Rent Seeking in Successive Monopoly: The Case of Casino Gambling in New Orleans
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-2014
Publication Title
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
DOI
10.14441/eier.110103
Abstract
This study explores how rent seeking in the U.S. casino gambling industry relates to unique issues concerning industry structure. To do so, we apply mathematical and graphical approaches from industrial economics to the history of land-based casino gambling in New Orleans, Louisiana, a history that includes public franchising, successive monopoly, vertical separation and integration, and rent seeking costs. Our conceptual approach highlights how local governments can gain advantages over higher forms of government (e.g., state government) in rent seeking contests.
Recommended Citation
Mixon, Franklin G. Jr., Rand Ressler.
2014.
"Rent Seeking in Successive Monopoly: The Case of Casino Gambling in New Orleans."
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 11 (1): 41-51.
doi: 10.14441/eier.110103
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/econ-facpubs/49
