cooperation with its allies, must seek to deter any aggression that could threaten that security, and, should deterrence fail, must be prepared to repel or defeat any military attack and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies."¹² The NSS follows with nine specific objectives that include: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; deterring hostile attacks against the United States, resorting to the use of force if necessary; and forcing "the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of its domestic economic shortcomings in order to discourage excessive Soviet military expenditures and global adventurism."¹³ While only a small portion of the objectives and interests specifically mention the Soviet Union, almost the entirety of the document beyond this chapter targets the Soviet

Union as its central focus. It becomes very apparent that dealing with the Soviet Union is Reagan's central objective, though this is not explicitly stated.

President Reagan connects means to the aforementioned ends through a lengthy description of military aspects of national power. In the section "U.S. Defense Policy," which comprises just over half of the entire document, Reagan at length describes how military means will be utilized to achieve his prescribed ends. Portions of this chapter define means for implementing military power in broad generalities and concepts. For example, after spending some time detailing the importance of intelligence support for national security, the section concludes by noting that "as part of our intelligence strategy we have taken a number of steps in recent years to strengthen our security and counterintelligence capabilities. These efforts will continue as a matter of high national priority."¹⁴ This section, while descriptive in the importance of maintaining intelligence capabilities, unfortunately does not offer any substantial input as to how intelligence will be utilized or improved in order to achieve national objectives. However, not all of the chapter on military means lacks clarity and direction.

Some portions of the chapter "U.S. Defense Policy" offer explicit methodologies. For example, when discussing the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program the 1987 NSS notes some of the elements of the program that are being pursued:

Improved strategic command, control and communications, to ensure timely warning of attack and an assured means of passing retaliatory orders to our strategic forces; ICBM modernization centered on the PEACEKEEPER (MX) and Small ICBM, both of which will have enhanced survivability through mobility; SLBM modernization, including deployment of the TRIDENT submarine and development and deployment of the TRIDENT II missile; Bomber and cruise missile upgrades, including deployment of the B-1B, and the exploitation of the important U.S. lead in low-observable technology by development of the Advanced Technology Bomber and the Advanced Cruise Missile; Strategic Defense programs, including SDI and the Air Defense Initiative, to redress the long-standing neglect of defensive programs generally, and to capitalize on the potential which modern technology offers for radically transforming the basis for deterrence and

laying the foundation for a far more safe and stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union.¹⁵

This example demonstrates an extreme of how prescriptive the means can be. Overall the chapter tends to blend the two methods of general concepts and explicit description in defining military means. Through this technique, the 1987 NSS generates a concise view of how the Reagan Administration approaches the application of military force as a component of national strategy while also including enough detail as to provide compelling examples to support the administration's broad conceptualizations.

While the majority of the 1987 National Security Strategy is primarily focused on military applications of national power, the document also dedicates sections to other aspects of national power. The section "International Economic Policy" describes how the administration utilizes economic measures such as blocking Soviet membership from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹⁶ Denying the Soviet Union membership to these international organizations would enable the United States and the West to apply economic leverage on the Soviet Union. The economic policy section details additional opportunities for economic power beyond this example, but it lacks anywhere near the development of the chapter on military power. This oversight may be the consequence of President Reagan's emphasis on military means as well as a short timeline in constructing the document. However, this still demonstrates an effective incorporation, even at a minimal level, of economic aspects of national power.

The 1987 NSS also lacks emphasis on applications of diplomatic power. The document contains a short section titled "Political and Informational Elements of National Power" where diplomatic opportunities are discussed. In this brief section, the 1987 NSS points to several

agencies such as the Department of State, Department of Defense, Agency for International Development, and the U.S Information Agency among others for taking the lead in U.S. foreign relations. According to the NSS, these agencies should disseminate effective political and informational policy. However, only a general, non-descript conception of how to achieve this is provided:

Our political and informational strategy must also reach to the peoples of denied areas, particularly the USSR and Eastern Europe—to encourage hope for change and to educate publics on the benefits of free institutions. This is achieved through the electronic media, written materials, and the increased contact and exchange of ideas that come from such contact. The process of gradual change will take place inside, but the stimulant and the vision of “how things could be” must come from outside in a closed society.¹⁷

This evidently lacks any sort of clarity of action. It provides a general direction, but no road map for success. Again, this may in part be due to the Reagan Administration’s focus on military aspects of confronting the Soviet Union.

Through the discussion of ends and means, the 1987 NSS largely fulfills the requirements of Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. The document clearly states American interests and objectives. Furthermore, it discusses various aspects of national power, though, admittedly, some better than others. Both short-term and long-term uses of national power are also discussed. For example, the 1987 NSS notes that regarding nuclear testing the Reagan Administration sought “essential [Soviet] verification improvements to permit ratification of existing treaties: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.”¹⁸ Alternatively, at a meeting in Iceland with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan proposed to accept a ten-year commitment to honor the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would effectively extend it to 1996.¹⁹ Through these descriptions of means and ends, the 1987 NSS

successfully fulfills two of the requirements of Section 603 of declaring American interests and incorporating short-term and long-term uses of national power.

The 1987 NSS also contains an overview of the foreign relations of the United States. In the chapter “U.S. Foreign Policy,” the state of American commitments and interests are detailed in regional sections (Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, East Asia and Pacific, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, The Middle East and South Asia, and Africa). For example, in discussing East Asia and the Pacific, the document declares that “the goal [of the United States] is to strengthen our natural political and economic associations, while proceeding steadily with necessary modernization of our military forces deployed in the area.”²⁰ This will be achieved by establishing a stronger relationship with Japan through such measures as the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The section also discusses the importance of relations with Thailand and Australia for pursuing regional interests. This example demonstrates fulfillment of Section 603’s requirement dictating that the NSS describe the worldwide commitments of the United States.

The final requirement of Section 603 stipulates that the NSS contains an evaluation of American capabilities to carry out the strategic plan proposed by the president. The 1987 NSS fulfills this in the chapter “Executing the Strategy.” The NSS notes that President Reagan requested \$16.2 billion for the foreign assistance programs that function to help secure American interests abroad. Reagan argued that Congress’s slashing of this request to \$13.6 billion would weaken the capabilities of the United States to achieve its objectives and ran the risk of having to “defend our interests with more direct, costly, and painful means.”²¹ Following this evaluation of budgetary discrepancies, this chapter continues to devote much of its ink towards appraising the defense capabilities of the United States. For example, the document states that “the warfighting capability of our naval forces is improving markedly with the increase in the quantity and quality

of ships and aircraft. This long-term program to assure our ability to use the world's oceans in peace and war requires continuing support."²² By evaluating American capabilities in instances such as these, the 1987 NSS fulfills the final requirement set forth by Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols.

Through completing the requirements of Section 603, the 1987 NSS also meets the first four Tenets of Strategic Planning. The 1987 NSS looks beyond military force to incorporate various resources and dimensions of national power into the national strategy. It also explicitly defines means and correlating ends; these include both short-term and long-term objectives. Furthermore, the NSS contains an appraisal of U.S. capabilities for carrying out the strategic plan. By accomplishing this, the 1987 NSS completes the first four tenets.

The fifth tenet, accounting for public opinion, is clearly stated as the last paragraph of the document. Throughout the NSS Reagan solicits Congressional support, but only at the end does he directly appeal to the will of the people. The document states that "I ask that we stand together in my final two years as your President to ensure that we continue setting in place a strategy which will carry us securely into the 21st Century."²³ Here Reagan acknowledges that he must answer to the people. Though this appeal to public opinion may stem from Reagan's interest in preserving his legacy, it still demonstrates that he understands that in creating a national strategy, the will of the people must be taken into account.

The sixth tenet notes that strategic planning does not occur in a vacuum, but that the strategist must also take into account the actions of outside actors. The 1987 NSS demonstrates this throughout the document, usually through an estimate as to the actions of the Soviet Union. The NSS provides an excellent example when discussing competitive strategies, declaring that "such strategies seek to make portions of the tremendous Soviet military machine obsolete and

force the Soviets to divert resources in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not necessarily threaten our own forces. Low observable (stealth) technology, for example, can render much of the Soviet investment in air defense obsolete and requires the Soviets to divert resources from offensive forces to defensive forces.”²⁴ Here Reagan notes how the United States can apply pressure in order to compel a reaction from the Soviet Union, thus considering Soviet action. While taking Soviet actions into account is clearly the top priority, the 1987 NSS also considers the actions of other actors such as NATO, terrorists, third world countries, and potential allies. The NSS undoubtedly incorporates the sixth Tenet of Strategic Planning.

The final tenet observes that since friction and uncertainty will always exist, a strategic plan must be flexible and adaptable over time in order to account for the unknown. This tenet is realized, not directly through the 1987 NSS itself, but by a comparison with the 1988 NSS. The 1988 NSS is remarkably similar to the 1987 NSS; the only differences between them being organizational and minor elaborations and updates to certain sections. For instance, the section on arms reductions was updated to include the treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) signed on December 8, 1987 between Reagan and Gorbachev.²⁵ This new consideration slightly alters the arms controls section from the 1987 NSS where it placed as one the nation’s priorities reaching a consensus with the Soviet Union on eliminating land-based long-range INF missiles and agreements on limiting INF arsenals.²⁶ Another example of an NSS update appears in the economic policy section. In the 1988 NSS Reagan adds a paragraph detailing the importance of energy security. The 1988 NSS notes that disruption in foreign oil supplies presents a major threat to American national security. Reagan planned to help manage this through increasing the size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.²⁷

An additional point of deviation between the two documents is in how they incorporate the fifth tenet of accounting for the will of the people. The 1987 NSS made a clear bid for their approval, demonstrating a consideration for public sentiment. The 1988 NSS approaches this a bit differently:

Above all, we must both [the president and Congress] work harder to rebuild a bipartisan public consensus on our National Security Strategy. ... Renewed consensus will be forged on the anvil of public debate – among responsible officials in government, between the Congress and the Executive, in consultations with our allies and friends, and among the larger community of interested and concerned American citizens. ... There can be no endeavor more important for the long-term well-being of the American people...²⁸

The 1988 NSS indirectly appeals to the people. It calls for public scrutiny and debate over the formation and direction of national strategy for the United States. Though the petition for public approval does not go directly to the people, it is clear that President Reagan considers the will of the people to be an important measure for creating and implementing national strategy. The above statement demonstrates that Reagan believes that ultimate authority lies with the people who elected him.

Aside from minor instances such as this, the core ends and means of the 1987 NSS are directly transferred to the 1988 NSS. The overall change occurs at the organizational level, taking a regional approach to national strategy. Considering this with the aforementioned update to the fifth tenet, the 1988 NSS, working in conjunction with 1987 NSS, fulfills the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols and the Tenets of Strategic Planning. Therefore, both the 1987 and 1988 National Security Strategies published by the Reagan Administration qualify as proper strategic plans.

The 1988 NSS displayed a more refined document from the 1987 NSS. Given the additional time to prepare the national strategy, it is evident that the new organization suited the

administration more so than the previous. However, throughout the changes in structure and adaptations, both National Security Strategies demonstrated a clear vision of Reagan's version of containment. Both put military priorities and confrontation with the Soviet Union central to national strategy. The two National Security Strategies show the shift in Reagan Administration policies towards a strategy of arms reductions as opposed to an outright military buildup. Reagan sought to meet the Soviet threat through a decrease in arms while maintaining technological superiority. Defense programs such as SDI and financial pressures from the arms race Reagan initiated at the beginning of his administration helped to convince the Soviet Union to cooperate on arms reductions. After meeting the Soviet military buildup, Reagan met Gorbachev at the negotiating table, thus depicting the aptly phrased "tit for tat" containment that defined his administration's approach to foreign policy.

1. Fareed Zakaria, "The Reagan Strategy of Containment," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (1990): 373.

2. Ronald W. Reagan, February 26, 1986, "Address to the Nation on National Security," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 274-275.

3. This manifested as "strategic modernization" and its replacement policy, the "Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)." Zakaria, "The Reagan Strategy of Containment," 380.

4. Ronald W. Reagan, March 8, 1983, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 363.

5. Ronald W. Reagan, March 23, 1983, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 438.

6. Ronald W. Reagan, March 23, 1983, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 438.

7. Ronald W. Reagan, March 8, 1983, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 364.

8. Ronald W. Reagan, March 8, 1983, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 364.

9. Some refer to this as a novel "rollback strategy," but Zakaria contends that this is actually just another form of containment in Zakaria, "The Reagan Strategy of Containment," 388-390.

10. Zakaria, "The Reagan Strategy of Containment," 395.

11. Ronald W. Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1987), 4.

12. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 4.

13. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 4.

14. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 32.

15. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 23.

16. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 11.

17. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 13.

18. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 25.

19. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 25.

20. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 15.

21. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 36.

22. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 38.

23. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 41.

24. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 20.

25. Ronald W. Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1988), 16.

26. Reagan, NSS, 1987, 24-25.

27. Regan, NSS, 1988, 12.

28. Reagan, NSS, 1988, 41.

CHAPTER 4

A NEW WORLD ORDER

A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.

—George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,” September 11, 1990

President George H. W. Bush was the first president to enter office after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. President Bush, though required to submit an annual national security strategy report to Congress at the beginning of each year, only managed to submit three National Security Strategies. The 1990 and 1991 National Security Strategies successfully fulfill the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, aptly representing the intended spirit of Section 603. Furthermore, these two National Security Strategies also adhere to the Tenets of Strategic Planning, thus making them proper strategic plans. Yet, where these two NSS's succeed, the 1993 NSS most surely fails. The 1993 NSS, published the same month Bush left office, does not fulfill the conditions set forth by Section 603, nor does it adhere to the Tenets of Strategic Planning. President Bush left office with a strategy report that amounted to a farewell address devoid of any strategic substance and undeserving of the title of “National Security Strategy of the United States.”

While his Presidency ended on a strategic sour note, the 1990 and 1991 NSSs found success as written articulations of strategy. President Bush utilized the NSSs to promote his new

image for U.S. national strategy; a Post-Cold War multi-polar world led by the United States. President Bush entitled his vision a “new world order.” He hoped to create this new world order by “prohibit[ing] state-to-state aggression through multilateral cooperation in international and regional organizations.”¹ The new world order grew out of the rapidly changing international environment in which the Bush Administration found itself.

President Bush did not commence his term with the guiding principle of a new world order. The rapid decline of the Soviet Union forced Bush and his advisors to reconsider the roles of both the United States and the Soviet Union in a fluid post-Cold War environment. Furthermore, this realignment of international politics occurred in the context of the machinations of a Middle Eastern dictator named Saddam Hussein. Bush, acknowledging the precarious relations between the United States and the crumbling Soviet Union, consulted Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev concerning the swift changes. President Bush recounted a September 7, 1990 meeting with Gorbachev where he said, “I think there is an opportunity to develop out of this tragedy [Iraq invasion of Kuwait] a new world order. ... The closer we can be together today, the closer the new world order. ... I want to work with you as equal partners in dealing with this. I want to go to the American people tomorrow night to close the book on the Cold War and offer them the vision of this new world order in which we will cooperate.”² This marked the beginning of Bush’s vision for the future, one where a multi-polar world worked in concert to resolve differences; a world where decisions could be made outside the trappings of the Cold War.

Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s national security advisor, recalls how the Bush Administration and National Security Council tried to set a pattern of international relations for the post-Cold War world. Following Soviet cooperation in condemning Saddam’s actions, the

groundwork for the new world order was set. Scowcroft reminisced that “our foundation was the premise that the United States henceforth would be obligated to lead the world community to an unprecedented degree, as demonstrated by the Iraqi crisis, and that we should attempt to pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the international community.”³ While Scowcroft succinctly presented the vision of the Bush Administration going forward, he also noted that this vision developed over time; it was not established policy from the beginning.

The drastically changing international environment that President Bush faced during his time in office helped to create his image of the United States’ future place in the world. Yet, this chimerical environment did not prove itself conducive to publishing National Security Strategies. Coming into office in January of 1989, President Bush was required to publish a National Security Strategy within next five months. Don M. Snider, who helped author the National Security Strategies for President Bush, noted that publication of the 1989 NSS was delayed until 1990 due to the swiftly progressing situation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁴ In 1989, pro-democracy demonstrations spread across the Eastern European Soviet bloc. Gorbachev made it clear that the Soviet Union would no longer intervene. This resulted in the fall of the Berlin Wall followed by, in early 1990, steps towards Germany’s reunification. Rapidly changing events in Europe forced a redraft of several major components of the strategy.

With the changing world scene, the Bush Administration published its first NSS in March of 1990. In the preface of the 1990 NSS, President Bush stated that, “this Report outlines the direction we will take to protect the legacy of the postwar era while enabling the United States to help shape a new era, one that moves beyond containment and that will take us into the next century.”⁵ This statement set the tone for the document and demonstrated that his vision of a new

world order was already taking shape. However, did the 1990 NSS successfully articulate this vision while adhering to the requirements set forth by the Goldwater-Nichols Act?

The first requirement in Section 603 stipulates that the president must declare and describe objectives pertaining to the national security of the United States. After a brief introduction describing the historical objectives of the United States, the 1990 NSS broadly defines four core political objectives of the United States:

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. ... A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad. ... A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions. ... Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.⁶

Using these broad interests as a foundation, the report establishes nineteen specific objectives.

The detailed goals commence with a traditional military focus. For example, the NSS discusses weapons as a military objective by “improv[ing] strategic stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms, control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing technologies for strategic defense, and strengthening our conventional capabilities.”⁷ Of course, the Bush Administration framed the military objectives in the context of working with their allies whenever possible, foreshadowing the future Bush Doctrine of a new world order. The 1990 NSS further details economic objectives as “ensur[ing] access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.”⁸ Additionally, the NSS presents a more focused methodology for its relations with Europe and its allies, stating that the United States should “work with our allies in the North Atlantic Alliance and fully utilize the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security, and democracy in a Europe whole and free.”⁹ President Bush’s 1990 National Security Strategy lays

out the broad interests of the United States and then further focuses on specific objectives that the administration wished to pursue. The objectives are specific enough to give direction while retaining a degree of flexibility. The objectives also cover a wide range of short-term and long-term goals. This suitably satisfies the first requirement of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The 1990 National Security Strategy contains three separate chapters describing the uses of national power in order to connect means and ends. The first chapter entitled “Relating Means to Ends: Our Political Agenda” begins with asserting the need for alliances and a reliance on them in implementing President Bush’s vision. The NSS states that “Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. ... We are prepared to share more fully with our allies and friends the responsibilities of global leadership.”¹⁰ Though this was published prior to the more complete doctrine of a new world order, this leading segment on alliances already demonstrates the beginnings of this policy. Additionally, this example expresses a means for achieving objectives utilizing the political component of national power.

President Bush pursues this wholehearted effort at achieving national objectives through international cooperation when he emphasizes the importance of arms control. The NSS discusses direct methods of pursuing arms controls, referencing the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), lowering the level of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), working towards continued global bans on chemical weapons, and seeking global cooperation in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. These initiatives all share a common theme of global participation and cooperation.¹¹

The 1990 National Security Strategy also states that the spread of information is essential for protecting American interests. The NSS asserts that through the free sharing of information, an informed global community will appreciate American democratic values. This spread of ideas

will help protect human rights and garner support for democratic governments. Here again, the president views political means in an international light, possibly hoping that the spread of democracy will ensure peace through the sharing of similar cultures and values.¹²

In the 1990 NSS, President Bush also discusses economic means to achieve desired objectives in the following chapter entitled “Relating Means to Ends: Our Economic Agenda.” The NSS states that “[the United States] will pursue a strategy that integrates domestic economic policies with a market-opening trade policy, enhanced cooperation among the major industrial countries, and imaginative solutions to the problems of the Third World.” More specifically, these economic means are: reducing the United States' large deficit, securing favorable trade agreements to expand American markets, a necessity of maintaining technological superiority, and securing reliable sources of energy. In order to ensure energy security, the United States must ensure reliable access to oil from the Persian Gulf, maintain the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and promote diversification and development of alternative fuel sources. Again, the president places national security in the larger context of global cooperation, setting the stage for his future proclamation of a new world order.

The military resources that President Bush plans to utilize in order to secure his objectives are presented in the third chapter on means entitled “Relating Means to Ends: Our Defense Agenda.” This chapter focuses on four major themes of utilizing military force – deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense, and force projection. Here President Bush devotes a great deal of time to outlining how to avoid both conventional and nuclear war through balanced force strength, collective defense, and maintaining a forward presence. The NSS points out threats to the United States and prescribes methods of defense against them:

The Soviet Union continues to modernize its strategic forces across the board. Even as START promises to reduce numbers substantially, the qualitative competition has not ended. Decisions on strategic modernization that I have already made take advantage of the most promising technologies in each leg of our Triad to increase stability. The B-2 bomber will ensure our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses and fulfill the role the bomber force has played so successfully for forty years. The D-5 missile in Trident submarines will exploit the traditionally high survivability of this leg and add a significant ability to attack more hardened targets. In a two-phase program for our ICBM force, the deployment of the Rail Garrison System will enhance stability by removing Peacekeeper missiles from vulnerable silos and providing the mobile capability we need for the near term. In the second phase, deployment of the small ICBM road-mobile system will further strengthen stability and increase force flexibility. While we will ensure that each leg of the Triad is as survivable as possible, the existence of all three precludes the destruction of more than one by surprise attack and guards against a technological surprise that could undermine a single leg.¹³

President Bush explicitly connects well-defined military means and ends throughout this section of the NSS. While not all of the recommendations are as detailed as the above example, they do nevertheless round out President Bush's strategic plan of how to best utilize the various aspects of national power to obtain the objectives that he has set for the United States. Through doing this, his 1990 National Security Strategy adeptly fulfills the third requirement stipulated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act regarding composition of the National Security Strategy Report.

The second requirement of Section 603 regarding international relations and defense capabilities closely resembles the fourth requirement, which analyzes the overall status of the United States' capabilities of national power concerning securing national interests. They both direct the president to analyze the capabilities of available resources for promoting national interests and security while placing them in the larger international context. President Bush discusses the breadth of United States worldwide commitments and foreign policy relations in the chapter "Regional Challenges and Responses." This section broadly covers American relations with foreign nations, mentioning every region with an abundance of specific references.

For instance, when discussing East Asia and the Pacific, the NSS presents American relations stating that “the U.S. security commitment to the Republic of Korea remains firm; we seek a reduction in tensions on the Korean peninsula and fully endorse Seoul's efforts to open a fruitful South-North dialogue. Our strong and healthy ties with our ally Australia contribute directly to regional and global stability.”¹⁴ The entire section is structured in this manner, presenting a brief but conclusive overview of the worldwide relationships of the United States.

The NSS also analyzes American capacity to exert national power. This analysis is spread throughout the document, mostly localized to the chapters on “Relating Means to Ends.” Considering military power, the president muses on the capabilities of forward forces stating that “operational restrictions on our forces overseas are also increasing, some of which we can accommodate with new training and technologies, but others of which may eventually reduce the readiness of our deployed units.”¹⁵ The president also considers the technological capabilities of the United States as they relate to economic power stating that “the United States remains in the forefront in the development of new technologies, but American enterprises must respond more quickly in their exploitation of new technologies if they are to maintain their competitiveness in both domestic and foreign markets.”¹⁶ Throughout the strategy report, President Bush acknowledges American capabilities. However, this point could benefit from a more explicit and succinct listing of the capabilities as opposed to passing comments regarding capacities of national power. This observation aside, the 1990 National Security Strategy demonstrates that considerations have been made regarding the ability of available resources to carry out the means described in the strategic plan. Additionally, a broad discussion of foreign relations has provided context for the United States in the world and has concluded the second and fourth requirements set forth in Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Fulfilling the obligations for a national security strategy outlined in Goldwater-Nichols quickly sets a strategic plan on the correct course for executing the Tenets of Strategic Planning. The 1990 NSS is no exception to this standard. By completing the four Goldwater-Nichols requirements for an NSS, the 1990 NSS satisfied the first four tenets: utilizing all forms of national power; plausible evaluation of capabilities and resources; having explicitly defined objectives and correlating means; and include both short-term and long-term objectives. However, the last three tenets have yet been covered.

The fifth tenet, accounting for public opinion, is largely discussed in the final chapter of the 1990 NSS entitled “A Public Trust.” The president commences with his bid to earn public approval stating that “as our defense efforts adapt to changing circumstances, our people must be confident that their defense dollars are efficiently and effectively supporting the cause of peace.”¹⁷ President Bush outlines his justification for spending taxpayers’ money on the objectives outlined in the beginning of the 1990 National Security Strategy. His bid for the will of the people in carrying out his plan is covered by a summary of the “Defense Management Review” that he undertook shortly after entering office. This initiative sought to make the Department of Defense more efficient and cost-effective. President Bush outlined several of the components of the review that needed to be addressed such as reducing overhead costs, increasing program performance, reducing micromanagement, strengthening the defense industrial base, and improving observation of ethical conduct.¹⁸ The NSS ends with the president’s final bid for approval through his appeal for bi-partisan and intergovernmental cooperation in national security matters. He concluded that “I believe there is a national consensus in support of a strong foreign and defense policy perhaps broader and deeper than at any time in 25 years. Congress and the president need, more than ever, to reflect that unity in

their own cooperation. We owe the American people no less.”¹⁹ Whether or not the American people were won over by this appeal for unity and public duty is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, this chapter of the 1990 NSS clearly demonstrates an application of the fifth Tenet of Strategic Planning by considering public opinion.

The sixth tenet, accounting for the actions of other actors, was also covered in the 1990 NSS. While various portions have mentioned or hinted at the actions of outside actors (e.g. other nations), President Bush clearly directs the reader’s attention to it in the section on proliferation. This section states that “the spread of ever more sophisticated weaponry—including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons—and of the missiles capable of carrying them represents a growing danger to international security. This proliferation exacerbates and fuels regional tensions and complicates U.S. defense planning. It poses ever greater dangers to U.S. forces and facilities abroad, and possibly even to the United States itself.”²⁰ This aptly presents an understanding that the actions of other nations must be incorporated into strategic planning.

The final Tenet of Strategic Planning notes that a proper strategic plan necessitates a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability over time. The 1990 National Security Strategy clearly demonstrates this through a comparison with the 1991 National Security Strategy. The 1991 NSS is remarkably similar to its predecessor, copying entire sections of text word-for-word. The majority of the 1991 NSS is near identical to the 1990 NSS, with minor updates. With the core strategy (means and ends) being transferred relatively intact, this demonstrates that the 1990 strategic plan maintained a degree of adaptability; it could be incrementally updated to meet new challenges and, thus, be qualified as a true strategic plan.

Throughout the 1990 National Security Strategy, President Bush attempted to outline methods of securing U.S. interests through global partnerships. The Bush Administration

acknowledged the diminishing power of the Soviet Union and the rapidly changing dynamic of the east-west international system. The president outlined how the new world order would necessitate a new approach to diplomacy stating that “a multipolar world, in which military factors may recede to the background, puts a new premium on the instrumentalities of political relations—of which foreign assistance has been one of the most cost-effective and valuable.”²¹ This summarizes where the president believed that strategic direction was shifting to; a world reliant on open hands instead of clenched fists. As the Cold War ended, the president looked ahead for how to handle the balance of world power, hoping that economic assistance would go further than massive military buildups. With this outlook, the 1991 National Security Strategy was produced.

The 1991 National Security Strategy shares numerous similarities with its predecessor, one of which was its tardy publication. Don Snider concludes that the NSS release in August of 1991 was mostly due to the crisis in the Middle East and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.²² In 1990, Germany reunified and the Baltic States declared their independence. Communist regimes across Eastern Europe fell concluding with the complete collapse of the Soviet Union. While the bipolar Cold War system was collapsing, Saddam Hussein attempted to exploit the situation by invading the neighboring kingdom of Kuwait. President Bush utilized his vision for a new world order by gathering international support for the expulsion of Iraqi forces. Beginning in early 1991, the United States led an international coalition to expel Hussein from Kuwait. This demonstrated the beginnings of a new post-Cold War paradigm where the United States directed international affairs as the sole hegemon. The 1991 NSS needed to address these changes occurring internationally and the evolution of the President’s vision for the United States. This

resulted in, as previously mentioned, a national security strategy remarkably similar to the one published the previous year, with a few updates reflecting recent international events.

One major update occurs in the Preface to the 1991 NSS. It is here where the president clearly illustrates his vision for a new world order and stipulates that it will be the guiding principle throughout the NSS. President Bush states, “A new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration—and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed—to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.”²³ The president ties together his previous allusions to this multi-polar international system of cooperation led by the United States. While this vision has already been guiding President Bush’s strategy, it has now been coherently and concisely presented.

The rest of the document follows a slightly different approach. While the Preface took many ideas already stated and blended them into a coherent vision, the rest of the document takes the published strategic plan and updates wording as needed. For instance, in discussing the state of Eastern Europe, the 1990 NSS stated that “the United States and its allies are dedicated to overcoming the division of Europe. All the countries of Eastern Europe are entitled to become part of the worldwide commonwealth of free nations. . . . Overcoming this division depends on their achievement of self-determination and independence.”²⁴ The situation in Europe since this statement has changed somewhat with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and withdrawal of Soviet military forces. Therefore, the 1991 NSS updates the status of Eastern Europe, stating that “all across the Continent, the barriers that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. East Europeans are determining their own destinies, choosing freedom and economic liberty.”²⁵ Aside from minor updates and some reorganization similar to this example, the 1991 NSS largely

maintains the essential elements of the previous NSS including, but not limited to, the core means and ends. Because of this near-facsimile, the 1991 NSS retains its predecessor's adherence to the requirements in Goldwater-Nichols as well as completing all of the Tenets of Strategic Planning except for one.

The 1991 NSS fails to transfer directly the verbatim that fulfilled the fifth tenet of accounting for public opinion. This resulted from the major change that occurred in the updated document. The final chapter of the 1990 NSS, "A Public Trust," was replaced by a new chapter entitled "Toward the 21st Century." In the closing paragraphs of this final chapter, the president presents a new appeal to the public opinion of the American people, replacing the bid for approval in the 1990 NSS. President Bush declared that "In this country we make such choices for peace just as we make the awful choices of war — as a democracy. ... Divided, we will invite disasters. United, we can overcome any challenge. In the Gulf, the dictator guessed wrong when he doubted America's unity and will. The extraordinary unity we showed as a Nation in the Gulf assured that we would prevail."²⁶ This consideration for the public opinion of the American people completes the 1991 NSS as a proper strategic plan.

Up to this point, President Bush and his administration have successfully published two consecutive national security strategies that adhere to the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols and are properly formulated strategic plans according to the Tenets of Strategic Planning. Unfortunately, this is where his triumph in strategic planning ends. The 1993 National Security Strategy is by all accounts a failure of strategic planning. The 1993 NSS is a farewell address and, at best, a strategic recommendation; the president evaluates his time in the White House as it nears its conclusion and offers advice to the incoming administration.

The 1993 NSS is an appraisal of the Bush Administration's achievements. It uses these as a foundation to peer out at the world and describe the challenges that still exist in it. The first chapter, "The World As It Is ... Our National Security Challenges and Opportunities," reads like a strategic recommendation for the incoming administration. It sounds like President Bush reminiscing on lost opportunities for what he would have wanted to accomplish with another term in office. The result materializes as an outgoing president attempting to convince his successor as to what the future political direction for the United States should be: "We must seize our opportunities, both for the benefits that will accrue to us, and to further the prospects for peace, stability, and prosperity that can and should be shared by others around the globe. We must lead because we cannot otherwise hope to achieve a more democratic and peaceful future in a world still rife with turmoil and conflict. If we shun this role, our own future will be shaped by others."²⁷

After endeavoring to dictate direction to the incoming administration, the document proposes a handful of "objectives" under the umbrella of a broad interest, stating that "the United States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions, and people."²⁸ However, it does not follow up with specific objectives, offering vague goals such as seeking "open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide" or "an open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants."²⁹ In the two previous NSSs, Bush listed specific objectives; the 1993 NSS only presents four unclear "objectives." However, it may be more appropriate to label them as national interests than as ends for directing a strategic plan. Overall, these "objectives" fail to provide clear and obtainable goals.

The first attempt to reference means for the proposed ends occurs in the chapter "The Promotion Of Peace And Democracy ... Our Policy Agenda." This chapter is obviously an allusion to the chapters on political means from the previous two NSSs. However, unlike the preceding NSSs, the 1993 NSS offers only three broad recommendations for pursuing American interests through a diplomatic agenda. One of these describes American support for the spread of democracy:

We must also work to support, encourage, and consolidate democracy elsewhere around the world, both multilaterally and bilaterally. Our tools include a vigorous public diplomacy conducted by the USIA, the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and successful assistance programs focused on democratic institution-building such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the International Military Education and Training program. These efforts should continue. We should strive to bring stable democracy and free markets to lands that have little knowledge of them, strengthen democratic institutions where they are fragile and threatened. Where authoritarianism still dominates, we should continue to explain ourselves and to provide factual information and hope. Maintaining our own high standard of democratic practice and the rule of law is vital to our ability to lead by example.³⁰

This example offers a glimmer of hope for presenting specific means correlating to explicit objectives, but ultimately does not deliver clear-cut ideas and explanation – only generalized recommendation.

The next chapter, "Economic Progress At Home And Opportunities Abroad ... Our Economic Agenda," provides a list of economic objectives. Ideally, this list would have been located in a preface or introductory chapter delineating all of the interests and goals. Yet, aside from this organizational quibble, it remains unfortunate that this chapter fails to follow its outlined objectives with any methodologies for pursuing them. This chapter, like the previous chapter, fails to properly describe specific means.

The chapter on military means, “Security Through Strength: Legacy and Mandate ... Our Defense Agenda,” provides excellent descriptions of the core national security issues and how the Bush Administration handled them. While offering an appraisal of the Bush Administration on these issues, the 1993 NSS stumbles into an objective that Bush failed to accomplish: “A major unfinished item on the arms control agenda, to which the United States attaches the highest priority, is the banning of chemical weapons. The best hope of achieving the worldwide elimination of chemical weapons and of stemming proliferation at the same time is to bring into force the Chemical Weapons Convention.”³¹ The chapter follows this pattern, presenting what Bush wanted to accomplish as a recommendation to the future administration. However, it still does not elaborate on how to achieve those unfinished goals.

The 1993 NSS also falls short of previous NSS standards in describing American worldwide commitments and foreign relations. While these are at times referenced offhand, there is no chapter solely devoted to the discussion of American relations with other nations. The only coherent discussion of this is two brief one-and-a-half-page descriptions of America's regional interests that are attached to the end of the chapters on political and military means. For example, the entire discussion of America's relationship with the Middle East Region pertaining to military means is only a single paragraph:

In the Middle East and South Asia, we will maintain forces deployed in the region, expand our bilateral defense arrangements, preposition materiel and equipment, and conduct joint and combined exercises to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of our partners in the region. We will continue to work to assure access to oil, deter recourse to war, terrorism and subversion, and enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions.³²

The brevity of each attachment and regional description fails to properly analyze, or describe in any detail, American relations with other nations.

Where the previous NSSs were prescriptive in dictating how to achieve the clear ends by enumerating specific means, the 1993 NSS only offers generalized recommendations. Without clear objectives, a strategic plan cannot possibly provide specific means to match. Furthermore, a plan would therefore be unable to supply an adequate appraisal of capabilities regarding means and ends. Without properly formatted means and ends, the core of strategy is missing from the 1993 NSS. Additionally, as it spends much time touting previous achievements, it is very unlikely that any future president would utilize it for a future iteration of strategy. As such, along with it being published days before leaving office, this strategic plan was dead on arrival. Thus, without the basic components of strategy, the 1993 NSS cannot possibly fulfill the requirements established by Goldwater-Nichols or the Tenets of Strategic Planning.

The 1993 National Security Strategy fails to meet the necessary conditions to be considered a strategic plan by any definition. The document disregards means and ends, instead discussing “agendas” which at times read more like a pie-in-the-sky wish-list offering a few prescriptive ideas for checking items off the list. Don Snider commented on the 1993 NSS stating that “Unlike the previous reports in both the Reagan and Bush administrations, this one was intended quite clearly to document the accomplishments of the past rather than to point to the way ahead. ... They wanted to document their accomplishments in strategic terms, as well as to put down markers by which the Clinton administration's foreign policy could be judged.”³³ The document accomplishes these aspects. Unfortunately, these are not elements of a strategic plan.

Aside from the strategic failure of 1993, the Bush Administration created two exceptional strategic plans during its tenure in the White House. It was able to articulate specific objectives with correlating means. This accomplishment of strategic planning was carried out in the

trappings of an evolving Bush Doctrine of a new world order. The National Security Strategies of the Bush Administration contained a largely outward perspective on national interests, choosing foreign over domestic issues. Chair of International Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations at Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate University, P. Edward Haley praised the administration:

[President George H. W. Bush] preserved a balance between commitments and capabilities by limiting what it attempted to do, and assuring that when it tried for ambitious goals, its policies were widely supported by other governments. As a result, even while cutting the size of the American military and reducing the defense budget, the administration found it relatively easy to accomplish its goals and its achievements were generally popular and widely regarded as legitimate.”³⁴

Foreign policy found many successes; it brought the United States to victory in the Gulf War and assisted in transitioning the world through the end of the Cold War. President Bush accomplished all of this utilizing his new world order and widespread international cooperation. His strategy to seek international support and rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also found success. The next administration would build on these foundations of strategy established by President Bush, but would ultimately take a decidedly more economic and domestic approach when determining which national interests should guide future strategy.

1. P. Edward Haley, *Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 42.

2. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 363-364.

3. Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 400.

4. Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 2nd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), 8. Snider worked as Director of Defense Policy on the National Security Council for the Bush and Reagan Presidencies and helped author the National Security Strategies for both Presidents (Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, iv).

5. George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1990), v.

6. Bush, NSS, 1990, 2-3.

7. Bush, NSS, 1990, 2.

8. Bush, NSS, 1990, 2.

9. Bush, NSS, 1990, 3.

10. Bush, NSS, 1990, 15.

11. Bush, NSS, 1990, 15-18.

12. Bush, NSS, 1990, 18.

13. Bush, NSS, 1990, 24.

14. Bush, NSS, 1990, 12.

15. Bush, NSS, 1990, 25.

16. Bush, NSS, 1990, 22.

17. Bush, NSS, 1990, 31.

18. Bush, NSS, 1990, 31-32.

19. Bush, NSS, 1990, 32.

20. Bush, NSS, 1990, 17.

21. Bush, NSS, 1990, 18.

22. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 8-9.

23. George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1991), v.

24. Bush, NSS, 1990, 11.

25. Bush, NSS, 1991, 6.

26. Bush, NSS, 1991, 34.

27. George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1993), 2.

28. Bush, NSS, 1993, 3.

29. Bush, NSS, 1993, 3.

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30. Bush, NSS, 1993, 6.
 31. Bush, NSS, 1993, 17.
 32. Bush, NSS, 1993, 20.
 33. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 9-10.
 34. Haley, *Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy*, 55.

CHAPTER 5

ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

I believe as strongly as I can say that just as your military strength permits America to have diplomatic strength, so that national security is both military and diplomatic, national security is also being strong at home as well as being strong abroad. And there is no longer a clear dividing line between what is foreign policy and what is domestic policy, not when everybody's job depends on whether we can compete in a global economy.

—William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the Military Community at Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, Hawaii,” November 16, 1994.

Bill Clinton published seven National Security Strategies out of his eight years as President of the United States. The next closest was George H. W. Bush with three National Security Strategies. No other president since has come close to the frequency and regularity of issuing strategy reports. Yet for the success in regularity, the Clinton Administration took a long time getting started. The first NSS was not released in its final draft until July of 1994, a year and a half into his first term. Clinton's 1994 National Security Strategy was the result of a lengthy process for a new administration trying to find its way through the morass of establishing a vision for national strategy. Yet, aside from the delay in its release, the 1994 NSS was a success in strategic planning. Furthermore, Clinton perpetuated this success to each of the six iterations of his strategic plan.

While trying to create a coherent vision for national strategy, Clinton faced a number of contentious international issues. In October 1993, the Battle of Mogadishu fought in the African nation of Somalia resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers. The American public voiced their disapproval of the administration over the debacle. The Clinton Administration's foreign policy was again tested in Africa in April of 1994 when genocide erupted in Rwanda between the

Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Clinton chose not to commit American forces, consequently drawing much public criticism. These events in Africa left the nation questioning Clinton's foreign policy acumen.

President Clinton got off to a rough start with strategic planning. Don Snider, who worked on the 1994 NSS as well as NSSs for Reagan and Bush, noted that Clinton's first strategy report went through 21 drafts.¹ Snider attributes this to the fact that "it took a long time for the administration to settle on a set of principles from which to design and implement a consistent foreign policy."² President Clinton campaigned largely on domestic and economic issues. Foreign relations and national security are points that the administration had to develop along the way while handling contentious international situations. Clearly, President Clinton was struggling to develop a vision for the United States that married his domestic and foreign policies.

The White House exhibited a lack of confidence in its initial attempt at defining national strategy through the multiple drafts of the 1994 NSS, the length of time it took in constructing a comprehensive strategy, and the manner in which it released the document. In his *New York Times* article, political columnist William Safire recalled the issuing of the NSS:

[The 1994 NSS] has been kept secret by the fiendishly clever device of making it public. Issued a month ago in the dead of night, the blue-covered "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" was dubbed "the En-En Document" by engaging reporters and enlarged pundits. The struggle over naming the policy engagement (a Gary Hart term favored by the State Department) vs. enlargement (a Tony Lake term favored by the N.S.C. staff) was resolved in a quintessentially Clintonian way: Both are used, conjuring a vision of involved tumescence.³

Safire illustrated the difficult beginning of strategic planning for the Clinton Administration.

Columnists John Lancaster and Barton Gellman in an article for *The Washington Post* noted that

“the strategy document, an annual report to Congress that normally gets scant public attention, has assumed new importance because it marks the Clinton administration's first attempt to describe its foreign policy strategy in a comprehensive way and because it carries implications for defense budgets and foreign aid.”⁴ The administration’s attempt at avoiding media scrutiny with a late night release in the hope that the document might fly under the radar failed to achieve the desired results – the 1994 NSS received much wider press coverage than any previous NSS release, partially due to the importance of it being the first comprehensive statement declaring the administration’s foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, Safire asserted that Clinton’s groundwork for a strategic vision of ‘engagement and enlargement’ was actually the result of timidity in establishing national strategy. Whether or not this is true, the explanation fits well with circumstances surrounding the publishing of the 1994 NSS and the administration’s struggle to establish coherent foreign policy.

The Clinton Administration also stepped away from the traditional titling of their first NSS, designating it “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” This title left no one guessing as to the core principles that President Clinton was trying to set as the cornerstone of his vision for national strategy. Yet, what does “engagement and enlargement” really mean? Professors of Political Science Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross concisely defined it stating: “the phrase ‘engagement and enlargement’ conveys both the mode and the purpose, or vision, of the strategy: the United States must be engaged in the world to enlarge the community of democratic free-market countries.”⁵ This approach places economic interests at the forefront of national strategy.

The theme “engagement and enlargement” represented a continuation of engagement strategy leftover from the previous administration with the additional emphasis on economic

policy. Lieutenant Colonel Winters writing for *The Army Lawyer* stated that “the annual United States National Security Strategy continues Bush administration ‘engagement’ strategies that evolved after Soviet hegemony collapsed in 1989 to 1990. ... Notably, the strategy expands from traditional notions of national security (such as national defense) into domestic forums such as the environment, research and development, and investment.”⁶ The Clinton Administration adhered to the long-term trend in U.S. national strategy, while advancing it with his own platform of economic expansion. Clinton believed that the domestic economy was intrinsically linked to the global market. Therefore, domestic economic reform played a crucial role for Clinton in directing national strategy. The most notable example of this is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which Clinton signed into law on January 1, 1994. President Clinton viewed NAFTA as an opportunity to expand the domestic economy by removing international trade barriers. It was hoped that this free trade zone would encourage economic growth and consequently result in more American jobs.

President Clinton attempted to bring his vision for the United States into action through his 1994 National Security Strategy. The 1994 NSS continues the worldwide “engagement” of the Bush Administration while also placing domestic economic issues at the core of its strategic vision. The 1994 NSS begins with a declaration of principles to lend structure to the president’s plan:

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote sustainable development.⁷

This statement of purpose also illustrates the three components of power that the ends and means will be coalesced into – security, economic prosperity, and the spread of democracy.

While the 1994 National Security Strategy establishes broad categories for ends and means, the document does not separate the ends and means into “to-do lists” like the Bush Administration. The chapter titled “Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement” broadly describes some objectives in the introduction:

We will continue to pursue arms control agreements to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict and promote stability. ... A vigorous and integrated economic policy designed to stimulate global environmentally sound economic growth and free trade and to press for open and equal U.S. access to foreign markets. ... Our efforts focus on preserving democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the former Soviet Union.⁸

The rest of the chapter blends the ends and means without explicitly separating and listing the objectives. Often the means are discussed in detail, but the objectives are rarely clearly ascertained. Reading closely and “between the lines” the public may discern the specific objectives that the Clinton Administration is aiming for, but this may be another instance of Clintonian ambiguity and an unsure hand in directing foreign policy. However, all of this aside, a trained eye can pinpoint some clear-cut political objectives in the 1994 NSS.

The document contains several specific military objectives. One example pertains to handling weapons of mass destruction, stating that “a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats.”⁹ In dealing with regional conflict, President Clinton acknowledges that “the United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response.”¹⁰ These examples demonstrate a military focus, but the document also provides economic objectives. President Clinton,

acknowledging the increasingly global economy, put domestic economic interests as international objectives imploring that “our primary economic goal is to strengthen the American economy and reverse the decline in American competitiveness that plagued our international economic performance for over a decade.”¹¹ The document further elaborates stating that “the success of American business is more than ever dependent upon success in international markets.”¹² The president rounds out his specific objectives by tying together the three threads of American national interests: security, economic prosperity, and promotion of democracy, stating that “the core of our strategy is to help democracy and markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference.”¹³ While not entirely straightforward, the 1994 National Security Strategy contains objectives to focus the president’s directive of “engagement and enlargement.”

The 1994 NSS devotes much space to the discussion of specific means to accomplish the, at times, obscure ends. For uses of military power to inhibit terrorism after the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the strategic plan declares that “as long as terrorist groups continue to target American citizens and interests, the United States will need to have specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to time, we might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.”¹⁴ The strategy also seeks to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through international cooperation in such measures as extending the Nonproliferation Treaty, achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and strengthening and supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency.¹⁵ The National Security Strategy even targets specific nations stating that “the United States seeks to cap, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities of India and Pakistan.”¹⁶

Utilizing economic means begins with strengthening the U.S. economy and international competitiveness. The Clinton Administration believed that this was best achieved by “reducing the federal deficit and the burden it imposes on the economy and future generations.”¹⁷ President Clinton also sought access to international markets for U.S. exports through international trade agreements such as The North American Free Trade Agreement, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement. Some of these efforts demonstrated short-term uses of economic power while others proved to be more long-term. Reiterating his economic focus for achieving national interests, President Clinton also argued that “if we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia (and the other newly independent states), we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partners. In addition, our efforts in Russia, Ukraine and the other states raise the likelihood of continued reductions in nuclear arms and compliance with international nonproliferation accords.”¹⁸ Overall, the president sought to leverage economic, diplomatic, and military means to work towards achieving the objectives included in the 1994 National Security Strategy.

By outlining the means and ends in a coherent plan, President Clinton successfully fulfilled the requirements in Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. The 1994 NSS clearly addressed the “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives” vital to American national security. These were discussed through maintaining a strong military with a worldwide presence, pursuing international military and economic agreements, securing American economic prosperity, and spreading democracy in the belief of the democratic peace theory.¹⁹ Furthermore, the objectives set forth by the Clinton Administration represented both short-term and long-term uses of a variety of forms of national power beyond military force.

The 1994 National Security Strategy also elaborates on the United States and its worldwide commitments and foreign relations. In the chapter “Integrated Regional Approaches,” President Clinton details American involvement throughout the world, region by region. For example, in the portion pertaining to “The Middle East, South and Southwest Asia,” the document describes American relations with Iran, stating that “our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the behavior of the Iranian government in several key areas, including Iran's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that oppose the peace process, its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the region and its dismal human rights record. We remain willing to enter into an authoritative dialogue with Iran to discuss the differences between us.”²⁰ Throughout this part of the 1994 NSS, the Clinton Administration outlines American foreign relations in a regional context with references towards specific states, thus fulfilling the Goldwater-Nichols requirement of addressing worldwide commitments.

The final necessary component of Section 603 to be addressed is an evaluation of U.S. capabilities to achieve the desired objectives. Appraisals of U.S. capabilities are sprinkled throughout the 1994 NSS, but the majority is tied to the discussion of means in “Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement.” For instance, the document declares that “U.S. military capabilities are critical to the success of our strategy. This nation has unparalleled military capabilities: the United States is the only nation capable of conducting large-scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders.”²¹ The 1994 NSS also addresses the problem of energy security that continues to face the United States as it continues to be reliant on foreign oil. The document outlines the issue, noting that “the United States depends on oil for more than 40% of its primary energy needs. Roughly 45% of our oil needs are met with imports, and a large

share of these imports come from the Persian Gulf area.”²² Through describing the capabilities of the United States to achieve its national security interests, the 1994 National Security Strategy aptly completes the requirements of Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. However, does this strategy measure up to the more stringent conditions established by the Tenets of Strategic Planning?

Through executing the requirements of Section 603, the 1994 NSS already completed several of the Tenets of Strategy Planning. First, the Clinton Administration clearly looked beyond military force and utilized various components of national power. Second, the document is plausible in expectations through accounting for the capabilities of the United States to achieve its objectives. Third, while not as explicit as the previous administration, the 1994 NSS nevertheless contains articulated ends correlated with precise means. Fourth, the strategy demonstrates a mixture of short-term and long-term goals. While these four guidelines put the 1994 National Security Strategy on track to completing the Tenets of Strategic Planning, the final three tenets have yet to be addressed.

The fifth tenet relates to accounting for the will of the people. President Clinton addresses this from the outset; in the Preface he declares that “I am committed to building a new public consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad. This document is a part of that commitment.”²³ His bid for public approval continues into the first section of the document:

We can only engage actively abroad if the American people and the Congress are willing to bear the costs of that leadership - in dollars, political energy and, at times, American lives. In a democracy, the foreign policy of the nation must serve the needs of the people. ... One purpose of this report is to help foster the broad, bipartisan understanding and support necessary to sustain our international engagement. Congressional participation is critical to this commitment.²⁴

President Clinton plainly accounts for public opinion, commencing with bids for public approval numerous times at the beginning of the document, and throughout the remainder of it as well.

The next tenet dictates that a strategic plan goes beyond its national boundaries and account for the actions of outside actors, such as NGOs, terrorist groups, or other nations. The 1994 NSS considers the sixth tenet in such instances as describing terrorism, noting that “[terrorists] have the advantage of being able to take the initiative in the timing and choice of targets.”²⁵ The 1994 NSS also considers other international incidents stating that “the murderous conflict in Yugoslavia reminds us that military forces remain relevant in a post-Cold War world.”²⁶ These examples are not exhaustive of the Clinton Administration’s understanding that strategy does not occur in a vacuum, but they demonstrate a fulfillment of the sixth Tenet of Strategic Planning.

As with previous administrations, the final tenet necessitating that a strategic plan exhibits longevity through flexibility and adaptability over time is best realized through a comparison of the 1994 National Security Strategy with its successive iterations. The 1995 National Security Strategy is a near-reprint of the 1994 NSS, demonstrating the flexibility of strategic planning in the Clinton Administration.²⁷ The 1995 NSS changes little from the previous year; it updates the list of administration achievements, highlighting such accolades as the NATO Partnership for Peace, START II Treaty, creation of nearly six million U.S. jobs, approval for NAFTA, and working with the U.N. to reverse a coup in Haiti.²⁸ The means and ends described remain the same with the exception that some treaty initiatives have been concluded and some new treaties have been introduced. These changes are in name only; the means of utilizing international diplomacy to achieve the same ends of security, free-trade, and democracy remain intact from the 1994 NSS. With so many similarities between the 1994 and

1995 National Security Strategies, it can easily be deduced that the 1995 NSS also fulfills the requirements of both Goldwater-Nichols and the Tenets of Strategic Planning.

A similar case may be made for the next iteration of President Clinton's national strategy in the 1996 NSS, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement."²⁹ The core ends and means are again transferred almost exactly as before, with the exception of minor updates to specifics such as certain international incidents or treaties, as well as the increasingly long list of achievements that the Clinton Administration wished to acknowledge. However, the 1996 NSS does add a few new objectives. The 1996 document identifies international organized crime as a threat to national security, and therefore one of the new objectives is to eradicate this threat wherever possible. President Clinton tasked the Justice Department with drafting legislation for Congress to expand the powers of United States Government Agencies to pursue these criminal enterprises. The president also wished to obtain international help combating the spread of organized crime as it was taking hold in the power vacuum left in former Soviet states, where the main concern was the sale of old Soviet military hardware and weapons of mass destruction.³⁰ Another initiative the president proposed in the 1996 NSS regards national security emergency preparedness. With the threat of major national disasters or terrorist acts, the nation needs to have emergency response measures in place to handle the crises as they develop. As such, President Clinton charged all Federal Departments with implementing emergency preparedness plans.³¹ The only other major update to this strategic plan has been to expand the means of increasing American exports in order to sustain economic development.³² Again, this economic objective is not new to his strategic plan, but it bears note that the president has put export policy front and center as the means of achieving his economic objectives. These changes

to the National Security Strategy do not alter the 1996 NSS from adhering to Goldwater-Nichols conditions or the Tenets of Strategic Planning.

Following the 1996 elections, President Clinton returned to office retaining the principles of security, economy, and democracy for national strategy. However, he decided to shake things up a bit. The 1997 National Security Strategy title was changed to “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.”³³ He also transformed the look and format of the document. Yet, for all of the aesthetic alterations and title change, the core means and ends remained the same. The 1997 NSS largely follows the trend of successful iterations by maintaining the essential structure, with only minor cosmetic updates to reflect the developments in world events. The president outlines six broad objectives guiding the 1997 National Security Strategy:

Foster an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe; forge a strong and stable Asia Pacific community; continue America's leadership as the world's most important force for peace; create more jobs and opportunities for Americans through a more open and competitive trading system that also benefits others around the world; increase cooperation in confronting new security threats that defy borders and unilateral solutions; strengthen the military and diplomatic tools necessary to meet these challenges.³⁴

This may sound like an ambitious new plan for the United States, but in reality these are all old objectives. The objectives have been dusted off, reworded, and injected into the 1997 NSS to appear as though they are novel and exciting initiatives. However, after reading the document and noting all of the similar specific ends and means, sometimes still retaining the exact phrasing of previous National Security Strategies, it becomes readily apparent that it is nothing new, but merely an iteration with the traditional revisions to bring the strategy up-to-date. Overall, the “Strategy for a New Century” sounds enticing and looks like a fresh take on national strategy, but in reality it continues the pattern of the Clinton NSSs, still adhering to the requirements of Section 603 and the Tenets of Strategic Planning.

The 1998 and 1999 National Security Strategies also continue the previous iterations, but with a couple of exceptions.³⁵ These NSSs stress a much more integrated and wide-ranging use of national power supported by a reliance on diplomacy, United States foreign assistance programs, and cooperation with international law enforcement to achieve national objectives. Through the progression of national strategies, President Clinton built up the importance of protecting the environment, supporting humanitarian aid initiatives, and looking to the World Trade Organization for expanding American trade with open-trade and fair-trade programs. These ideas take a more prominent role in the 1998 and 1999 editions than in previous National Security Strategies, with the foundational ends and means remaining intact.

The 2000 National Security Strategy, titled “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age,” represents a marriage between a successive iteration in the progression of Clinton Administration National Security Strategies and George H. W. Bush’s 1993 “farewell speech” NSS.³⁶ The 2000 NSS restructures much of the familiar language of “engagement,” focusing on security, economics, democracy, and now human rights (the “enlargement” terminology has since been dropped, but the principles retained). With the reorganization of President Clinton’s 2000 NSS, though still containing some of the similar ends and means, it has taken on a different tone. No longer does it read like a strategic plan, but more like a mission statement; a document full of principles, theories, and values as opposed to a straightforward plan of action. This iteration of the document now contains chapters on “Elements of the Strategy,” “Guiding Principles of Engagement,” and “The Efficacy of Engagement.” These chapters appear to be the Clinton Administration’s explanation of strategic theory and principles by means of the accomplishments of President Clinton’s time in office. For instance, the 2000 NSS reminisces on the spread of American institutions stating that “the United States has sought to strengthen the

post-Cold War international system by encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development. These efforts have produced measurable results. The number of democracies, as a percentage of world states, has increased by 14% since 1992. For the first time in history, over half of the world's population lives under democratic governance.”³⁷ These first parts of the document read in a manner such as this, speaking about abstract principles and attempting to correlate them to real world success stories for the administration.

If readers can make it past the initial abstractions and self-congratulatory notes, the readers will find themselves in familiar territory. The 2000 NSS returns to all of the recognizable themes of past strategic plans from the Clinton Administration, discussing ends and means of such topics as diplomacy, arms control, international crime, combating terrorism, promoting open trade, increasing exports, and humanitarian activities. The most notable difference in the chapter on objectives is the amount of space dedicated to humanitarian endeavors. In this iteration of national strategy, the discussion regarding the spread of democracy has been expanded to include human rights as a vital component. This aspect of American national interests has grown over the course of President Clinton’s second term. The document describes the president’s goals, stating that “our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian programs, which are designed to alleviate human suffering, address resource and economic crises that could have global implications, and pursue appropriate strategies for economic development.”³⁸ The aspirations of the administration to intervene on moral and humanitarian grounds have often been described as the “Clinton Doctrine.”³⁹ Yet, aside from a few changes, the 2000 NSS continues the administration’s adherence to the Tenets of Strategic Planning and Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols.

The Clinton Administration followed some of the examples of the Bush Administration in setting strategy. The Clinton Administration defined its national strategy in an initial document, and carried that core vision throughout a progression of modified strategic plans. Like the previous administration, President Clinton's National Security Strategies never hesitated to point out administration successes. While many similarities surely existed, President Clinton also deviated from the norms established by Reagan and Bush.

Primarily, President Clinton gave unique titles to his National Security Strategies. Also, the administration attempted to differentiate itself in its methods of developing strategy through connecting domestic economic policies to the larger international context of national strategic planning. The Clinton Administration attempted to exploit its foreign policy platform to advance domestic interests. No longer was national strategy solely intent on protecting American interests abroad, but now it was also utilized as a means for developing national interests at home. The reliance on economics, diplomacy, democratic values, and, eventually, humanitarian causes, defined the Clinton Era National Security Strategies and provided a stark contrast to previous approaches to national strategy.

Clinton also received more media scrutiny concerning strategic planning than previous presidents. The increased media attention garnered some harsh criticism of the "engagement and enlargement" strategy. Writing for *The Washington Post*, foreign policy analyst Dimitri Simes criticized the administration's strategy, stating that "too often, Clinton's foreign policy is guided by sentimental paternalism. Behind the notions of an 'enlargement' of democracy, nation-building and humanitarian intervention, one can detect a well-meaning but arrogant temptation to fix other people's problems. The temptation is based on the unspoken belief that America knows what is good for others, and must accept at least some moral responsibility for their affairs."⁴⁰

This critique holds some value in that the United States should not police the world, however, the democratic peace theory appears to contradict Simes and justify Clinton's national strategy, often finding long-term success if nations can make the democratic transition.

Not all critics of Clintonian Strategy take such a negative stance towards the initiatives. P. Edward Haley, Chair of International Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, asserts that "there was a strategy. It was imaginative and innovative. ... Seeing no serious threats to American security, Clinton's strategy identified improving the domestic and world economy as the primary responsibilities of the United States. Success in these two actions would do more than any other measure to make the world safer, wealthier, and more democratic."⁴¹ Haley contends that the only problem confronting President Clinton's strategy was that it did not adequately handle ethnic and religious conflict and Islamic terrorism. The response to these problems, though often overlooked by critics, was the true shortcoming of the administration's strategy.⁴²

Overall, President Clinton developed a coherent strategic vision during his tenure in the Oval Office. He got off to a rough start in developing his strategic plan, but was able to carry it through his two terms. President Clinton was also able to bring the topics important to him to the forefront of strategy: economic policy and humanitarian interventions. While not perfect, the Clinton Administration was able to successfully develop seven strategic plans that represented not only the spirit of the law, but also the essence of proper strategic planning.

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 6. Winters, "The 1994 United States National Security Strategy," *The Army Lawyer* (Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-266, January 1995): 61.
 7. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994), i-ii.
 8. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 5.
 9. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 11.
 10. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 13.
 11. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 15.
 12. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 16.
 13. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 19.
 14. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 8.
 15. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 11.
 16. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 11.
 17. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 15.
 18. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 19.
 19. International relations expert Joseph Nye describes the "democratic peace theory" as an explanation for the paucity of international conflict (war) between democratic states. He further contends that this theory posits that established liberal democracies with processes such as freedom of the press, checks on executive power, and regular elections will be less likely to go to war with one another. However, he also notes that while promoting democracy (exemplified by the foreign policies of Presidents William Clinton and George W. Bush) may find success in peace and security in the long-term, the early stages of democratic transitioning may actually increase the likelihood for war in the short-term. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2009), 49-50.
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23. Clinton, NSS, 1994, ii.
 24. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 2.
 25. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 8.
 26. Clinton, NSS, 1994, 21.
 27. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1995).
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 33. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1997).
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 35. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1998). William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1999).
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 38. Clinton, NSS, 2000, 38.
 39. Lawrence J. Korb, *A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented As Presidential Speeches* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 14.
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 41. P. Edward Haley, *Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 110.
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CHAPTER 6

PREEMPTION

Our nation's cause has always been larger than our nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors human liberty. We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

—George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York,” June 1, 2002

President George W. Bush entered office in January 2001 after a narrow victory over the Democratic Party Candidate Al Gore. Bush, like Clinton, had hoped to tackle domestic issues, wanting to focus on national standards for education, economic reforms, stem cell research, and uniting a national constituency that was still torn over the controversy surrounding the 2000 election. However, fate had other plans for Bush. Catastrophic events defined the Bush Presidency; the 9/11 terrorist attacks directed his focus from domestic politics to foreign policy and Hurricane Katrina forced his attention to cleaning up one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history. Through all of this turmoil, the Bush Administration was able to produce two iterations of proper strategic planning. These two National Security Strategies would be the most scrutinized in history, largely over one small, yet immensely significant, line declaring America’s option for pre-emption.

President Bush developed his new vision for American foreign policy over the course of his first term. Bush’s vision would come to be defined by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which focused and directed his plan for securing national interests. In his June 1, 2002

West Point commencement speech, Bush described his plan as it evolved from previous Cold War strategies:

For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply, but new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. ... The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action, and this nation will act.¹

President Bush clearly depicted the previous administrations' strategies of deterrence and containment that guided national strategy through the Cold War. He then continued to outline why these strategic concepts are out of touch in a new age of tyrants and terrorists that no longer adhere to the standards of engagement that defined the Cold War. These new threats require new ways of thinking about securing the safety of the United States. It is here that the president began to establish the "Bush Doctrine."

The Bush Doctrine guided American foreign policy for the majority of Bush's tenure as president. There was no coherent document presenting a clear definition of the concept, but it developed as part of public releases and speeches, such as the West Point Commencement Address. In her dissertation on the Bush Doctrine, Pamela Lauren Foerstel Branson defined it as "a combination of nationalism and a foreign policy committed to freedom, morality, and democracy."² The Bush Doctrine sought to spread American economic and democratic ideals to provide for a safer world. This initiative sought to foster these goals under the umbrella of international cooperation of the great powers led by the United States. However, the Bush

Doctrine also declared that the United States would act unilaterally in order to secure its national interests, even if this meant pre-emptive/preventative use of force.³ In an article for *The Washington Post*, James B. Steinberg, who served as Clinton's deputy national security advisor, commented on Bush Administration strategy, stating that "it sees the world as one problem -- terrorism and weapons of mass destruction -- and builds a strategy around it."⁴ These principles became enshrined in the Bush Administration's first centralized pronouncement of its strategic vision in the 2002 National Security Strategy.

President George W. Bush's first National Security Strategy was released on September 17, 2002 and was the first public release of a strategic plan in almost three years. While the delay in its release failed to follow the stipulated publication deadline set by Goldwater-Nichols, its delay may have been for the best because any strategic document released prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks would have been rendered largely obsolete.⁵ However, the delay of its release coupled with its cachet as the initial strategic plan following this catastrophic event created huge expectations regarding the document's significance. Furthermore, the new strategic direction described in the 2002 NSS generated a media buzz yet unknown to any National Security Strategy.

The media attention focused on the principle regarding preemptive use of force against threats to the United States. The 2002 NSS, in discussing preemptive utilization of force, justified it through its historical international implementation; states throughout history have attacked first when imminent danger, traditionally as threats of conventional forces, have been looming. However, the document asserts that this concept of preemption needs to be adapted to the new era of rogue states and terrorists. These entities circumvent conventional measures, relying instead on terror and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which are easily concealed

and delivered with little or no warning.⁶ Thus, as its enemies have evolved new methods to threaten national security, the United States needs to adapt its strategic doctrine to match:

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.⁷

The announcement that the United States would act to preempt an attack through military force represented a radical shift in articulated strategy, garnering international media and academic attention.

In his editorial for *The New York Times*, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Robert Wright noted that “reporters, after wading through 13,000 words on his strategic vision, focused mainly on two controversial doctrines: preserving overwhelming American military superiority indefinitely; and preemptively attacking nations deemed threatening rather than relying on traditional deterrence. Less was said about the more high-minded stuff, like fostering peace, prosperity and democracy around the world.”⁸ Wright noted, that though the media latched onto specific controversial doctrines, those doctrines do not accurately represent the entire 2002 National Security Strategy. Adam Quinn, a Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Birmingham, recognized why the media scrutinized the new doctrine to such a degree, stating that “indeed, though the term itself [preemption] was used few times in the NSS, and not emphasized in the introduction or conclusion, its proclamation was widely depicted as a revolutionary policy shift, overturning the base platform of international order and potentially

inaugurating a new era of unilateral American militarism.”⁹ This new policy of preemption symbolized the overall theme of the Bush Administration’s attempt to shift into a post-Cold War world. The United States as the sole hegemon no longer faced the threat of a bi-polar conflict, or even a traditional conventional conflict. The new challenges facing the United States have evolved along with the United States’ new position in the world. As such, President Bush in his 2002 National Security Strategy advocated an equally dramatic strategic shift to confront the new threats of the post-Cold War world.

The 2002 NSS frames the core of its vision around a marriage of American values and national interests with the aim of making the world a safer and *better* place.¹⁰ The broad goals accompanying this vision are “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”¹¹ These goals are broken down into eight more specific objectives:

Champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.¹²

Individual chapters are devoted to each of these specific goals. Each chapter discusses the goal and the means to accomplish it.

The chapter “Preventing Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends, with Weapons of Mass Destruction” provides an excellent example for demonstrating how the 2002 NSS structures ends and means. This chapter further refines its objectives as preventing rogue states and terrorists from obtaining and deploying nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons. In this chapter, Bush defines rogue states as repressive regimes that demonstrate contempt for the established international order and seek to challenge peaceful nations through advanced weaponry and WMDs as well as support for global terrorism. The 2002 NSS declares these states a direct threat to the United States, asserting that these rogue states “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.”¹³ The document lists Iraq and North Korea as fitting the description of a rogue state.

This chapter of the 2002 NSS also reveals the means that the United States should follow to achieve these objectives. It argues that “we must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.”¹⁴ Additional means are delineated to combat WMDs: counter proliferation (deterring and defending against WMDs), nonproliferation (preventing the production or acquirement of WMDs), and consequence management (prepared measures to respond to a WMD attack). However, these methods of securing the United States do not go far enough.

The means implicate a reliance on international cooperation and support, or the hope that through intelligence and technology enemy plots will be discovered and halted by established legal norms. President Bush needed to take this a step further and clarify that new threats necessitated new methods to prevent them. He believed that the National Security Strategy needed to explicitly declare that the United States would not sit back and allow a rogue state to function under international auspices of sovereignty or commonly held interpretations of

international law. Therefore, the 2002 NSS announced that one of the ways to prevent an attack was to preemptively deter an attack through any means possible, including the use of force.¹⁵ This instigation of force radically altered perceived international norms regarding military force and international law. This highly controversial method of obtaining national security brought much criticism to the National Security Strategy. Yet, while much of the discussion that swirled around the 2002 NSS focused on preemption, Robert Wright was correct in his previously cited assertion that there was more to the NSS than the declaration of preemption.

The 2002 National Security Strategy contains other objectives, including a central desire of President Bush to champion aspirations for human dignity, or more simply, to spread American ideals of democracy and liberty. Means of achieving this are listed as: utilizing diplomatic measures through international organizations; leveraging foreign aid for non-violent democratic transitions; pressing allies to promote democratic reform; and taking “special efforts to promote freedom of religion.”¹⁶ Aside from the final approach of “special efforts,” the means to achieve the objectives clearly depict methods of leveraging national power. This chapter even cites specific instances of democratic transitioning that resulted from these uses of power. It notes such examples as the democracies of Eastern Europe that formed after the fall of the Soviet Union (even as recently as Belgrade in 2000), democratic allies in Asia (Taiwan and South Korea), and the evolution of Latin American and African authoritarian regimes towards democracies with the exchange of generals for elected leaders.¹⁷

A third example of clearly defined means and ends is illustrated by the chapter “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade.” Means of advancing economic objectives include domestic policies such as lowering taxes, promoting business growth, and decreasing constrictive regulations that inhibit businesses or economic

expansion. However, the economic interests of the United States are also secured through global cooperation. This includes strong connections and trade frameworks with American allies, including Europe and Japan. The sections on global trade detail specific regulations for constructing an international market of free and fair trade through such legislation and organizations as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Trade Act of 2002, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹⁸ These examples of ends and means demonstrate the core of the 2002 National Security Strategy and begin to develop it as a true strategic plan.

Clearly depicting and correlating ends and means set the 2002 NSS on the path towards fulfilling the requirements stipulated in Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. The first requirement of describing the interests, goals, and objectives of the United States is undoubtedly accomplished. Individual chapters dedicated to each objective elaborate on goals and methods to achieve them.

The second requirement pertaining to foreign policy commitments, while not as plainly stated in its own section as that of previous administrations, is also fulfilled in the 2002 NSS. The chapter “Work With Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” best exemplifies this through its discussion of foreign relations with and commitments to other states. This chapter, as is common throughout the 2002 NSS, is concise and direct. It describes American foreign relations broadly in a regional construct. However, it supplements these broad characterizations with specific cases. For instance, the document touts administration efforts towards building strong bilateral relations with Pakistan and India. Through establishing connections with these nations, the Bush Administration hoped to advance American interests such as combating terrorism and encouraging democratic transitions in the area while defusing the military confrontation between

the two nations that contained the potential to destabilize the entire region.¹⁹ This section also details specific relationships with other nations such as with Indonesia and Colombia. This chapter of the 2002 NSS completes the second Goldwater-Nichols requirement.

The NSS also completes the third requirement of proposing short-term and long-term uses of national power. Short-term uses of national power include immediately deterring terrorism and taking action against rogue states that harbor them. As a short-term objective, this was demonstrated by the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. This short-term objective became a long-term objective as described in the 2002 NSS, which stated that “Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida.”²⁰ The United States quickly invaded Afghanistan, ending the Taliban controlled government. However, while one goal was completed in the short-term, the Bush Administration and the nation found out that eradicating the al-Qaida and Taliban threat would be a much more long-term goal. President Bush most likely did not intend for the War in Afghanistan to continue for over a decade, but it was clear even in September of 2002 that “winning” the war would be a long-term objective.

The fourth requirement of Section 603 stipulates that the NSS consider the capabilities of the United States to implement the national strategy. The Bush Administration addressed the shortcomings of the federal government in coping with the 9/11 attacks and sought to correct these deficiencies through policy initiatives described in the 2002 National Security Strategy:

This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and the private sector. This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not

just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic.²¹

This section notes the shortcomings of American capabilities in addressing the new era challenges of terrorism and WMDs confronting the United States. President Bush proposed policy initiatives to address these deficiencies. These included the USA PATRIOT Act, which was signed by President Bush on October 26, 2001, and the Homeland Security Act, which would be enacted on November 25, 2002. Including evaluations such as the above example of American capabilities fulfilled the fourth and final requirement of Section 603.

As many of the Tenets of Strategic Planning mirror the requirements of Section 603, some of the tenets have already been met. The first tenet of incorporating aspects of national power beyond military force is achieved through diplomacy and economic objectives previously discussed. The 2002 NSS meets the second tenet of plausible expectations through the formerly elaborated evaluation of capabilities. The third tenet of explicitly defined objectives and means has been fulfilled through the eight chapters devoted to describing goals and how to achieve them. The fourth tenet is accounted for through the utilization of short-term and long-term objectives as previously mentioned.

The fifth tenet, accounting for public opinion, has yet to be covered through the discussion of Goldwater-Nichols requirements. In the 2002 NSS, President Bush directly acknowledges the importance of taking the will of the people into account. The NSS notes that “history has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people.”²² By commenting that history scorns nations that fail to appreciate the significance of the will of the people, President Bush conversely implies that people should be a central consideration for any leader. Therefore, this statement indicates President Bush’s

acknowledgment that the will of the people should be accounted for. However, even though he acknowledges its significance, President Bush fails to directly appeal to public opinion in the manner that his predecessors chose.

The 2002 NSS appeal for public approval is not explicit; it claims that preemptive action is necessary to protect the homeland. It is assumed that in directing all action towards protecting America, the citizenry will approve. Furthermore, the Bush Administration also assumed that the moral justification of its cause would equate to winning over public approval for its strategic plan. The NSS stresses the significance of the threat to American citizens, noting that “the targets of these [terrorist] attacks are our military forces and *our civilian population*, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, *mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists...*”²³ The NSS later states that “our most important priority is to protect the homeland for the American people.”²⁴ Here the document makes clear that protecting America is the central objective of the Bush Administration. This illuminates the fact that the threat is imminent and the president will act in accordance with the *assumed* wishes of Americans to protect the United States. The NSS declares that the president must utilize preemptive action in order to achieve the peace that American citizens desire, stating that “given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.”²⁵ The president has clearly made his case that terrorist threats abound and that for him to protect Americans (which it is assumed that this objective would meet with public approval), he must act preemptively to take out the threats of this new age.

President Bush's assumption of public approval for the utilization of preemptive action garnered much criticism. Most notably, the essayist Wendell Barry authored an article decrying the inherent undemocratic characteristics of Bush's preemptive doctrine in the 2002 NSS:

The idea of a government acting alone in preemptive war is inherently undemocratic, for it does not require or even permit the president to obtain the consent of the governed. As a policy, this new strategy depends on the acquiescence of a public kept fearful and ignorant, subject to manipulation by the executive power, and on the compliance of an intimidated and office-dependent legislature. Even within the narrow logic of warfare, there is a substantial difference between a defensive action, for which the reason would be publicly known, and a preemptive or aggressive action, for which the reason would be known only by a few at the center of power. The responsibilities of the president obviously are not mine, and so I hesitate to doubt absolutely the necessity of governmental secrecy. But I feel no hesitation in saying that, to the extent that a government is secret, it cannot be democratic or its people free. By this new doctrine, the president alone may start a war against any nation at any time, and with no more forewarning than preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.²⁶

Barry's critique is thoughtful and well-argued. He makes the case that preemptive action occurs in secrecy, which is inherently undemocratic and implicitly works against the will of the people. Yet, as Bush argued, the will of the people is that first the government protects them from all threats. In the 2002 NSS, Bush claims that preemptive action is necessary for this protection to occur effectively. The opposing opinions of Bush and Barry demonstrate the ambiguity over how to interpret public opinion in this rare instance of American history.

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the illusion of American invulnerability as the last remaining superpower was shattered. With this revelation of susceptibility Americans entrusted more power to their government and inevitably this resulted in a loss of individual liberty. President Bush initiated two wars and oversaw the passage of numerous laws restricting the rights of Americans. However, this all arguably occurred in the interest of national security, that Bush viewed as the central objective of his national strategy. While critics came forward

with elegant arguments like Wendell Barry's, it is not too much to assume that the public largely approved of the measures. The most obvious gauge of the public's approval of President Bush was his successful reelection in 2004, where he was the first candidate since his father's 1988 election to carry the majority of the popular vote.²⁷ Therefore, while he does not explicitly make a direct appeal to the people in the 2002 NSS, Bush justifiably assumes that he acts in their interest. The continued political support seems to confirm that, through his preemption doctrine, he acted with public approval.

The next tenet addressed by the 2002 NSS is that strategic planning must account for the actions of other actors. By now, it should be markedly clear that the NSS accounts for other actors as the core strategy of preemptive action revolves around reacting to outside actors (rogue states and terrorists). The NSS makes this point with a connection to its allies and accounting for their actions as well:

While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide.²⁸

This statement clearly takes into account the actions of America's allies. However, the 2002 NSS goes even further by describing specific states, declaring that "we are attentive to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition. Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal transition—most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape."²⁹ Again, this demonstrates an acknowledgement that the United States

does not act alone in the world, but that other states also have a choice to take action and affect American national strategy, thus satisfying the sixth Tenet of Strategic Planning.

The seventh tenet notes that there will always be friction and uncertainty; therefore a strategic plan should be flexible and adaptable over time. President Bush also acknowledges this limitation of strategic planning, stating in the 2002 NSS that “no doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action—direct or indirect—is warranted. We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities.”³⁰ Strategic planning has constraints determined by humanity’s lack of omniscience and physical limitations of resources. However, the 2002 NSS successfully fulfills this tenet through its iteration in the 2006 NSS, which adapts Bush Administration strategy to the friction that arises.

The 2006 National Security Strategy follows the same basic goals found in its predecessor: “promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity” with America leading “a growing community of democracies.”³¹ The 2006 NSS also follows the same structure as the previous document, including the same chapter titles. This NSS features an update by dividing each chapter into three sections: part A summarizes the 2002 NSS; Part B details successes and challenges faced since the 2002 NSS; and Part C updates the goals and means for pursuing them. While the structure of each chapter may have been altered, this is a clear example of a successful iteration of strategic planning. Each chapter in the 2006 NSS refers to its predecessor, maintains similar wording where possible, and updates the ends and means to reflect contextual changes. However, some of the updates have created entirely new sections that the previous document did not contain.

President Bush commences the preface with a warning to the American people. He declares that “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the

grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people.”³² This direct opening sets a tone for the updates to the NSS; the new phrasing is more direct and has a harsher wartime tone. Furthermore, two new sections have been included that discuss the strategy for the two wars that the United States is involved in (Iraq and Afghanistan). The first section, “Afghanistan and Iraq: The Front Lines in the War on Terror” briefly describes the strategies in the war on terror as it pertains to the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.³³ Another new section, “Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” explains the logic behind going to war with Iraq, why the Bush Administration was wrong in its intelligence estimate, and how the administration will correct the deficiencies that led to such a wrongly informed decision.³⁴ These wartime changes are incorporated into the updates and fit with the iteration, though they receive more emphasis than some of the other minor changes.

The 2006 NSS also includes one new chapter titled “Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization.” This chapter broadens President Bush’s conception of national security to include such transnational concerns as: public health challenges (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza); illicit trade (human trafficking, drugs); and environmental disasters (hurricanes, tsunamis).³⁵ With this wider view, President Bush adds to the 2006 NSS and retains the core structure of the 2002 NSS.

Aside from a few updates and additions, the 2006 NSS maintains the core strategic planning of the 2002 NSS. As a result, this iteration fulfills the Tenets of Strategic Planning with itself being a proper strategic plan. Furthermore, when considered with the 2002 iteration, it

aply demonstrates the seventh tenet of a strategic plan, containing a level of flexibility and adaptation, thus fulfilling the tenets for both National Security Strategies.

President Bush successfully published two National Security Strategies that adhered to the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols and fulfilled the Tenets of Strategic Planning. These two National Security Strategies are proper strategic plans, thus continuing the legacy of previous administrations. However, the Bush Doctrine took national strategy in a radically new direction. Christine Gray, a University Lecturer at Cambridge, commented that “much of the [2002] National Security Strategy is not new. The tone is populist, the language simple. There is much stress on cooperation in the prevention of terrorism. But on the use of force the message is stark and revolutionary.”³⁶ The Bush Doctrine’s utilization of preemptive force challenged the established norms governing international relations. President Bush argued that this new direction was necessary to confront the new challenges facing the United States. In the end, the Bush Administration successfully formulated two iterations of proper strategic planning around this principle.

1. George W. Bush, June 1, 2002, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York,” *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 2002*, vol. 1. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 919.

2. Pamela Lauren Foerstel Branson, “The Study of Political Tradition through Rhetoric: The Bush Doctrine, How It Relates to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, and Its Comparison to Wilsonianism” (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate University, 2009), 31.

3. Branson, “The Study of Political Tradition through Rhetoric: The Bush Doctrine, How It Relates to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, and Its Comparison to Wilsonianism,” 31.

4. Karen DeYoung and Mike Allen, “Bush Shifts Strategy From Deterrence to Dominance,” *The Washington Post*, September 21, 2002.

5. Lawrence J. Korb, *A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented As Presidential Speeches* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 13.

6. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), 15.

7. Bush, NSS, 2002, 15.

8. Robert Wright, "Contradictions of a Superpower," *The New York Times*, September 29, 2002

9. Adam Quinn, "The Deal: The Balance of Power, Military Strength, and Liberal Internationalism in the Bush National Security Strategy," *International Studies Perspectives* 9 (2008): 41.

10. Bush, NSS, 2002, 1. The document, in its brevity, does not elaborate from whose perspective the world will be made a better place from achieving the NSS objectives. Though, it may not be too much to assume that this view comes from an American perspective and assumes that the rest of the world will share said perspective.

11. Bush, NSS, 2002, 1.

12. Bush, NSS, 2002, 1-2.

13. Bush, NSS, 2002, 14.

14. Bush, NSS, 2002, 14.

15. The NSS states that "to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." Bush, NSS, 2002, 15.

16. Bush, NSS, 2002, 4.

17. Bush, NSS, 2002, 3.

18. Bush, NSS, 2002, 17-20.

19. Bush, NSS, 2002, 10.

20. Bush, NSS, 2002, 5.

21. Bush, NSS, 2002, 6-7.

22. Bush, NSS, 2002, 3.

23. Bush, NSS, 2002, 15. (Emphasis has been added.)

24. Bush, NSS, 2002, 31.

25. Bush, NSS, 2002, 15.

26. Wendell Barry, "A Citizen's Response to the National Security Strategy of the United States," *Irish Pages* 1 (2003): 17.

27. Todd S. Purdum, "An Electoral Affirmation of Shared Values," *The New York Times*, November 4, 2004.

28. Bush, NSS, 2002, 7.

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29. Bush, NSS, 2002, 26.
30. Bush, NSS, 2002, 9.
31. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), ii.
32. Bush, NSS, 2006, i.
33. Bush, NSS, 2006, 12-13.
34. Bush, NSS, 2006, 23-24. In this section, the Bush Administration claimed that Saddam Hussein intentionally mislead the international community regarding his WMD programs. Additionally, it admitted that American pre-war intelligence estimates of Iraqi WMD stockpiles proved to be incorrect.
35. Bush, NSS, 2006, 47-48.
36. Christine Gray, "The US National Security Strategy and the New "Bush Doctrine" on Preemptive Self-defense," *Chinese Journal of International Law* 1 (2002): 437.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: TRENDS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING

Success will require approaches that can be sustained and achieve results. One of the reasons that this nation succeeded in the second half of the 20th century was its capacity to pursue policies and build institutions that endured across multiple Administrations, while also preserving the flexibility to endure setbacks and to make necessary adjustments.

—Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010

This thesis attempted to discern whether or not a theoretical discussion of strategy could lead to an analytical framework for qualifying strategic planning, and then whether or not that framework could be utilized to evaluate the National Security Strategies of the United States for their success or failure in representing proper strategic plans. Through this assessment, it has become apparent that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 effectively established a guide for presidents to create a properly formatted strategic plan that erected means and ends around their strategic vision for America. Furthermore, the more stringent analytical framework, titled “Tenets of Strategic Planning,” extended the bounds of strategic planning to incorporate additional requirements beyond the traditional definition of national strategy. The chapter “Introduction” commenced this inquisition with three guiding questions for the discussion of qualifying American National Security Strategies.

The first question inquired as to whether or not, with the president annually directing national strategy, Congress through Goldwater-Nichols effectively communicated to the president how to create national strategy. As noted in the chapter “On Strategy,” Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols established broad guidelines for the president on how to create a strategic

plan. An NSS must include: interests, goals, and objectives; foreign policy and worldwide commitments relating to national security; short-term and long-term uses of economic, political, military, and other aspects of national power to achieve interests, goals, and objectives; and an evaluation of U.S. capabilities to carry out the national strategy.¹ The analysis of the Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II NSSs demonstrated that, with the exception of the 1993 NSS, each president utilized this set of directives to properly construct National Security Strategies incorporating the Goldwater-Nichols foundations for strategic planning.

The second question asked if Goldwater-Nichols resulted in the annual creation of true strategic plans. The answer to this is “yes and no.” Yes, each administration from Ronald Reagan through George W. Bush developed true strategic plans adhering to the foundational principles in Goldwater-Nichols. Furthermore, these documents also passed the more stringent test of the Tenets of Strategic Planning. Additionally, they fundamentally followed the definition of national strategy: utilizing various aspects of national power in order to achieve short-term and long-term national interests and objectives directed at international competitors throughout peace and war. Unfortunately, Goldwater-Nichols did not establish a mechanism for ensuring that these aptly-constructed strategic plans would be delivered to Congress and the public on an annual basis. As demonstrated by the case study chapters, every president except for Reagan failed to deliver consistent reports. Therefore, “no,” Goldwater-Nichols did not result in the *annual* creation of true strategic plans.

The final question, which was partially discussed by the previous question, asks if all of the National Security Strategies qualify as proper strategic plans. The answer, as previously established, is “yes,” all but the 1993 NSS qualify as proper strategic plans. They all follow the guidelines of Goldwater-Nichols that directs the president on how to construct a coherent vision

of ends and means with appraisals of international commitments and national capabilities, and thus fulfills the first four Tenets of Strategic Planning. As demonstrated by the 1993 NSS, without this strategic core, true strategic planning cannot take place. However, this thesis argues that true strategic planning goes further than this strategic core and includes additional elements as addressed by the final three Tenets of Strategic Planning.

The fifth tenet notes that proper strategic planning takes public opinion (also known as the will of the people) into account. Most administrations accomplished this through a direct appeal for public approval. Ronald Reagan followed this methodology by calling on the American people to unite behind a strategy directed at defeating the Soviet threat. Reagan wanted public consensus and Congressional support for his approach to containment. In the trappings of the Cold War, Reagan found an easy bid for public approval through the “us-against-them” mentality.

George H. W. Bush, writing his first NSS at the beginning of the Soviet Union’s demise, dedicated an entire chapter to discussing this issue. In the 1990 NSS’s chapter “A Public Trust” he justified his strategy to the American public. Following Reagan’s lead, he also asserted that public opinion favored his national strategy. This notion of public consensus was repeated in the 1991 NSS, which discarded the chapter-long justification of strategy and public appeal. Though he abandoned the lengthy justification, Bush still contended that national unity behind his foreign policy and international actions (especially in the Gulf War) demonstrated public approval for his national strategy.

Bill Clinton also considered public opinion throughout all of his National Security Strategies. He argued that the National Security Strategies were justifications of his strategic vision and that they helped to foster broad public consensus. The NSSs achieved this support

through placing the needs of the people at the core of American foreign policy. Therefore, with public approval for his national strategy, Clinton argued that Congress should also come forward with bipartisan support for his strategic initiatives.

George W. Bush also noted the importance of accounting for the will of the people in constructing a national strategy. In the 2002 NSS, Bush asserted that this should be a central consideration for any leader. However, unlike his predecessors, he never explicitly articulated a direct appeal to the people in the 2002 NSS. The 2002 NSS implies that public consensus is unified behind Bush's national strategy. The argument follows logical reasoning, such as that the public wants to be protected from terrorists. Furthermore, since this protection necessitates in some cases preemptive action, the people would therefore also approve of preemptive military force to stop a terrorist threat. Additionally, Bush's argument for having public approval seemed to be affirmed by his 2004 reelection where he was the first president to win the majority of the popular vote since his father's 1998 election. The 2006 NSS iteration repeats the implied bid for public approval of the 2002 NSS.

Overall, administrations utilized the National Security Strategies to establish a consensus for public approval of their national strategies. They most commonly incorporated direct rhetoric appealing to the domestic audience to achieve this. Don M. Snider, a visiting professor at the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, noted that the American public looked toward the National Security Strategies for "coherence and farsightedness in the security policies of their government: a strategy they could, as citizens, fully support."² Ultimately, the people desire a national strategy reflecting their interests and ideals. It is the president's job to convince the people that his strategy represents their interests, and is one the attentive citizen can support. This point serves as the impetus for the fifth tenet.

The sixth tenet addresses the fact that strategic planning does not occur in a vacuum, but that other actors whose actions will affect any strategic plan. Each administration framed its NSS around some sort of international competitor, usually through an acknowledgment of a direct threat to national interests. These other actors worked towards their own ends and threatened to derail American national strategy. NSSs across the four administrations consistently identified these actors as any combination of: the Soviet Union (later Russia), terrorists, and hostile nations (usually China, North Korea, and Iran). The National Security Strategies also accounted for actions of American allies, normally condensed into an appraisal of NATO actions and interests. Each NSS considered in the case studies of this thesis contained this common approach to addressing the sixth tenet.

After qualifying National Security Strategies across four presidencies for their strategic content, it becomes apparent that they achieved much success through addressing the final tenet, which declared that true strategic planning necessitates flexibility and adaptability. While the original intent of Goldwater-Nichols' annual strategic report requirement was to couple it with the president's annual budget in order to reign in defense spending, it later became clear that consistent reevaluations of strategy were necessary to ensure adequate strategic planning.³ Strategists do not have crystal balls; they can do no more than offer informed predictions of future events. As such, the plans that they develop need to be revisited to account for the friction, chance, or other unknown variables in strategic planning that they simply could not account for when the plans were written. Certain administrations understood this concept better than others.

The Reagan Administration never had the opportunity to develop successive iterations of strategy. While Reagan was able to publish two consecutive strategic plans, the pressure was on him to be the first president to interpret Goldwater-Nichols while working within a truncated

period. Reagan's first attempt met the basic requirements, though it clearly needed improvement. It is with his second attempt that Reagan set the standard for future administrations on how to translate strategy from year-to-year while also establishing the basic framework for constructing National Security Strategies.

George H. W. Bush followed Reagan's lead in the structure and format of his first two National Security Strategies. He also utilized the iterative process to lend continuity to strategy while adapting to unforeseen events. However, Bush was also the only president to present an absolute atrocity of strategic planning in the guise of an NSS with his 1993 strategy report. Yet, aside from this momentary lapse in strategy, the Reagan example continued through Bush and into the next administration.

William Clinton adhered more than any other president to the intended spirit of Goldwater-Nichols' Section 603. He was the best and most consistent at coming close to publishing deadlines. Additionally, he most aptly demonstrated the iterative process of strategic planning, producing seven consecutive National Security Strategies. Following his 1996 reelection, Clinton's strategies underwent a title and format change, though they retained all the same elements that comprised his previous plans. Essentially, the strategy remained the same, but was refurbished to update its appeal. Aside from aesthetic considerations, Clinton followed the iterative pattern begun by Reagan and improved by Bush. However, he was to be the last president to do so.

President George W. Bush only produced a single NSS during his first term in office. This was the lowest record for any administration, including Reagan's, which was able to produce two National Security Strategies in his final two years in office. However, understanding the catastrophic events that President Bush faced early in his first term, it may

very easily be assumed that any NSSs produced at this time would have required major revision (if not totally discarded) following the 9/11 terrorist attack. This pardon aside, from the 2002 NSS Bush made it apparent that he was going to alter the entire NSS process. Though his 2002 NSS carried over the basic national interests and values from previous administrations, it did not conform to any of the structural or format models of previous versions. It redefined how national strategy was presented. Furthermore, it very nearly failed in this measure from not continuing the iterative process.

The publication of the 2006 NSS qualified Bush's two strategic plans to meet the seventh tenet by the smallest margin. If he had not been reelected, he would have completely failed to meet this requirement. However, at its most fundamental level, the bridging of the 2002 and 2006 NSS creates an iterative adaptability for President Bush's strategic planning. Delaying the written articulation of strategy to once every four years completely goes against the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols and takes the time span between publications to the limit of being considered iteration. Situations change constantly and can drastically influence strategic planning. As such, a strategic plan loses credibility the longer it goes without an update to account for changing events. Unfortunately, Bush set a new trend in strategic planning by reducing the NSS from an annual reappraisal of strategy to a single strategic statement for each term of office.

At the time of writing this thesis in March of 2012, Barack Obama has followed George W. Bush's lead in creating a single National Security Strategy in his first term.⁴ Obama's 2010 NSS is his only comprehensive publication of national strategy and, going into the beginning of campaign season for his second term, it is very likely that this will be his only NSS for this term. If he fails to be reelected or produce one within the immediate future, he will perpetuate this

downward spiral in the iteration process of strategic planning that began a decade ago under George W. Bush.⁵

Overall, the iterative process provided a method for successfully adapting strategic planning. Maintaining a consistent requirement would help to keep pressure on future administrations to meet the submission deadline, thus continuing the iterative process. Of course, previous administrations have largely disregarded any sort of deadline, but this is where Congress needs to step in and assert its authority. The annual requirement is quite clear in Goldwater-Nichols, and the president should be held accountable for executing the duties prescribed to him under the law.

Additionally, the iterative process produced a positive side effect of causing administrations to consistently review strategy. By reviewing national strategy annually, most presidents transferred the core components of the document (often word-for-word) from one NSS to the next. This created a connection and progression of strategy throughout each president's time in office. Longevity of strategic planning is preferential to ad hoc planning, lending coherence and consistency to the progression. Longevity in planning began with NSC-68. However, until Goldwater-Nichols there was no procedure to ensure that written articulations of strategy would continue with any regularity while maintaining a core structure to give the iterative process a sense of coherence. Goldwater-Nichols sought to correct this aspect of strategic planning by requiring an annual report.

Scholars have also speculated on the annual requirement of Goldwater-Nichols concerning National Security Strategies. Don M. Snider argued that the United States suffers from a failure of long-term planning. According to Snider, long-term planning places a far distant second to immediate concerns of crisis management and urgent policy-planning.

However, he admitted that administrations have been successful in “episodic planning,” or planning for the next 4-6 months. Snider went on to assert that Executive Branch comprehensive strategic planning (he describes the NSS process, but does not call his suggestion by that name) should be undertaken on the first and third years of a president’s administration. He then further clarified, that if no major external events occur to derail the strategy, this comprehensive review may take place only once during the first year of a term.⁶ This contradicts his previous argument that administrations have only been successful at short-term “episodic planning” and have failed to produce long-term strategy. If they have yet to prove able at long-term planning, how does it then seem plausible to conclude that planning should take place even less frequently than it already does?

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Reilly, a U.S. Army Strategist and graduate of the Army War College, largely agreed with Snider’s overall appraisal of the Goldwater-Nichols annual strategic report requirement. He noted that the submission process has a mixed record for success in terms of meeting the annual deadline. This mixed record may result from the limited period facing an incoming administration that has to additionally deal with the complications arising from having to re-staff all of the key cabinet and departmental positions upon entering office. Reilly also contends that the annual submission creates too much work for the administration to deliver a strategic report to Congress on time. Furthermore, a staggering of submission deadlines would allow the administration time to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy it already had in place. Therefore, like Snider, he recommended a biannual submission of the report, except that he changed the deadlines to the second and fourth years of the administration.⁷

While Snider and Reilly’s arguments appear quite convincing at first glance, certain flaws in their logic appear after further analysis. Taking into account George H. W. Bush’s, Bill

Clinton's, George W. Bush's, and Barack Obama's first terms in office, it is apparent that Reilly is correct in noting the lack of success in producing a strategic plan in the first year. It is commonly understood that the first year for any administration is fraught with filling appointments and a huge learning curve for all of the new staff, the president not excluded. Therefore, it may be in the best interest of strategy to give the administration time to settle in and develop its strategic vision before being required to set it in the "unforgiving medium of cold type."⁸

After the correct assertion that first year strategic planning should be avoided, Reilly's argument loses traction. Continually reevaluating strategic planning should not be considered too much work. As previously noted, part of the success of the iterative process is that the core components and vision of strategic plans are carried over from document-to-document in order to establish strategic longevity. Strategic plans necessitate only minor updates from year-to-year; this should not over burden the NSC or other administration strategists. The most difficult NSS to produce would, by this reasoning, be the initial NSS. Accepting Reilly's argument abolishing the first year requirement would give the administration a full year after the January 20 inauguration to develop the initial NSS and to have its submission coincide with the annual budget. Following this logic, each administration could produce three iterative National Security Strategies per term. Furthermore, this would also give the administration a reprieve from having to expend time developing an NSS during what is either a campaign or lame-duck final year. From previous administrations, it is apparent that creating an NSS during this final year rarely occurs and, when it does, it is either a transcription of a previous NSS as in the case of Clinton's 1996 NSS or a complete failure like Bush's 1993 NSS.

Reilly's third argument, that staggering the deadline would result in more accurate appraisals of the effectiveness of an NSS, fails to account for the fact that time continues to move forward even if the strategist pauses. While strategic plans should be evaluated, strategic planning is a constant process of adaptation. This is not a game where participants may be granted extra time to review their plans. As the sixth tenet notes, strategy does not occur in a vacuum; outside actors continue on a course of action even if American strategic planning does not. A strategic plan must be constantly evaluated and redefined to keep up with international events and, ideally, keep ahead of the opponent. Additional time off, while useful for intellectual exercises, may not be a sound argument for strategist-presidents. Furthermore, this becomes an even weaker construct if one accepts Snider's first argument that administrations are only successful in short-term planning. Hypothetically, if results from an evaluation of biannual strategic planning were taken, they would most likely note something along the lines that the NSS was short sighted and lacked longevity from the two-year gap in planning.

Overall, the National Security Strategies succeed from their reevaluations and adaptations to changing events. The iterative process lends a coherence and longevity to strategic planning. While Reilly and Snider were correct that the annual requirement necessitated reassessment, their assertion of its success through biennial publication is misguided. However, Reilly's argument for avoiding strategic planning during the first year and campaign season is well-founded and a fitting recommendation for future success. Reilly also observed that the annual requirement led to mixed results. This is true that most administrations published the documents sporadically (aside from Reagan and Clinton). Part of the reasoning for this has already been addressed. However, it should be noted that if future requirements adopt the NSS publication schedule as proposed here, Congress will need to hold the president accountable for maintaining

the deadline. Congress created the law and it has failed to address the fact that presidents have not abided by it. If future administrations are held responsible for producing strategy according to the recommendations provided, American strategic planning will become a coherent, consistent, and successful process.

Over the course of the last sixty-five years, the American strategy-making process has evolved from an ad hoc process into a well-defined procedure. The National Security Act provided the impetus for ad hoc strategic planning. Goldwater-Nichols offered direction and a system for consistent and successful iterative strategic development. The Tenets of Strategic Planning further qualified American National Security Strategies from 1987 to 2006 as containing the necessary elements to be considered proper strategy.⁹

This thesis presents the strategy-making process as a rather straightforward endeavor. However, strategy is a difficult concept to define and an even more difficult notion to put into practice. Historian MacGregor Knox of the London School of Economics pondered the complexities and pitfalls of the strategy-making process:

Ultimately, makers of strategy must narrow their focus; too much complexity makes the mind seize. At a minimum they must see clearly both themselves and potential adversaries, their strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, and limits – through humility, relentless and historically informed critical analysis, and restless dissatisfaction even in victory. They must weigh imponderables through structured debates that pare away personal, organizational, and national illusions and conceits. They must squarely address issues that are bureaucratic orphans. They must unerringly discern and prepare to strike the enemy's jugular – whether by surprise attack or by attrition, in war or in political and economic struggle. And in the end, makers of strategy must cheerfully face the uncertainties of decision and the dangers of action.¹⁰

Knox illustrates some of the challenges that confront strategists. However, the basic strategic principles discussed in this thesis provide a foundation for creating an effective system that will guide strategists to create proper strategic plans.

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1. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, §603.
 2. Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 2nd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), 5.
 3. Snider noted that “the central, external purpose of the report beyond the Executive Branch is to communicate strategic vision to Congress, and thus legitimize a rationale for resources” in Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 5.
 4. Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010).
 5. A strategic plan produced late in the first term of a single term president will be worthless since the president will have no time to utilize it and the next president will most likely discard it. This was part of the problem with the 1993 NSS.
 6. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 16-18.
 7. Thomas P. Reilly, “The National Security Strategy of the United States: Development of Grand Strategy,” in *A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change*, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 338.
 8. John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” *International Security* 4 (1980): 164.
 9. The 1993 NSS serves as the single exception to the successful development of National Security Strategies.
 10. MacGregor Knox, “Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Making of Strategy,” in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 645.

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APPENDIX A

TENETS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING

1. Strategy must look beyond military force and utilize all available resources.
2. A strategy needs to be plausible in expectations for capabilities and available resources.
3. A plan needs to explicitly define objectives and correlating means.
4. Planning should include short-term and long-term objectives; it should exhibit a longevity that extends beyond crisis-management.
5. A strategist should account for public opinion in developing a strategic plan and anticipate the enemy to do the same.
6. Strategic planning should not occur in a vacuum; a strategist must account for the actions of other actors including allies and enemies.
7. There will always be friction and uncertainty; therefore, strategy should be flexible and adaptable over time.

APPENDIX B

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF

1986: SECTION 603

SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

(a) ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL REPORT. —(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

ANNUAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT

SEC. 104. (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a ‘national security strategy report’).

(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

(b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.

(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.

(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

(c) Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified and unclassified form.

(2) The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103 the following new item:

“Sec. 104. Annual national security strategy report.”

(b) REVISION OF ANNUAL SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT.—Subsection (e) of section 113 (as redesignated by section 101(a) of this Act) is amended to read as follows:

(e)(1) The Secretary shall include in his annual report to Congress under subsection (c)—

(A) A description of the major military missions and of the military force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year;

(B) An explanation of the relationship of those military missions to that force structure; and

(C) The justification for those military missions and that force structure.

(2) In preparing the matter referred to in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall take into consideration the content of the annual national security strategy report of the President under section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 for the fiscal year concerned.