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4-6-2014

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Are There Cracks In The Democratic Peace?

An Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in
Political Science

By
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Under the Mentorship of
Dr. Jamie Scalera

Abstract:

The Democratic Peace Principle is both a well-documented and a heavily scrutinized element of International Relations theory. My research aims to further analyze the principle to determine more precise conditions under which conflict can arise between democratic states. More specifically, my research analyzes the amount of conflict between democratic states of differing military and economic capabilities in order to see if such dyads have different dynamics than dyads with comparable military and economic might. If there are differing degrees of the democratic peace based on factors such as military and economic strength, this could indicate where future wars between democratic states would arise.

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April 2014
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Georgia Southern University

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Georgia Southern University Honors Program and the Georgia Southern Department of Political Science for financial support, as well as my parents for both financial and emotional support. I would also like to thank my classmates and professors in the Honors Program for sharing their ideas about my work and how to improve it and shape it. I also owe a great debt to all of my other professors who have taught me the skills and knowledge that I used in this paper. Most of all, this would not have been possible without my advisor, Dr. Jamie Scalera who managed to advise me while I was on two different continents. Without all of this help, this thesis would not have been possible, and I would like to once again say thank you to all of you.

In 1989, the United States (US) had a civilian fishing vessel come under fire by the Canadian Navy. This action, while a clear breach of state sovereignty, never violated the Democratic Peace Principle, as a war was never declared between the two states.

The Democratic Peace Principle is a staple of International Relations (IR). The principle states that democratic states do not often go to war (Moaz and Russett 1993, p. 624). It is safe to say that the US has long held this belief to be true, as evidenced by the common rhetoric of “making the world safe for democracy,” a saying that originated with Woodrow Wilson (65th Congress, 1 Session, Document No. 5, 1917). While the theory has been in the mainstream of IR theory since at least the 1990s, a new analysis of interstate relations, known as the *Steps to War* approach, has introduced new wrinkles into the analysis process. The *Steps to War* approach states that there are several steps that a dyad, or pair, of states take on the path to war. But even if the Democratic Peace is followed by not declaring war, do states often engage in conflict and violations of state sovereignty by non-belligose methods?

How do we explain these events? Does the *Steps to War* approach provide a new facet to the Democratic Peace, or does it invalidate its principle claim? This research seeks to find out the effect of the steps to war on the Democratic Peace by observing democratic dyadic interactions across differing levels of military might.

Since most of the states that exist and are coming into existence in this age are democratic, at least in principle, it is worth investigating whether the Democratic Peace is striated. Moreover, it is important to investigate if any possible power divisions between democratic states are the origin of conflict between democracies. Is this era of peace between Western democracies the Democratic Peace at work? In light of the heavy-

handed global policies of the United States, especially towards Latin American states and its seemingly constant military presence in the Middle East, this paper will seek to demonstrate that power is still the ultimate factor in international politics, however tempered by the Democratic Peace it may be.

What is the Democratic Peace?

Maoz and Russett's (1993) research compares the validity of structural and normative causes for the Democratic Peace. It concludes that democratic governments have a statistically significant effect on reducing the conflict between two states in a dyad (Maoz and Russett 1993). For the normative causes, the authors contend that the compromising and peacefully competitive nature of democracies lead to the creation of norms that tend to favor negotiation and mediation, rather than zero-sum war. The structural model is based on the speed that public support is mobilized in democratic and non-democratic states. They state that a reason that two democracies do not often go to war is that it takes quite some time for the state to prepare for war (Maoz and Russett 1993). The study reaches the conclusion that the normative reasons for the Democratic Peace may be a better explanation than the structural reasons.

Some authors, such as Bruce Russett (2006), have gone as far back as Ancient Greece to analyze the Democratic Peace. Russett looks at ancient Greek dyads and finds very little peace between the democracies there. He contends that the lack of institutional constraints that are found in modern democracies were a major issue that led to many inter-democratic wars in ancient Greece.

However, Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (1999) argue against some points of the findings of Moaz and Russett (1993). They hold issue with the normative explanation, arguing that the history of democracies engaging in imperialism or “wars that were about subjugation rather than self-preservation” threw a wrench in the normative approach (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999, p. 792). The paper finds that the institutions of democratic states, not norms play a role in the prevention of conflict, especially unwinnable conflict. This is due to the fact that a democratic leader has more pressure to win a war, as a failure will often result in the domestic removal of said leader. Therefore the democratic leader is often more willing to devote more resources towards the war effort in order to survive politically (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999). The paper also concludes that the desire to stay in power leaves even democratic states vulnerable to engaging in imperialist wars of expansion (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999).

Crescenzi and Enterline’s (1999) research finds that the relationship between policy and reductions in interstate violence is a simplification at best. They also found a positive relation of democracy to war when system democracy is low at the global, European and Middle Eastern systems. They also found that casual relationships between system democracy, democratization and war are based on special and temporal elements (Crescenzi and Enterline 1999).

Erik Gartzke argues in “The Capitalist Peace” that the best explanation for peace across democratic states is capitalism, a trait which most democracies share. He argues that states still have the territorial or resource issues that cause most wars, but the development of a global market and the rise of capitalism have made acquiring the

resources peacefully an easier option (Gartzke 2007). His research found no wars between capitalist dyads to go along with no wars between democratic dyads.

Mousseau, Hegre and Oneil (2003) reach the conclusion in their research that the Democratic Peace is indeed based on capitalist trading principles, however they find a caveat in the development of both members of the dyad (Mousseau 2003). The paper concludes that the actual cause of conflict reduction is a result of the development of the dyad, and “if at least one democratic state in a dyad has a GDP per capita of 1400 USD or less, joint democracy is not a significant force for peace (Mousseau, et al. 2003, p. 277).” However, they also note that by the end of 1992, no democratic dyad was underneath that threshold.

In *The Steps to War* by Paul Domenic Senese and John A. Vasquez (2008), the authors outline their steps to war analysis of international relations. The two authors provide evidence that the majority of wars and conflicts begin with a territorial dispute. This dispute sends a dyad of states down the road of power politics, which in turn creates a security dilemma (Senese and Vasquez 2008). This security dilemma can lead to create tension and insecurity between states, which can lead, in turn, to conflict of varying severity from war games to full scale attacks and wars. Nowhere in these steps is a “stop if both states are democratic” option. Democratic states, like all states will come into conflict with each other given the right conditions. Territorial issues are first and foremost when it comes to creating conflict, but other issues such as trade and exploitation of the global commons can also create conflict, even between democracies.

While there is an abundance of literature about the Democratic Peace and its causes, none of the research shows the effect of democracy on non-belligose conflict. The

existing research does show that in modern times war is an especially rare event between democracies, but war is just the tip of the iceberg of conflict. However, wars are not isolated events. As the *Steps to War* approach demonstrates, wars are the culmination of a series of events between states. I aim to find out if democratic states start down the path to war with each other and never let it culminate, or if that path is not even taken by the democratic states.

Power and The Democratic Peace

I theorize that states, being self-interested actors, would only engage in conflict when it is beneficial to them. To be beneficial, these conflicts must be winnable; therefore the conflicts would happen between states of largely differing power levels. The stronger states will go into conflict with the weaker states, and the weaker states would be forced into the conflict, even though it is not likely to result in a victory for them.

US dealings with the democratically elected states in the Global South, especially in Latin America, are a foreign policy issue of prime importance. The importance of the region as a sphere of influence of the United States is evident since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and reaffirmed by the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904. Although there were few, if any democracies in the region when the Doctrine was signed, in later years the United States has taken actions against democratically elected presidents and leaders of states in the Western Hemisphere that it deemed a threat. During and even after the Cold War, when any leader that was left-leaning was considered a threat in an area that America considered to be securely in its sphere of influence, the US has engaged in multiple

disputes and conflicts in and with Latin American democracies (Bulmer-Thomas 1999). Examples, such as Venezuela in 2002 (Campbell 2002), Guatemala in 1954 (Cullather 1999) and Chile in 1970 (Kornbluh 2003) show that even if the US does not engage in open warfare with these democracies, instead it funds and equips groups dedicated to overthrowing the regimes that the US does not view favorably, even if they are democratically elected.

Although the US has reserved the right to intervene in the affairs of the Americas for almost two hundred years, since the early days of the Cold War it became at least partially responsible for the defense affairs of Western Europe with NATO. While this does not carry the same weight as the Monroe Doctrine, during the Cold War both the Monroe Doctrine and NATO were used as tools to slow the advance of communism and communist ideology. However, leftist leaders in Europe, such as Clement Atlee of the United Kingdom or Guy Mollet of France, did not face the threat of a US-backed coup. Why would a democracy engage in conflict-like behavior with other democratic states, when the Democratic Peace suggests otherwise? Can this difference in the security of the political regimes in the different hemispheres be solely explained by the Monroe Doctrine and NATO or rather by the power differential of Latin American states versus those of Western Europe?

The majority of the research on the Democratic Peace Principle seeks to explain why the phenomenon occurs. Instead, my focus will be on trying to discover if there are different degrees of the Democratic Peace between democratic dyads. In a global system where most states are at least nominally democratic, discovering if there are specific

types of democratic states that are drawn into conflict with other democratic states is a relevant and worthy topic.

If the power differential between states has a significant effect on the Democratic Peace Principle, then investigating the causes of striation between democratic states is important for predicting future conflicts and the best way to remedy current intra-democratic issues.

The Democratic Peace Principle as I see it is based upon the principle that democracies rarely go to war because more pressure can be exerted on one state by another without military threats. The reason that democracies do not often engage in all-out war is because the states can relate on their form of government and shared norms as a starting point for negotiations and settlements, not because democracies are intrinsically peaceful or good.

As we saw in the interactions between Angela Merkel and Barack Obama over the US spying program, a leader can influence the decisions made in another country simply by using the power of the other state's electorate against the opposing leader (Smith-Spark 2013). Alternatively, as in the case of several presidents in the Americas, individuals can reach office by running on a platform of resisting foreign influence. This force is more likely to be used dyads where one state militarily dominates the other.

So, what is a democracy? Even the experts disagree. Robert Dahl, in his book *On Democracy*, lists four criteria that a democratic association must meet. He lists that a democratic association must provide the opportunity for effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda and the inclusion of adults (Dahl 1998). To Dahl, these criteria are indispensable for

maintaining a democracy. He clearly states, "...to the extent that any of the requirements is violated, the members will not be politically equal (p. 38)." He then proceeds to apply the criteria to the state as a whole, stating that most democratic institutions were developed for the governance of the state. He adds, however, that no state has ever lived up to the four criteria that are is definition of democracy, and he suspects no state ever will. (Dahl 1998) While these are certainly noble and lofty goals, the fact that no state can fully measure up to the expectations renders these criteria useless, so I needed to turn to a more practical and measurable solution.

In 2002, Andreas Schedler published an article that simplified the world governments between electoral democracies and electoral authoritarianism. He divides governments in this way because most governments hold elections, even if the elections are shams (Schedler 2002). Schedler makes the dividing line with free elections and lists seven criteria the elections must meet in order to be "free." In his eyes, the elections must provide empowerment, free supply, free demand, inclusion, insulation, integrity and irreversibility. This is measureable and states actually met the criteria, however, his data is incredibly hard to replicate and does not extend as far back as I would like to look. So I needed to look for a measurement system that extended far back enough and had all the details I needed.

Larry Diamond stratified world governments into six categories based on their Freedom House scores. His categories were Liberal Democracies, Electoral Democracies, Ambiguous Regimes, Competitive Authoritarian, Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian and Politically Closed Authoritarian. Altogether, the Liberal Democracies and Electoral Democracies made up 104 of 192 states on his list in 2001 (Diamond 2002). I liked the

idea that Diamond had, but was still meeting a stiff roadblock when I tried to look at past data, but luckily, I was able to finally find one that worked for me.

After discovering the EUGene software, I came to the conclusion that the Polity III scores provide the most accurate scores of democracies in the EUGene software. The Polity data measures executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and the competitiveness of the political landscape (Marshall 2012). Its scale provides what I need in terms of measurability and the EUGene software system provided an efficient system by which to sort the information. EUGene helps me sort democracies by a comprehensive, institutional definition of democracy.

Defining and measuring power is the next step for discovering if different levels of power affect the Democratic Peace Principle. In John M. Rothgeb, Jr.'s book, *Defining Power*, Rothgeb's definition of power "variously refers to the nation's total resources, to a specific foreign policy goal, and to the means used to attain goals (p. 10)." However, he warns against relying on the resources definition too much, due to resources giving more of a projection of power rather than actual power. He goes on to say that power requires interdependence between two actors and that "power only exists when actor and target are in conflict with each other (p. 45)." However, resource power is both a statistic that is easily obtainable and measurable, so this research will focus on the resource measurement. As well, Rothgeb's statement about power existing only in conflict does not show the potential of power to deter conflict, a key part of this research.

Giulio M. Gallarotti introduces the idea of "Cosmopolitan Power" in his book, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism*. He defines cosmopolitan power as a theory that takes principles

from the three main schools of international relations thought and combines them into a single, cohesive theory. His theory also combines aspects of soft and hard power. The three signature processes of Cosmopolitan power are soft empowerment, or raising a nation's influence through soft power, hard disempowerment, or avoiding overreliance on hard power, and the superiority of combining hard and soft power without over relying on either. (Gallarotti 2010) However, influence and by extension soft power, are immeasurable variables, so the ability to measure that kind of strength is non-existent.

The Correlates of War project releases the Composite Index of National Capability or CINC numbers that measure a state's military power. The CINC score takes into account total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures of states. This dataset was originally produced by David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey in 1972 and expanded upon by Singer again in the 80s. For the purpose of this research, the resource capabilities of a state are extremely important, as they are hard measurements of capability and data that other states can look at when considering conflict as an option to resolve disputes. Hard power, rather than soft or cosmopolitan power is the type of power this research will focus on.

Hypothesis

I argue that while all states come into conflict occasionally at the global level, how far the dyad progresses down the *Steps to War* is contingent not necessarily on their regime type, but rather on the balance of power between the dyad. States that are not

closely tied the other state(s) in the conflict by lack the power to adequately fend for themselves will progress farther down the steps of war before a resolution is reached.

Therefore, we should expect to see more conflict and violations of state sovereignty between states of differing power levels, even if those states are both democratic.

H1: Democratic dyads with different levels of power are more likely to experience conflict than democratic dyads with similar levels of power, ceteris paribus.

Research Design and Methodology

Using EUGene software, I created two data sets to test my hypothesis. First, I created a dataset for all US dyads in the Western Hemisphere from 1945-1994. Then, I created a dataset for all US and European dyads also from 1945-1994.¹ Each year for each dyad is called a dyad-year. For example, US-UK 1990 is a dyad-year, while US-Canada 1990 is a different dyad-year.

These two regions were selected for several reasons. First, they have a large number of democracies. Second, both regions are areas of particular interest of US foreign policy. In the Western Hemisphere, Latin America is key because of the Monroe Doctrine and Canada is important because of the abundance of trade. In the European theater, American influence is strong because of NATO and the general promotion of democratic anti-communist states during the Cold War. Finally, the difference in military

¹ 1994 is the last year for Polity III data.

power between Europe and the Western Hemisphere provides a good example of how it US relations differ with states of differing military strength.

For each state in the dyad-year, I selected the variables for the Polity III numbers, the CINC score and the highest level of hostility taken. The Polity score was selected because it provides a way to measure *democracy* from 0 (authoritarian) to 10 (democratic); this allowed me to see how democratic the states were during this time. The CINC score shows the military assets and preparedness of each state on a scale of 0-1.0; this allows me to determine the power level of each state in the dyad. I then constructed a measure of *relative power* by subtracting the CINC of each state from the CINC score of the US. This allowed me to see how strong each democracy was in comparison to the United States during the dyad-year in question. This measure of relative power serves as my primary independent variable.

The highest level of hostility on the Correlates of War dataset shows if there was *conflict* between states and how severe the conflict was; the higher the number, the more severe the conflict. For the dyad, I selected the highest action of the dyadic conflict. This measure serves as my primary dependent variable.

For the Western Hemisphere dyad set, there were originally 54544 data points, and after narrowing the data sets down by selecting only US dyads with other democratic states (polity score of 5 or higher)², there were 482 data points that met the criteria.

As for the European-US datasets, there were originally 65503 data points, of which 849 met the criteria.

² I chose a Polity score of 5 because I felt it allowed room to measure many of the transitional democracies that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union in Europe and that are still common in Latin America.

Once I had the specific dyad-year data available from the data, I researched the start and end dates of the conflicts using the COW data and then searched for newspaper articles that corresponded to those dates. These articles allowed me to build case studies. The most accessible articles were from after 1980, so I found two conflicts after the 1980s to use for my European and Western Hemisphere case studies. The case studies provide more insight than just the pure numbers of the research, which can be seen in the case study section.

Findings

The preliminary findings of the research yielded some interesting results. Of the 849 democratic dyad-years in the European theatre that involved the US, there were only 5 dyad-years that had conflict. In fact there were only 3 different European democracies that engaged in conflict with the US: Austria (1960), Switzerland twice (1954, 1959) and Greece twice (1983, 1984).

Table 1: US-Europe Dyads

<i>Dyad Type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Average Power Difference</i>
Conflict	5	0.1950
Peace	844	0.1791
Total	849	0.1792

In the years of their conflict, the 5 democratic states involved in conflict against the United States have a larger difference in CINC scores than the other 844 cases. The difference between the CINC scores of the US and the conflict states in Europe is an average of 0.195019, as compared to the average of 0.179174 for peaceful dyad-years, and 0.179268 for the all democratic dyad-years. These results seem to refute my claim that the states with more similar military capabilities engage in more conflict, as the stronger states stayed out of conflict in Europe.

In the Western Hemisphere dyad sets, where territorial conflict is far more likely to occur, there were 11 democratic dyad-years of conflict involving the US out of a possible 54544 dyad years. Predictably, due to Canada's proximity to the US, most of the conflicts were with the US's northern neighbor, with five of the 11 conflicts occurring between the two states (1974, 1975, 1979, 1989, 1991). The other conflicts involved Chile once (1957), Ecuador (1980, 1981) and Peru (1955, 1962) twice, and Haiti (1994) once.

Table 2: US-Western Hemisphere Dyads

<i>Dyad Type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Average Power Difference</i>
Conflict	11	0.1623
Peace	470	0.1752
Total	481	0.1750

In the Western Hemisphere, dyad-years with conflict happened between the US and democracies with stronger relative CINC scores, but these numbers are skewed due to the preponderance of conflict with the militarily powerful Canadian state.³ That being said, the Western hemisphere follows my theory of the states that are more powerful on average engaging in more conflict with the US.

Case Study: US-Canadian Conflict 1989

Due to the small number of cases that met the criteria of the study, I have chosen to examine individual cases to show the nature of many of the conflicts that were found in the research.

The most severe conflicts between the United States and another democratic state in the Western Hemisphere occurred between the United States and Canada. To the casual observer, this may seem odd as the relationship between the two northernmost states in the Americas is regarded as one of the most peaceful in the world. However, in the literature of the *Steps to War* approach, territorial conflict is the first step towards a war.

One of the most severe conflicts between the two states occurred in 1989, when a Canadian destroyer actually fired upon a US fishing vessel. The vessel, *Concordia*, was found 2.5 miles inside Canadian waters and was intercepted by the Canadian destroyer *Saguenay* which, according to Canadian officials, attempted to hail the ship by all means possible (Hays 1989). When the vessel refused to yield, the captain of the destroyer

³ Canada's average CINC score during its conflicts with the US is 0.012248, all other Western states in conflict with the US have an average CINC score of 0.002098

rammed the boat three times, damaging both the destroyer and the fishing vessel. After ramming yielded no results, warning shots were fired from both a small machine gun and one of the 3-inch guns. The *Concordia* eventually yielded to the destroyer, but not after suffering \$20,000 worth of damage from the ramming (Hays 1989).

The conflict was brought about by a variety of issues, including a strike by civilian employees of the Canadian Navy, the absence of the Canadian scalloping fleet due to quota restrictions and an increase of incursions by American fishermen into Canadian waters. American fishermen were already upset about a ruling by the International Court of Justice that gave the most fertile fishing areas in the Gulf of Maine to the Canadians (US Fishing Vessels Test Canada's Patience 1989). This combination of events led to unusually high tensions between American civilian fishermen and the Canadian Navy in charge of maintaining the maritime border.

While there was tension between the two states over the use of the Gulf of Maine, this conflict was in reality an isolated incident that was an infrequent occurrence. Most US fishing vessels were not fired upon if they wandered into Canadian waters, and most US boats did not refuse to yield to Canadian authorities if a mistake was made. While both the Canadian and American ambassadors to the other country may have had a rough day in the office, there was no lingering damage to US-Canadian relations. However, if the two states wanted to use the incident as a spark plug to war, they could have done so.

This does not confirm my hypothesis of weaker states being more susceptible to acts of conflict from the stronger states due to Canada's CINC score being lower than the US during this conflict. In fact, Canada is credited with starting the conflict due to the state destroyer firing at the US vessel, which was privately owned. What this case does

demonstrate, however, is that conflict is possible between two democracies when they follow down the *Steps to War* path, regardless of regime type or power. However, the Canadian military engaged in a winnable conflict (destroyer versus unarmed civilian vessel) when it was beneficial to the state (maintenance of territorial integrity), fitting with qualifications for conflict I laid out earlier.

Case Study: US-Greek Conflict 1983-1984

Not all conflicts involve direct action between two states. Policies and words can cause conflicts just as easily as guns. An example of this less violent type of conflict between two states is that of Greece and the US between May 20, 1983 and March 10, 1984 according to the COW data. This is the longest lasting conflict between two states in the data, so it is important to see what makes this different than most of the one-day conflicts in the data. Unlike the Canadian case which constituted an “attack” where the military was directly involved in forcing a US citizen to surrender control of his vessel, the Greek case was only an “alert,” where the government officially protested against US action and warned against any future incursions into its airspace, despite the two countries’ NATO membership. The Correlates of War project rates the severity of the events, with an attack being a “16” and an alert an “8.” Even though this example is technically in two dyad-years due to the timing of the event, it is only one conflict.

The Greek prime minister at the time was the US-educated former economics chair of Berkley, Andreas Papandreou. Despite his many ties to the US, Papandreou was perceived by many to be both anti-American and anti-NATO (Kamm 1985).

The alert was not due to solely one action or escalation, it was a string of events that made Greek-American relations tense. According to the Correlates of War data, the conflict began on May 20, 1983 when the Greek government lodged an official protest against the United States and Turkey for violating its airspace during joint NATO operations in the Aegean (Greece Protests to U.S. Over Airspace Violations 1983). This protest came in part because Greece felt that the US was favoring Turkey, a longtime rival of Greece, and that the US had too much influence in Greece (Kamm 1985). And this protest came only months after the Reagan administration proposed increasing aid for Turkey so it could upgrade its military at a greater rate than the aid to Greece would be increased (Henze 1983). For much of the next year, US and Turkish planes and ships were banned from Greek airspace and waters for peacekeeping in Lebanon. The situation was further complicated when the Greeks allowed Soviet ships access to their ports at the same time that the US was banned and refused to condemn the Soviets for shooting down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in September of 1983. In August of 1983, Papandreou also proposed a six-month delay in deploying American nuclear missiles in Europe to the European Economic Council and started planning to remove US nuclear stockpiles in Greece (Howe 1983). The US lodged a protest against the Greek government when the Communist party of Greece published an article saying that the US was behind a string of recent bombings in Greece (Greece Rejects Protest by US Embassy 1983). These events prevented any de-escalation of tensions between the two democracies, which prolonged the alert status between the two states.

The end of this conflict coincides with the conclusion of an investigation by the Greeks into an incident with Turkey in the Aegean Sea, where a Greek destroyer was

allegedly fired upon by two Turkish vessels (News Summary; Saturday March 10, 1984 International). Since the Greeks felt that the US and Turks were aligned against them (despite the NATO membership of the triad), due to the US support of the military junta in Greece in the 1960s and 70s and the US refusing to condemn the Turkish presence in Cyprus, a decrease in tensions with Turkey meant a decrease in tensions with the US.

This example shows that not all of the conflicts are relatively simple incidents, like the example in Canada. The conflict between Greece and the US was long and drawn out and had influences from the democratic Turkish state and by the political leadership of Greece. The third-party Turkey, which was also receiving US support, complicates the dyad-year relationship between Greece and the US, as the Greeks took offense to the US involvement and support of Turkey at a greater rate than themselves, so any analysis of just two states in this case study cannot give the full picture. With US operations in the Mediterranean hindered by the actions of the Greek government and its nuclear prowess in Eastern Europe threatened with diminishment, was it the Democratic Peace that prevented a conflict between these two states or is there a more realist explanation?

Papandreou actually extended the leases on US military bases in Greece in July 1983, technically when the two states were in conflict, even though he spoke often about the preponderance of US influence in the country. Considering his popularity in the country, he may have been using this alert just to build up his own support and to secure a better rent for the bases.

But most importantly, the US was only a peripheral player in a much greater conflict between geopolitical rivals Turkey and Greece, two states with much smaller militaries than the US during the conflict. Greece smartly used the strategic value of its

relationship with the US to make sure that it did not get left behind in foreign aid and military size in comparison to Turkey. While this does not prove my theory that states with similar capabilities will go to war more often, it does show that states will engage in conflict mainly when it is a winnable situation. Even though any sort of offensive military action would go poorly for Greece against both the US and Turkey, engaging in a conflict via political maneuvering was certainly a conflict the government could win.

The Greek government had a moment of power when it could use its clout by negotiating the status of the US bases in Greece and also by way of its appointment to head the European Economic Council during the last half of 1953 to improve its standings versus Turkey, and it took advantage of the situation by getting profitable price for the US bases in Greece as well as influencing US and NATO policy to potentially hinder Turkish military upgrades. Another important discovery is that weaker countries can and will antagonize larger ones if the head of state feels it will lead to more political clout, Greece both pushed the buttons of the hugely powerful USA and of Turkey, which had a military three times Greece's size. If I were to expand my dataset to include all democratic dyads from 1945-1994, a conflict between Greece and Turkey during this time probably would show up. Focusing on just the US cases limits the possible data in this regard.

An important note to make about all of the European cases in general: All five conflicts between the US and the European democracies happened during the Cold War with states that were trying to be neutral. Switzerland is famously neutral in almost every conflict, Austria declared its permanent neutrality shortly after WWII, and Greece, while a member of NATO was famously non-partisan under the leadership of Papandreou. All

of these states considered that a conflict with the US was preferable than appearing to be partisan towards US interests.

Conclusion

I proposed that conflict would be more common between democratic states with highly differing power levels. To investigate my theory, I examined the world's most powerful democracy, the US, and European and Western democracies. What I found was that conflict is more common between democratic states than war, but is still relatively infrequent. With less than 20 incidents between US and other Western democracies between 1945 and 1994 representing only 1.2% of all democratic dyad-years, it is safe to say that conflict is not the norm for these dyads.

Still, these conflicts are much more frequent than the Democratic Peace Principle might otherwise suggest. Unfortunately, the study of power levels did not suggest that power played much of a factor in influencing how far conflict progressed. Instead, I discovered that territorial issues, as demonstrated in the *Steps to War approach*, are an important cause of conflict between democracies.

Moving forward, I can expand my research to include a greater number of dyad-years and regions by looking at all democratic dyads, not just those involving the US and Europe/Western Hemisphere. This would allow for more conflict data to be analyzed and provide a greater sample size. However, the data that would be the most useful for future research into this subject is yet to be compiled. A dataset of covert actions taken by states against one another would be extremely useful to go along with the COW data that tracks

overt conflict. The very nature of covert conflict makes it difficult to record, especially when the records of many activities are kept sealed for decades. Nonetheless, it would be a great benefit to the field for that information to be compiled.

Democratization is a very popular topic for the foreign policy makers of the United States. In states such as Syria, Egypt and Libya, democracy is thrown around as a solution for the problems of the states and in Europe, referendums regarding the future of regions in their current states in Catalonia, Scotland and Crimea have caused many to question if there is such a thing as too much democracy. As demonstrated in the Greek case study, leaders that are democratically elected can still cause issues for the US. Papandreou, despite all of his ties to the US, was at times very tough on his rhetoric and unafraid to align himself with the Soviet Union in order to better the lives of his people and the role of Greece in international politics.

Many of the Greek population's issues with the US stemmed from the US support of the junta in Greece. If the US had remained committed to promoting democratic processes, regardless of the political leanings of those elected, there may have never been a conflict between Greece and the US. It is tempting for the US to support or continue supporting despots who are friendly to the US government rather than taking a chance with a potentially anti-American elected dictator, Saudi Arabia and pre-Arab Spring Egypt are two examples of this. The US should continue to promote democracy worldwide, without exempting favorable dictators.

Additionally, the US should make sure that it maintains good relationships, both diplomatically and economically with as many states as possible, but especially its neighbors. Despite the plethora of conflicts with Canada, the US still maintains the

world's longest unguarded border with our northern neighbor due to the good relations between the two states. Territorial conflict and disputes are major factors that can escalate quickly and dangerously, as is evident in the dispute between China and Japan over the islands in the South China Sea. It is highly unlikely that an incident like the Canadian case study would go over nearly as well between China and Japan at this point in time. But if both states can be expected to act in a self-interested manner like the other states in the case studies, the escalation of the conflict can be avoided by making the cost too great. The current administration's goal to move more of the US military force to the Pacific, combined with the obligation of the US to defend Japan is already starting to make a conflict look like a dangerous possibility for the Chinese.

As far as US military might goes, the US has every reason to continue to be the world's foremost military power. The ability to protect the commercial interests of the US and maintaining national border integrity are two abilities too valuable to lose. As well, the US military's foreign presence is oftentimes an economic boon for the host country and its rapid-response disaster relief is an example of the US using a different kind of power than military to influence world events. However, the US should try to avoid getting too involved in the foreign affairs of other states, especially if those affairs do not directly involve the US. As was demonstrated in the Greek case study, the US never wanted to get involved in a Turkish-Greek dispute, but because of its military presence and aid packages to the two rival states, the US was dragged into the conflict.

This research is significant because it combines two of the newer and more exciting theories in the field of International Relations by using the *Steps to War* to analyze the Democratic Peace. Predicting future conflicts is a way of preventing future

conflict, so determining when conflict can occur between democratic states is paramount, especially in this era of worldwide democratization.

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